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INTRODUCTION 
The Debate 
The broad aim of this thesis is to try and answer the question 
of why people act as they do - why they act in one way rather 
than another and what influences them in their decisions to 
perform certain actions. I want to stress at the outset that in 
referring to actions I am making a distinction between the 
activities of agents which are intentional and mere 'behaviour' 
which can be seen in terms of reflex bodily movements or things 
that 'just happen' to agents (as in the case of accidents). 
As a sociologist such an analysis is of vital importance in the 
explanations we try to formulate concerning not only the 
actions of individuals, but their relationships with each other 
and with the society of which they are members. For example, 
if we take the view that people act as a result of purely 
'subjective' motives, desires, reasons, and so on, then our 
methods of enquiry will concentrate purely on the reasons 
agents themselves give for their actions. If, on the other 
hand, we see the explanation of actions lying in the notion of 
social rules determining the actions of individuals then the 
'subjective' reasons of actors have little significance. 
(2) 
It was to an examination of these, seemingly, diametrically 
opposed views that my attention was first drawn. Should we 
explain actions in terms of the 'internal' reasons of the 
agents; should we explain them in terms of socially constructed 
rules or other forms of societal influences; or should action 
explanations be seen in terms of both internal reasons and 
external factors? The other area to be examined is what the 
status of action explanations should be. That is, can actions 
be explained in terms of cause and effect or does the fact that 
people are actors capable of thinking and deliberating, unlike 
the subjects studied in the natural sciences, render causal 
analysis in sociology inappropriate? In order to try and 
answer these questions I shall divide this thesis into four 
main areas of discussion. 
Action as Rule-Governed Behaviour 
In the first place, I will question the notion, advocated most 
strongly by Winch, that actions must be seen as rule-governed. 
Thus, I shall examine what is involved in the notion of 
following a rule. In Winch, it is suggested that the actions 
of individuals should be explained in terms of socially 
constructed and sanctioned rules. That is, all 'meaningful' 
behaviour (action) is 'ipso facto' rule-governed and that there 
(3) 
can be no private rules of conduct since these rules are the 
product of the society of which the individual is a member. 
There are, as we shall see, a number of problems associated 
with such a conception of action. 
One of the most fundamental implications of such a view, in 
terms of our interests here, is that people seem to cease to be 
active agents - they become like 'puppets' who make no 
subjective decisions concerning their own actions. Whilst 
Winch argues for an interpretative understanding of the actions 
of agents and stresses the importance of the subjective motives 
of these agents, when we examine his claims in more detail we 
begin to see that this stress on socially constructed rules in 
fact implies that agents are merely responding to the dictates 
of the social structure to which they belong. What then, I 
ask, happens to 'agency'? Are we not back to the positivist 
idea that people's beliefs, attitudes, desires, motives, and so 
on, are really determined by social structures over which they 
have little or no control? This is the type of explanation I 
want to question, although, as will become clear, I do not want 
in any way to exclude the influence of social or other external 
factors on the actions of agents. But, neither do I want to 
argue that such factors actually determine actions in any 
(4) 
mechanistic way. Instead, I am going to argue that action 
explanations should be given in terms of reason which does not 
necessarily presuppose the notion of rules. Before considering 
in more detail the idea of reasons as explanations of action, 
however, I want to examine to what extent reasons can be seen 
as 'causes of action' 
Reasons as Causes of Action 
The essential point I want to make in part two, is that reasons 
must be seen as causes of action if reasons are to explain 
actions at all. In saying this, however, I am going to argue 
for a rejection of the Humean notion of causality in explaining 
natural as well as social phenomena. In Hume, to say that 'A' 
is caused by 'B' is to say that the temporal succession of 'A' 
and 'B' is an instance of a generalisation to the effect that 
events like 'A' are always followed by events like W. Such a 
conception of causality obviously cannot be applied to human 
action. It is patently the case that generalisations which 
connect reasons to actions cannot be made into the kinds of 
laws advocated by Hume. Nor can we say that the same cause or 
reason will always result in the same effect or action since 
agents live in 'open' systems whereas Hume's model only applies 
to phenomena that exist in 'closed' systems. Thus, it is not 
(5) 
surprising that many objections have been made to seeing 
reasons as causes if we conceive of causes in a Humean way. 
However, I shall argue that this conception of causal analysis 
is not the only one nor, necessarily, one which is always 
applicable to the functioning of natural mechanisms let alone 
social phenomena. 
As an introduction to this section, I will briefly outline the 
theoretical arguments concerning the idea that the explanation 
of action should be in terms of reasons and that reasons should 
be seen as the product of desires plus beliefs. This 
conception of reasons is one that is put most forcefully by 
writers such as Davidson and Hollis. Davidson argues that a 
reason consists of a pro-attitude towards an action and a 
belief that the action is of that kind. Hollis, in a similar 
way, maintains that a reason consists of a desire and a related 
belief. Both argue that when we examine reasons we should take 
both pro-attitudes or desires and beliefs into account. This 
idea is important since, as Hollis argues, beliefs and desires 
may not always correspond with each other and that the former 
may, in some cases, serve to modify or go against the latter. 
In other words, in explaining the action of an individual we 
must try and discover what his or her internal desires and 
beliefs are - these, then, constitute the reason the agent had 
(6) 
for acting (or not acting) in a certain way. Here, then, we 
have an explanation of action whereby agents are seen to make 
decisions based on their own desires and beliefs. They are not 
seen to be acting purely on the basis of adherence to socially 
prescribed rules as Winch argued. It is then possible to 
analyse what the status of reason-explanations are - if we 
accept the notion that reasons are seen as the product of 
desires plus beliefs - that is, can they be seen as causal in a 
sense different to that argued by Hume. 
It is here that I introduce the works of Bhaskar and his 
conception of causal analysis which he applies both to the 
natural and the social sciences. Bhaskar maintains that causal 
laws are, in fact, tendencies. They should be seen as the 
tendencies of things which may be possessed unexercised and 
exercised unrealised, just as they may be realised unperceived 
by people. Thus, in this view, in citing a law we are 
referring to the activity of mechanisms as such and not making 
a claim about the outcome which will be co-determined by the 
activity of other mechanisms. 
This idea of causes as tendencies can, I will suggest, 
reconcile the fact that agents act in open systems where there 
are no constant conjunctions of events with causal explanations 
(7) 
of actions in terms of reasons. What will be argued is that 
the possession of a reason seen, as Bhaskar suggests, as a more 
or less long-standing orientation to act in a certain way can 
be seen as a cause. If we see causes as tendencies then they 
are clearly distinct from actions because they can be possessed 
unexercised and will only be exercised under suitable 
conditions. It seems to me, therefore, that there are two 
fundamental aspects of the role of reasons as causes of action. 
Firstly, that agents having certain sets of beliefs and desires 
will 'tend' to act in certain ways on the basis of these 
desires and beliefs. Secondly, however, these can only be 
analysed as 'tendencies' since they are defeasible in special 
circumstances or under the pressure of countervailing reasons. 
This idea of reasons as tendencies, however, raises the 
fundamental issue I wish to address. That is, whilst the idea 
that reasons are the product of the desires and beliefs of the 
agent allows us to let 'agency' back in to action-explanations 
(and so we avoid the 'over socialised' view of man as advocated 
by Winch), have we gone too far in the other direction? Can we 
really argue that the explanation of all the actions of 
individuals should be seen in purely 'subjective' terms? Can 
(8) 
we exclude social, cultural or structural factors when 
explaining action? I am going to argue that this is also a 
mistake. 
Reasons as Explanations of Action - The Three Categories 
Whilst I agree that we should explain actions in terms of 
reasons I do not want to suggest that reasons are only 
'internal' to the agents concerned. Rather, that while some 
reasons may be so, in many cases external factors may serve to 
modify actions. Thus, I shall consider how 'emergent 
properties' can condition, help form, or modify the reasons of 
individual agents. In an attempt to do this, I am going to 
propose three fundamental categories of reason-formation which, 
as I shall suggest, are not in any way static or fixed as to 
their boundaries. Thus, I suggest that reasons can be: (i) 
internal - the agent's own reasons not influenced by any 
external factors; (ii) appropriated - where the agent 
appropriates reasons from their society or culture and then 
internalises them and makes them his or her own; and (iii) 
external - reasons which are not the agent's own but which 
serve to influence his or her actions by acting as constraints 
on their desired action or as facilitators of that action. It 
is to be my contention that: (i) is contra-Winch; (ii) is 
(9) 
consonant with Hollis' view; but (iii) is my own contribution 
which challenges the adequacy of either (i) or (ii) alone, and 
is held necessary to supplement categories (i) and (ii) which 
are inadequate without the addition of category (iii). I shall 
argue that in many cases of explanations of actions in terms of 
reasons we must take into account both the internal reasons of 
the agents and the influences of external factors - whether 
appropriated or constraining/facilitating - on the decisions of 
agents to act in one way rather than another. 
However, in examining the influence of external factors on the 
reasons of agents - even in the case of category (iii) factors 
-I do not want to argue that 'subjectivity' is of little or no 
importance. One fundamental area, in this section, therefore, 
is the question of whether all reason explanations have to have 
a 'subjective' aspect. It is to be my contention that the 
answer to this question is 'yes'. In the first place, even 
when considering external constraining factors I will argue 
that it is still the agent's subjective choice of whether or 
not to abide by the constraints they impose (for example, 
people can and do break laws). Instead of seeing external 
factors as determinants of action I want to suggest that we 
should analyse the effects of these factors in terms of 
(lo) 
'opportunity costs' - the price an agent is willing to pay to 
fulfil their desires and beliefs taking into account the 
situation in which they find themselves. 
Another aspect I will examine is the proposal that we can act 
in terms of 'unconscious' motives which would imply that the 
agent is not acting in terms of his or her own reasons but 
rather as a result of motives or reasons of which they cannot 
be aware. The question here is, do we have to be aware of the 
reasons for our actions for them to constitute our reasons for 
our actions? Here I am going to argue that agents, in general, 
are aware of their reasons (although this does not always 
involve full discursive penetration) and that even if the 
reason the agent gives for his or her action may appear to us 
to be 'irrational', based on false information, badly thought 
out, and so on, this does not mean that such a reason is not 
the agent's own reason. Such reasons, therefore, even if the 
agent later becomes aware, at some time in the future, through 
a process of learning, that they were not 'good' reasons should 
be seen as providing an adequate explanation of the action of 
that agent, at the particular time in question. 
Having outlined how I perceive reasons to be formed in terms of 
the three categories, the final chapter is concerned with how 
these can be applied to Bhaskar's notion of reasons as causes. 
(11) 
My contention is that it is possible to account for both 
tendencies and external factors in the explanation of human 
action by using these categories and thereby we are able to 
give all explanations of action in terms of reasons. In other 
words, tendencies can be explained in terms of category (i) or 
(ii) reasons with external factors bringing into the 
explanation category (iii) reasons. The fact that I have 
emphasised external categories as 'reasons' is that I do not 
want to perceive them in any 'deterministic' way. Yes, there 
are external factors that do not involve the agent in any 
'subjective' choice of whether or not to act in accordance with 
them - that is, things that just happen to agents as in the 
case of accidents or reflex movements. But, I will argue that 
this is not what we are referring to when talking in terms of 
meaningful action. In other words, the concept of external 
category (iii) reasons involves more than just 'behaviour', it 
involves the agent weighing up costs in the light of the 
situations in which they find themselves. Reasons, however, 
should be seen as 'causes' of action if causes are seen as 
tendencies. An agent may have the tendency to act in a certain 
way based on his internal beliefs and desires, and yet thete 
ndencies not be manifested in overt action because of 'other' 
reasons which derive from an external source. In strict 
parallel, observed regularities in action patterns, especially 
(12) 
of large groups, may be due to the constancy of external 
factors (to their consistent tendencies) rather than to 
internal dispositional tendencies of actors (that is, their 
constant desires and beliefs). 
Of fundamental importance in my arguments concerning reason- 
formation in terms of my three categories is that we are able 
to conclude that the internalist/externalist debate is somewhat 
limited in arguing that reasons are only internal or only 
external to the agent. This is brought out clearly in the last 
part of the thesis when we consider how other theorists have 
viewed action-explanations. 
Methodological Comparisons 
The final section involves an analysis of how various theorists 
have perceived the relationship between structure and agency 
and the ways in which this has influenced their approach to the 
explanation of action. I shall begin with the holist account 
of Durkheim and argue that his stress on 'social facts' results 
in his only being able to explain actions in terms of something 
like category (iii) reasons. We thus lose any notion of the 
'subjective' reasons agents have for their actions. In 
opposition to this, the second chapter deals with 
(13) 
methodological individualism as endorsed in and illustrated 
here by rational choice theorists. I shall argue that their 
notion that reasons are the product of desires alone means that 
their analysis is limited only to category (i) reasons; and, 
further, that these internal reasons are wrongly perceived as 
not including the beliefs of the agent as well as his or her 
desires. 
The last chapter examines the attempt by Hollis to re-work the 
idea of rational choice theory in order to introduce some 
notion of external reasons for actions. Whilst this theory is 
less extreme than the two arguments previously discussed, it is 
to be my contention that Hollis' account is also restrictive in 
the sense (a) that his conception of external factors only 
really refers to category (ii) appropriated reasons thus 
ignoring category (iii) reasons; and (b) that in arguing 
against the idea of reasons as being only explicable in terms 
of desires, he takes the issue too far and fails to take 
account of the possibility that reasons for actions  ay be 
internal (category (i)) reasons (albeit in a different way from 
that claimed by rational choice theorists). 
The fundamental aim of this section, therefore, is to 
demonstrate that these theorists, by limiting their accounts to 
only one 'type' of reason, produce a restricted and inadequate 
(14) 
account of action. Further, that by allowing that reasons may 
be formed on the basis of category (i), (ii), or (iii) factors 
(or a combination of these categories) we can view the well- 
worn internalist/externalist debate in a new light. We do not, 
in other words, need to argue that just because we accept that 
reasons can be internal to the agent, that we should reject any 
notion of externality and vice versa. The debate should not be 
in terms of either one type of reason or another, rather we 
should be examining what has influenced the formation of 
reasons agents have for their actions which could involve one, 
two or all of my three categories. 
PART ONE 
ACTION AS RULE-GOVERNED BEHAVIOUR 
Before commencing with this examination of what Winch means by 
rule-governed behaviour, I want briefly to outline the reasons 
why I considered this idea as an important starting point for 
an analysis of how we can explain actions. Winch, in response 
to more positivist thinkers such as Durkheim, wanted to argue 
for a subjective understanding of human action in terms, as he 
himself stated, of the reasons or motives of the agents in 
question. Thus, he rejected the idea that social phenomena 
should be treated in the same way as natural phenomena and the 
notion that the methodology of the natural sciences could be 
equally applicable to the social sciences. Of particular 
importance in this idea of interpretative sociology and a 
subjective explanation of action was the contention that social 
structures should not be seen as determinants of human action 
(as writers such as Durkheim seemed to imply). 
Yet, when Winch's ideas are examined in more detail it emerges 
that in speaking of socially constructed and sanctioned rules, 
he was, in fact, also emphasising the social at the expense of 
the subjective reasons of agents. This raised two fundamental 
questions. What was it in Winch's analysis that resulted in 
(16) 
this seeming contradiction whereby while stressing that it is 
important to examine actions in terms of the 'subjective' 
motives of agents, he then proceeded to produce a rather 
'oversocialised' view of man?; and was it possible to 
incorporate some of the important insights of Winch into a 
theory of action which avoided seeing action as socially 
determined while also allowing for the influence of social 
factors on individual agents? In order to answer these 
questions we need to examine, in detail, the basic claims made 
by Winch in order to bring out what, in my view, are the 
positive aspects of his ideas; and also to assess what the 
implications are of seeing action in terms of rule-governed 
behaviour. It would then be possible to explain why I want to 
argue that reasons involve more than simply the following of 
rules. 
CHAPTER ONE 
WHAT IT IS TO FOLLOW A RULE 
Introduction 
Winch begins his analysis of the role of sociology by examining 
the relationship between science and philosophy. He argues 
that whereas the scientist investigates the nature, causes and 
effects of particular real things and processes, the 
philosopher is concerned with the nature of reality as such and 
in general. The question of 'What is real? ', for Winch, 
involves the problem of man's relation to reality. Thus, we 
must ask whether the mind of man can ever have contact with 
reality and, if it can, what difference this will make to his 
life. Essential to Winch's subsequent arguments here is that 
this is not an empirical question but a conceptual one. It has 
to do with the force of the concept of reality and cannot be 
understood in terms of the preconceptions of experimental 
science or answered by generalising from particular instances 
because a particular answer to this question is already implied 
in the acceptance of these instances as real. (1) 
For Winch, the question of whether reality is intelligible 
involves asking about the relation between thought and reality. 
In considering the nature of thought, he suggests, we are led 
(18) 
to consider the nature of language - that is, the question of 
how language is connected with reality, of what it is to say 
something. (2) Taking an idea from Wittgenstein, Winch 
concludes that in discussing language we are discussing 'what 
counts as belonging to the world' and thus the problems of 
philosophy arise out of language. Our idea of what belongs to 
the realm of reality is given for us in the language we use - 
the concepts we have decide for us the form of experience we 
have of the world. The world is for us what is presented 
through these concepts, and while they may change, when they do 
our concept of the world has also changed. (3) 
In view of this, argues Winch, the theoretical issues raised in 
philosophy should be settled by 'a priori' conceptual analysis 
rather than by empirical research (which, as we will see later, 
is an argument that constitutes the basis for his rejection of 
causal analysis in the realm of actions explanations). In other 
words, the concepts we have decide for us the experience we 
have of the world and that the sociologist's understanding 
involves understanding these concepts rather than seeing what 
empirical research may show us (indeed, for Winch, this would 
be concept-mediated anyway - on his view it could not show 
anything independent of concepts). (4) This, for Winch, is 
fundamental to how we understand human action. 
(19) 
The Importance of Context in Understanding 
The vital philosophical question here, for Winch, is that 
regarding the nature of intelligibility of reality - what it is 
to understand something. The notion of intelligibility, argues 
Winch, is systematically ambiguous. Its sense varies according 
to the context in which it is being used. Thus, for example, 
scientists, historians, religious prophets, etc., all try to 
make the world intelligible but in many ways their objectives 
are very different. (5) Here then we begin to see Winch's 
emphasis on the importance of context in understanding action. 
However, as will be discussed subsequently, there are a number 
of problems involved here, not least that taken to its logical 
conclusion it leads to a form of relativism that seems to 
undermine the role of sociology itself. 
To return to Winch, though, and how we can understand social 
life. People, he suggests, decide how they will behave on the 
basis of their view of what is the case in the world around 
them. What then is involved in having such knowledge and what 
is the general nature of behaviour which is decided in 
accordance with this knowledge? Understanding, for Winch, 
depends on our recognition of the 'prima facie' importance of 
understanding the situation in which one lives one's life. We 
(20) 
must show why such an understanding has importance in a 
person's life by showing what is involved in having it. To 
answer the question of how understanding is possible it is 
necessary to show the central role which the concept of 
understanding plays in the activities of human societies. 
According to Winch, people's social relations with other people 
are permeated with their ideas about reality. In fact, social 
relations are expressions of ideas about reality. We must, 
therefore, enquire into the nature of man's knowledge of 
reality and the difference such knowledge can make to human 
life. (6) 
Linguistic Rule-Following 
It is at this point that Winch introduces the Wittgensteinian 
idea of what it is follow a rule. It must be noted that at 
this stage Winch is talking in terms of linguistic rule- 
following, but he is later to apply this to the explanation and 
understanding of human action. Winch begins with, what he 
terms, an obvious 'prima facie' case of the mind's contact with 
reality. Suppose, he suggests, I am wondering when Everest was 
first climbed and explicitly express my thoughts that 'Mount 
Everest was climbed in 1953'. What is it about the words 
'Mount Everest' which makes it possible to say I mean by those 
(21) 
words a certain peak in the Himalayas? A natural answer is 
that I am able to mean what I do because the word has been 
defined to me. I have had Everest pointed out to me; I have 
been told its name is Everest; and in virtue of those actions 
in the past I am able to mean by those words that peak in the 
Himalayas. However, a further question has to be asked - what 
is the connection between those acts of the past and my 
utterance of the word which gives the utterance the meaning it 
has? What is it to follow a definition? A superficial answer 
to this is that the definition lays down the meaning and to use 
a word in its correct meaning is to use it in the same way as 
that laid down by the definition. What is it, though, asks 
Winch, to use a word in the same way as that laid down by the 
definition? Suppose, for example, that the word 'mountain' 
rather than 'Everest' was being defined when that peak was 
pointed out to me. In that case too my grasp of the correct 
meaning of the word 'mountain' would be manifested in my 
continuing to use it in the same way as that laid down by the 
definition, yet the correct use of the word 'mountain' is not 
the same as the correct use of the word 'Everest'. (7) 
It appears, therefore, argues Winch, that the word 'same' is an 
example of systematic ambiguity - we cannot know whether two 
things are the same or not unless we know the context in which 
(22) 
the question arises. There is, in fact, no absolute, 
unchanging sense to the words 'the same'. It is only in terms 
of a given rule that we can attach a specific sense to the 
words 'the same'. In this way, asking what it is for a word to 
have a meaning leads on to the question of what it is for 
someone to follow a rule. On the face of it, someone could be 
said to be following a rule if he always acts in the same way 
on the same kind of occasion. This, though, does not advance 
matters since it is only in terms of a given rule that the 
words 'the same' have sense. In what circumstances, therefore, 
for Winch, does it make sense to say that someone is following 
a rule? 
Suppose, he suggests, that the word 'Everest' has been defined 
to me and I settle its future use by deciding that I vill use 
this word only to refer to this mountain. This is perfectly 
intelligible, but, argues Winch, it is presupposing that whose 
very possibility we are investigating. It does not matter how 
emphatically I point out this mountain and utter the words 
'this mountain', my decision still has to be applied in the 
future. It is, then, what is involved in this application 
which is in question. What is the difference between someone 
who is really applying a rule and someone who is not? (8) 
(23) 
Winch answers this question by arguing that in following a rule 
we must take account not only of the actions of the person 
involved but also the reactions of other people to what they 
do. Thus, it is only in a situation in which it makes sense to 
suppose that somebody else could in principle discover the rule 
being followed that a person can be said to be following a rule 
at all. (9) For instance, given a certain form of training 
everybody does, as a matter of course, continue to use the 
words 'Everest' and 'mountain' in the same way as would 
everybody else. It is this that makes it possible for us to 
attach a sense to the expression 'the same' in a given context. 
(10) But, Winch argues, it is important to note that going on 
in one way rather than another as a matter of course must not 
be just a peculiarity of the person whose behaviour claims to 
be a case of rule-following. His behaviour belongs to that 
category only if it is possible for someone else to grasp what 
he is doing by being brought to the pitch of himself going on 
in that way as a matter of course. (11) 
The Impossibility, in Winch, of a Private Rule of Conduct 
Here, then, we come to the argument that it is not possible to 
have a private rule of conduct. Is what we call 'obeying a 
rule', asks Wittgenstein, something that it would be possible 
(24) 
for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life? He 
replies that it is not possible that there should have only 
been one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. To obey a 
rule is a custom but it is also a practice and thus to think 
one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. For Wittgenstein, 
it is not possible (and here, as will be shown, I disagree) to 
obey a rule 'privately' otherwise thinking one was obeying a 
rule would be the same as obeying it. (12) 
The notion of following a rule, therefore, in Winchian terms, 
is logically inseparable from the notion of making a mistake. 
If it is possible to say that someone is following a rule, that 
means we can ask whether he is doing what he does correctly or 
not. There is no sense, Winch argues, in describing his 
behaviour without doing this since everything he does is as 
good as anything else he might do, whereas the point of the 
concept of rule is that it should enable us to evaluate what is 
being done. A mistake, in fact, is a contravention of what is 
established as correct and it must be recognisable as such a 
contravention. (13) This idea of the impossibility of private 
rules of language, for Winch, is also true of actions - that is 
the rules which govern our actions must be publicly accessible 
and involve the notion of making a mistake. 
(25) 
The Possibility of Private Rules of Conduct 
To take, first, the idea that rules involve the notion of 
making a mistake - Maclntyre asks 'What is the wrong way of 
going for a walk? ' and 'if there is no wrong way, is my action 
in any sense rule-governed? '. To ask these questions, he 
claims, is to begin to bring out the differences between those 
activities which form part of a coherent mode of behaviour and 
those which do not. It is to begin to see that although many 
actions must be rule-governed in the sense that the concept of 
some particular kind of action may involve reference to a rule, 
the concept of action as such does not involve such a 
reference. (14) Maclntyre's point here is very important to my 
subsequent arguments. It is to be my contention that the 
explanation of human action should be seen in terms of the 
reasons the agent has for that action. The possession of a 
reason though does not require adherence to rules - it may do - 
but people do not have to be obeying a rule to have a reason 
for an action and for that action to be intentional. In other 
words, reasons are more than rule-following, as I hope to 
demonstrate in Part Three. 
Ryan, though, suggests that Maclntyre is overweighting Winch's 
case. The point Winch is making, he argues, is that there is 
always some correct and recognised description of his action 
(26) 
that both the agent and his fellows can accept, such that it 
makes it possible to say or deny that that was what he did. 
(15) Winch is claiming, in fact, that establishing a standard 
is not an activity which it makes sense to ascribe to any 
individual in complete isolation from other individuals since 
it is contact with others which alone makes possible the 
external check on one's actions; and this is inseparable from 
an established standard. It is, of course possible, concedes 
Winch, for an individual to adhere to a private rule of 
conduct, but it must in principle be possible for other people 
to grasp that rule and judge whether it is being correctly 
followed. Also, it makes no sense to suppose anyone capable of 
establishing a purely personal standard of behaviour if he 
never had experience of human society with its socially 
established rules. (16) 
This, it seems to me, is speculative and by no means a self- 
evident proposition. For example, would it not be conceivable 
that a desert islander could create private rules in terms of 
which he relates to 'nature' such as 'do not go near this wild 
animal' or 'do not walk on thin ice'. Such rules could be 
based on his own observation or experience of what properties 
'wild animals' or 'thin ice' have. It is not necessary for 
other people to understand these rules for them to be rules of 
(27) 
conduct for the desert islander. Indeed, they are probably 
essential rules of action for that individual if he is to 
survive. It thus seems that Winch should not dismiss the idea 
of a private rule of conduct (or, as I shall later term them, 
internal reasons for action) as easily as he does. Many rules 
may be socially constructed but others may be privately 
constructed and be still as efficacious in producing certain 
forms of action and have just as much explanatory power. 
Strawson makes a similar point arguing that it is perfectly 
conceivable that we can imagine a desert islander who has never 
been brought up in human society devising a language for his 
own use. Also, we can imagine an observer who sees a 
correlation between the use of the words and sentences of this 
language and the speaker's actions and environment. This 
observer is thus able to form hypotheses about the meanings 
(the regular use) of the words of this subject's language and, 
in time, come to be able to speak it. While, at this stage, 
the practice of each serves as a check of the practice of the 
other, this does not mean that before the use of the language 
becomes a shared form of life the words of the language had no 
meaning or use. (17) 
(28) 
Strawson, for Winch, is begging the question by using in his 
description terms like 'language', 'use', 'words', 'meanings', 
and so on; the applicability of which is exactly what is in 
question. To say, he argues, that the observer may form 
hypotheses about the meanings of the words in his subject's 
language is senseless unless we can speak of what his subject 
is doing in terms of the concepts of meaning, language, use, 
etc. From the fact that we can observe him going through 
certain sounds which, were they performed in the context of a 
human society it would be legitimate to describe in those 
terms, it by no means follows that his activities are 
legitimately so describable. Further, the fact that the 
observer might correlate his subject's practices with his own 
does not, for Winch, establish Strawson's case since it is not 
these practices, considered on their own, which justify the 
application of categories like language and meaning, but the 
social context in which these practices are performed. It is, 
he argues, precisely the nature of the connection between the 
initial definition and the subsequent use of the sound that is 
in question. (18) Yet, as has been argued, the origins of rule 
formation may depend upon a natural context and be independent 
of a social one. 
(29) 
Even if, however, we accept that all rules are socially 
constructed (which I do not), another problem that faces Winch 
is where these rules came from originally. Could it not be, as 
Strawson implies, that there were once private rules which 
gradually became shared? Ayer, in fact, argues that some human 
being must have been the first to use a symbol. (19) Ayer, 
Winch argues, implies that socially established rules cannot 
have been presupposed by this use and so established rules 
cannot be a necessary prerequisite to the use of symbols in 
general. Winch maintains, however, that it does not follow 
from the fact that there was a translation from a state of 
affairs where there was no language to one in which there was, 
that there must have been some individual who was the first to 
use language. The supposition that language was invented by 
some individual, for Winch, is nonsensical (although he does 
not explain why). (20) It is more likely, Winch argues, that 
we can imagine practices growing up amongst early men none of 
which could count as the invention of language; and yet once 
these practices had reached a certain degree of sophistication 
one can say that there was a language. (21) This, it seems to 
me, is avoiding the whole issue of where these early practices 
came from. Winch has not answered the fundamental question of 
the origins of rules. He takes as his starting point socially 
(30) 
created rules but is unable or unwilling to discuss how they 
first arose and how they became socially accepted as rules of 
conduct. 
Summary 
In sum, therefore, Winch is arguing that a major property of 
language-using, and of the behaviour which accompanies it, is 
that these are performances that can be done correctly and 
incorrectly; and the assessment of this requires that there 
should be a set of socially maintained rules which embody the 
criteria of correct and incorrect performance. These rules, 
suggests Ryan, will include the criteria for the correct and 
incorrect application of a word, as well as the rules of a 
different scope concerned with the appropriate and 
inappropriate occasions for its use. (22) 
As has been discussed, however, there are a number of problems 
associated with this view. Firstly, that it is by no means 
clear whether we can dismiss the idea of private rules of 
language or conduct as easily as Winch, nor can he 
satisfactorily answer the question of where these socially 
accessible rules originated from. Moreover, and this is vital 
to my fundamental criticism of Winch, I would dispute the idea 
(31) 
that adherence to rules is fundamental to all action 
explanations. We should explain actions in terms of reasons, 
and the notion of reasons involves more than the simple 
following of rules. In the second place, bound up with the 
notion of rule-governed behaviour is the idea of 'ways of life' 
and the importance of context. This has fundamental 
implications for sociology and the study of action so it is to 
this I will turn in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE 'WAYS OF LIFE' ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
As previously outlined, Winch's idea of following a rule turns 
on whether it makes sense to distinguish between a right and a 
wrong way of doing things in connection with what an agent 
does. Winch, in arguing against Oakeshott's contention that 
most human behaviour can be adequately described in terms of 
the notion of habit or custom (1), maintains that learning to 
do something is not just copying what someone else does. It 
may start in that way, but a teacher's estimate of a pupil's 
prowess will lie in the latter's ability to do things which he 
would precisely not simply have followed. The pupil has to 
acquire not merely the habit of following his teacher's 
example, but also the realisation that some ways of following 
that example are permissible and others are not. He has to 
learn not only to do things in the same way as his teacher, but 
also what counts as the same way. Learning, in fact, often 
involves doing something different from what one is originally 
shown, but in relation to the rule that is being followed. 
This counts as 'going on in the same way' as one was shown. (2) 
(34) 
There may be a sense, Winch admits, in which to acquire a habit 
is to acquire a propensity to go on doing the same kind of 
things; and there is a sense in which this is true of following 
a rule; but these senses are different. For example, in the 
case of an animal forming a habit there can be no question of 
'the reflective application of a criterion'. Even when, for 
instance, a dog always responds in the same way - performing 
tricks to a command - what counts as 'always doing the same 
kind of thing' when the word of command is uttered is decided 
by the owner rather than by the dog. It is only in relation to 
the owner's purposes that the statement that the dog 'always 
does the same kind of thing' has any sense. In contrast, the 
human being has to understand what is meant by 'doing the same 
kind of thing on the same kind of occasion' before he can be 
said to have acquired a rule; and this is also involved in the 
activities that can be described as 'habit'. It is, Winch 
maintains, only because human actions exemplify rules that we 
can speak of past experiences as relevant to our current 
behaviour. (3) 
The dog performing a trick in response to a command, Winch 
argues, has no conception of what it would be to respond 
differently because it has no conception of what it is doing at 
all - it just responds to the appropriate stimuli. An honest 
(35) 
man may refrain from stealing money, though he could easily do 
so and needs it badly. The thought of acting otherwise need 
never occur to him, but, nevertheless, he has the alternative 
of acting differently because he understands the situation he 
is in and the nature of what he is or is not doing. 
Understanding something, for Winch, involves understanding the 
contradictory too, and that is why conduct which is the product 
of understanding, and only that, is conduct to which there is 
an alternative. (4) 
Rules as Specific to 'Ways of Life' -A Contextual Approach 
In Winch, however, understanding action not only involves the 
idea that meaningful behaviour involves a choice between 
alternatives, but also the idea of rule-following specific to 
certain 'ways of life'. Thus he argues that learning what a 
motive (or reason) is "belongs to learning the standards 
governing life in the society in which one lives and that again 
belongs to the process of learning to live as a social being". 
(5) Ideas, for Winch, cannot be torn out of their context. 
The relation between ideas and context is an internal one. The 
idea gets its sense from the role it plays in the system and it 
is nonsensical to take several systems of ideas, find an 
element in each which can be expressed in the same verbal form, 
(36) 
and then claim to have discovered an idea which is common to 
all systems. (6) What Winch is claiming, therefore, is that 
there can be no non-contextual ideas. 
This view is clearly expressed in the article "Understanding a 
Primitive Society" where Winch takes issue with Evans- 
Pritchard's discussion of the Zande belief in magic. (7) 
Evans-Pritchard, suggests Winch, although emphasising that a 
member of a scientific culture has a different conception of 
reality from that of the Zande believer in magic, wants to go 
beyond merely registering this fact and making the difference 
explicit. He wants to say that the scientific conception 
agrees with what reality is actually like, whereas the magical 
conception does not. (8) 
While, argues Winch, the idea that men's ideas and beliefs must 
be checkable by reference to something independent - some 
reality - is important, great care is needed in fixing the 
precise role that this conception of the independently real 
does play in men's thoughts. In the first place, we should 
notice that the check of the independently real is not peculiar 
to science. God's reality, for example, is certainly 
independent of what any man may care to think, but what that 
amounts to, ontologically, can be seen from the religious 
(37) 
tradition in which the concept of God is used, and this use is 
very unlike the use of scientific concepts. Within the 
religious use of language, therefore, the conception of God's 
reality has its place. This does not mean, though that it is 
at the mercy of what anyone cares to say; if this were so God 
would have no reality. In the second place, Winch claims that 
reality is not what gives language its sense. What is real and 
unreal shows itself in the sense that language has. Further, 
both the distinction between the real and the unreal, and the 
concept of agreement with reality, themselves belong to our 
language. They are not concepts of the language like any other 
since they occupy a commanding and even limiting position here; 
nevertheless, we could not distinguish the real from the unreal 
without understanding the way this distinction operates in the 
language. If, then, we wish to understand the significance of 
these concepts, we must examine the use they actually do have 
in the language. (9) 
From these arguments, suggests Winch, one question that can be 
raised is: is it in fact the case that primitive systems of 
magic constitute a coherent universe of discourse like science, 
in terms of which an intelligible conception of reality and 
clear ways of deciding what beliefs are and are not in 
agreement with reality can be discerned? An affirmative answer 
(38) 
to this, Winch argues, does not commit him to accepting as 
rational all beliefs conducted in magical concepts or all the 
procedures practised in the name of such beliefs. This is no 
more necessary than is the proposition that all procedures 
'justified' in the name of science are immune from rational 
criticism. It is important to distinguish a system of magical 
beliefs and practices like that of the Azande, which is one of 
the principal foundations of their whole social life, and 
magical beliefs that might be held and magical rites that might 
be practised by persons belonging to our own culture. Concepts 
of witchcraft in our own society, for Winch, at least since the 
advent of Christianity, have been parasitic on and a perversion 
of other orthodox concepts both religious and scientific, and 
have been rejected as irrational in the system of beliefs on 
which these practices are thus parasitic. Hence, when we speak 
of such practices as 'superstitious', 'illusory' or 
'irrational' we have the weight of our culture behind us 
because these beliefs and practices belong to and derive such 
sense as they have from that same culture. The sense is thus 
only apparent in terms which are culturally relevant. If, 
though, we wish to understand Zande magic we must seek a 
foothold elsewhere. (10) 
(39) 
The crux of Winch's argument is that the concepts used by 
primitive people can only be interpreted in the context of the 
way of life of those peoples. Winch, to demonstrate this, 
considers the criticism made of him by Maclntyre. Maclntyre, 
argues Winch, claims correctly that description is important 
for the concept of human action and that these descriptions do 
not exist in isolation but occur as constituents of beliefs, 
speculations and projects which are continually criticised, 
modified, rejected or improved, so the stock of descriptions 
changes. The changes in human actions are thus intimately 
linked to rational criticism which requires the notion of 
choice between alternatives. To explain, which is a matter of 
making clear what the agent's criterion was and why he made use 
of this criterion rather than another; and to explain why the 
use of this criterion appears rational to those who invoke it. 
Hence, in explaining the rules and conventions to which action, 
in a given social order, conform, we cannot omit reference to 
the rationality or otherwise of those rules and conventions. 
Furthermore, argues Maclntyre, the beginning of an explanation 
of why certain criteria are taken to be rational in some 
societies is that they are rational, and since this has to 
enter into our explanation we cannot explain social behaviour 
independently of our own norms of rationality. (11) 
(40) 
What is important here, argues Winch, is to be clear about 
whose concept of rationality is being alluded to. It seems, he 
suggests, that it must be that which is current in the society 
in which the criterion is invoked. Something can appear 
rational to someone only in terms of his understanding of what 
is and what is not rational. If our concept of rationality is 
different from his, then it makes no sense to say that anything 
either does or does not appear rational to him in our sense. 
Maclntyre, however, seems to be suggesting that the explanation 
of why, in society 'S', certain actions are taken to be 
rational, has got to be an explanation for us; so it must be in 
terms of concepts intelligible to us. If, then, in the 
explanation, we say that these criteria are rational, we must 
be using the word 'rational' in our sense. (12) 
The explanation, suggests Winch, would then run: members of 
society 'S' have seen to be the case something that we know to 
be the case. If 'what is seen to be the case' is common to us 
and to them, it must be referred to under the same concept for 
each of us. But, argues Winch, this explanation is not open to 
us since we start from the position that standards of 
rationality in different societies do not always coincide. 
From the possibility, therefore, that the standards of 
rationality current in 'S' are different from our own, we 
(41) 
cannot assume that it will make sense to speak of members of 
'S' as discovering something we have also discovered since such 
discovery presupposes initial conceptual agreement. 
Rationality, for Winch, is a concept necessary to the existence 
of any language, it is not just a concept in a language. Where 
there is a language it must make a difference what is said and 
this is only possible where the saying of one thing rules out, 
on the pain of failing to communicate, the saying of something 
else. Maclntyre, Winch states, is right to say that we have 
already invoked our concept of rationality in saying of a 
collection of people that they constitute a society with a 
language, but this is to say nothing about what constitutes 
rational behaviour in that society. This would require more 
particular knowledge about the norms they appeal to in living 
their lives. It is not a matter of invoking our notion of 
rationality, rather it is a matter of invoking our notion of 
rationality in speaking of their behaviour in terms of 
'conforming to norms'; but how precisely this notion is to be 
applied to them will depend on our reading of their conformity 
to norms - that is, what actually counts for them as conformity 
and what does not. (13) 
(42) 
Again Winch is emphasising the importance of context when 
trying to understand and explain ideas and actions. However, 
the question must be asked as to how he could explain that some 
ideas have been 'lifted' from their context of origin and 
transported to other contexts. For example, the introduction 
of industrial techniques from one culture to another; or the 
influence on the social lives of many non-Christian societies 
that missionary activities have had. Is, then, Winch rather 
overstating his case when he argues that all ideas and actions 
must be explained in terms of the context in which they arise 
or take place? 
The Justifications for a Contextual Approach 
There are, suggests Gellner, various motives and/or 
justifications for a contextual approach. One of these is 
simply that it contains a good deal of validity since one does, 
indeed, get a better appreciation of a doctrine by seeing its 
setting and use. There are, however, other motives. There is 
the laudable desire to be tolerant, understanding and liberal - 
to refrain from an uncomprehending and presumptuous superiority 
in one's attitude to other societies. (14) Indeed, Winch, 
himself, states that we do not initially have a category that 
looks at all like the Zande category of magic. Since it is we 
(43) 
who want to understand the Zande category, it appears, he 
argues, that the onus is on us to extend our understanding so 
as to make room for the Zande category, rather than to insist 
on seeing it in terms of our own distinction between science 
and non-science. Certainly, Winch argues, the sort of 
understanding we seek requires that we see the Zande category 
in relation to our own categories, but this neither means that 
it is right to evaluate magic in terms of the criteria 
belonging to those other categories, nor does it give any clue 
to which of our existing categories of thought will provide the 
best point of reference from which we can understand the point 
of Zande practices. (15) 
Let us pause here for the moment. Winch seems, here, to be 
undermining his own position regarding understanding only being 
possible within ways of life, not between them. If, as he 
suggests, we are able to extend our understanding to make room 
for the Zande category then this implies that we are able to, 
as Hollis suggests subsequently, build conceptual bridges 
between elements of the system so that we can understand the 
Zande category; and, moreover, that these 'bridges' go in both 
directions. In other words, there is a possibility, even in 
Winch, that we can understand other cultures without having to 
become 'part of that culture' - to go native. Thus it seems 
(44) 
that Winch has, in fact, contradicted himself in yet another 
argument by suggesting that such understanding is possible, 
whilst also implying that while 'we' are able to do this, the 
Zande are not. This is a very strange conclusion for him to 
draw! 
The Problems of Contextual Charity 
This aside (as we will be considering it more detail later), 
such a contextualist approach must be treated with caution. As 
Gellner suggests, it may be that the sympathetic, positive 
interpretation of indigenous assertions is not the result of a 
sophisticated appreciation of context, but the other way 
around: that the manner in which the context itself is invoked, 
the amount and kind of context and the way the context itself 
is interpreted, depend on prior tacit determination concerning 
the kind of interpretation one wishes to find. (16) 
What Gellner is arguing is that contextual charity, as 
advocated by Winch, may be too charitable. (17) Gellner claims 
that when it is argued, in a sense rightly, that the 
interpretation of people's assertions must be made in the light 
of what they do and the social setting they do it in, this 
requirement is profoundly ambiguous. Two quite different 
(45) 
things may be intended. Assume, he suggests, that in the 
language of a given society there is a word 'boble' which is 
applied to characterise people under either of the following 
conditions: (a) a person who antecedently displays certain 
characteristics in his conduct, say, courage, is called 
'boble'; and (b) any person holding a certain social position 
is also described as 'boble'. One is tempted, he argues, to 
say that 'bobility' (a) is a descriptive term whose operational 
definition consists of tests for the possession of certain 
attributes, whereas (b) is simply an ascription depending on 
the will or whim of those in authority or on the social 
situation but not dependent on the characteristics of the 
person in question. The society, however, does not distinguish 
between the two concepts. It only uses one word 'boble' and 
its theories about 'bobility' only knows bobility, one and 
indivisible. As a first and simplified approximation, Gellner 
suggests, the logic of bobility is not an unrecognisable model, 
perhaps, of some familiar concepts in our own language. (18) 
What, however, asks Gellner, is the observer to say about 
bobility-like semi-operational concepts? Bobility is a 
conceptual device by which the privileged class of the society 
acquires some of the prestige of certain virtues respected in 
that society without needing to practise it thanks to the 
(46) 
meaning of the word. It is, at the same time, a manner of 
reinforcing the appeal of those virtues by associating them 
with prestige and power. However, all this needs to be said, 
and to say it is to bring out the internal logical coherence of 
the concept. The over-charitable observer determined to defend 
the concept he is investigating from the charge of logical 
incoherence, though, is bound to misdescribe the social 
situation. To make sense of the concept is to make nonsense of 
the society. Thus, the uncharitable may be 'contextualist' in 
a second, deeper and better sense. Excessive indulgence in 
contextual charity, argues Gellner, blinds us to what is best 
and what is worst in the life of societies. It blinds us to 
the possibility that social change may occur through the 
replacement of an inconsistent doctrine or ethic by a better 
one, or through a more consistent application of either (or the 
possibility, for instance, of social control through the 
employment of absurd, ambiguous, inconsistent or unintelligible 
doctrines). (19) 
Ideological Explanations 
A similar point is raised by Mackie under the rubric of 
'ideological explanation'. He defines 'ideology' as a system 
of constructs, beliefs and values which is characteristic of 
(47) 
some social class (or other social group or a society as a 
whole), and in terms of which the members of that group see and 
understand their position in relation to their social 
environment and the world as a whole and explain, evaluate and 
justify their actions especially the activities and policies 
characteristic of their group. At least some of the beliefs 
and concepts in the system, he argues, are false, distorted or 
slanted, and at least some of the activities sustained and 
guided by that ideology have a real function differing from 
that which, in the ideology, they are seen as having. (20) 
The point this illustrates, suggests Mackie, is the ironic 
resonance to Winch's insistence that ideas cannot be torn out 
of their context since the idea gets its sense from the role it 
plays in the system. This position, he argues, appears 
plausible only so long as we forget that concepts can play 
different roles in systems, and that there are different sorts 
of systems of categories. A given idea can be situated in more 
than one context. Thus, even if we set aside the question of 
the truth or falsity, say, of Azande witchcraft beliefs in 
order to ask merely how they are related to other elements of 
Azande life, we will be drawn back to the matter of truth in 
order to answer this question. Zande witchcraft can be 
considered as ideology, under Mackie's definition, and this 
(48) 
indicates the need for some explanation of the maintenance of 
false beliefs which must play a role in social life different 
from the one they are thought to play by people who believe 
them to be true. (21) 
A full explanation and description, in this view, must take 
account of both how their actions appear to the agents and what 
is not apparent to them. This, I would argue, is a very 
important point and essential to my subsequent assessment of 
reasons as explanations of actions. What I am going to suggest 
is that although action explanations should be seen in terms of 
the agents' reasons for their actions, I also argue that in 
some cases these reasons may have been appropriated from the 
culture in which the agent lives and then internalised. It may 
be that the agents may not fully appreciate the function of 
these ideological tenets, a fact that may only be apparent to 
an observer who exists outside the situation in question. 
For Mackie, the shallowness of Winch's theory derives in part 
from his simple identification of concepts and action. In 
Winch actions embody concepts. The context from which ideas 
cannot be torn is a system of ideas. Understanding a society 
is nothing more than grasping the meaning of ideas in their 
systematic interconnection. But, argues Mattick, institutions 
(49) 
and beliefs are not always correctly understood by the natives 
whose property they are. An unbeliever's account of magical 
properties will be quite different from a believer's. 
Witchcraft, he argues either works or does not. The 
persistence of belief in methods that do not work calls for 
some explanation, even though we normally cannot expect those 
for whom these methods embody basic traditions to heed that 
call. (22) In other words, when explaining the actions of 
individuals we should not only examine what their reasons are 
but how they are formed and this involves an assessment of the 
cultural or societal system in which they live and the ideas 
they have internalised which they may not fully appreciate or 
understand. 
A further important point, for Mattick, is that social 
intercourse is richer than language. It comprises a vast range 
of objects and practices which may lie outside the field of 
verbal representation or even contradict it. Even in those 
areas of social action, he argues, which are organised through 
language, if we identify the meaning of a word or idea with the 
social behaviour in which it plays a role, it may easily turn 
out that the meanings in this sense will differ from the 
meanings elicitable from the natives. How then do we describe 
the social intercourse in which a concept has its place? If, 
(50) 
Mattick argues, we do it in the language of the natives we have 
learned nothing; if we do it in our own theoretical language we 
will describe social action differently from a native and 
perhaps in a way that the native will not recognise. Winch's 
view assumes a double coherence of world views; both internal 
coherence and coherence in relation to action. But, Mattick 
argues, the criteria implicit in the practice of a society are 
not necessarily coherent. (23) 
Gellner, for Mattick, has brought out a basic flaw in Winch's 
identification of social concepts and social action - his 
neglect of the fact that concepts generally contain 
justifications of practices, and hence that one misrepresents 
them grossly if one treats them simply as these practices, and 
their context, in another guise. Thus, Gellner argues that 
nothing is more false than the claim that, for a given 
assertion, its use is its meaning. On the contrary, its use 
may depend on its lack of meaning, its ambiguity, its 
possession of wholly different and incompatible meanings in 
quite different contexts, and on the fact it emits the 
impression of possessing a consistent meaning throughout - on 
retaining, for example, the aura of justification valid only in 
one context when used in quite another. (24) 
(51) 
The Problem of Relativism 
Another outcome of the 'ways of life' argument specifically 
relates to the problems of relativism and the implications this 
has for sociology. While, argues Mattick, it is only 'polite' 
to extend our understanding so as to make room for the Zande 
category, it is difficult to see how categories can be expanded 
in this way if Winch's conception of a culture is correct. 
Either we are dealing with two systems each with its own 
criteria of rationality and truth of which the elements are 
meaningless when dissociated from the whole; or else, as has 
already been suggested, it is possible to build conceptual 
bridges between elements of the systems for us to understand a 
Zande category. Such bridges, if they are possible, however, 
go in both directions. If we can stretch our categories to 
meet a Zande concept, the latter has 'ipso facto' been brought 
into congruence with our ways of thought. (25) 
Thus, as Gellner argues, it is not tenable to claim that 
indigenous societies always live in a conceptual dimension of 
their own in which our categorial boundaries do not apply. On 
the contrary, we can sometimes only make sense of the society 
in question by seeing how the manipulation of concepts and the 
violation of categorial boundaries helps it work. The 
(52) 
doctrines advocated by Winch which identify meaning with use, 
therefore, as well as failing to account for the forces of 
ideology also cannot account for social change. It precludes 
us from making sense of social changes which arise, at least in 
part, from the fact that people spmetimes notice the 
incoherence of doctrines and concepts and proceed to reform the 
institutions which justify them. (26) 
Maclntyre also argues that the weakness of Winch's position is 
clear when we consider the conceptual self-sufficiency claimed 
for 'ways of living' and 'modes of social life'. The examples 
given in Winch are 'religion' and 'science', but, argues 
Maclntyre, at any given date in any given society the criteria 
in current use by religious believers and by scientists will 
differ from what they are at other times and places (indeed, 
religious believers and scientists may differ between 
themselves). Criteria have a history and this emerges 
strikingly if we ask how we are to think of magic in Winch's 
terms. Is magic a 'mode of social life', or a 'primitive 
religion', or, perhaps, a 'primitive society'? For we do want, 
Maclntyre claims, to reject magic as illogical because it fails 
to come up to our standards of rationality. A belief in magic 
may not be falsifiable, but does it stand in need of rational 
criticism and, if so, by what standards? Maclntyre suggests 
(53) 
that one could only hold a belief in magic rationally in the 
absence of any practice of science and technology in which 
criteria of effectiveness and ineffectiveness, etc. have been 
built up. To say this, however, is to recognise the 
appropriateness of scientific criteria of judgement from our 
standpoint. A belief in magic is not intended either as a 
piece of science, or non-science. The people do not possess 
these categories. It is only in the light of later and and 
more sophisticated understanding that their beliefs and 
concepts can be classified and evaluated at all. This suggests 
to Maclntyre that beliefs and concepts are not merely to be 
evaluated by the criteria implicit in the practice of those who 
hold and use them; a conviction, he suggests, that is 
reinforced by other considerations. As Gellner argued, the 
criteria implicit in the practice of a society or mode of 
social life are not necessarily coherent; their application to 
problems set within that social mode does not always yield one 
clear and unambiguous answer. When this is the case people 
start questioning their own criteria. They try to criticise 
the standards of intelligibility and rationality which they 
have hitherto held. On Winch's view it is difficult to see 
what this could mean, which returns us to the point that 
criteria and concepts have a history. It is not just 
activities which have a history while the criteria which govern 
actions are timeless. (27) 
(54) 
NacIntyre's ultimate quarrel with Winch, and one with which I 
completely concur, is the suggestion that agreement in 
following a rule is sufficient to guarantee it making sense. 
There are cases where we cannot rest content, he argues, with 
describing the user's criteria for an expression, but we can 
criticise what he does. Indeed, unless we could do this we 
could not separate the case where there are no problems of 
meaning, the case where there is now no clear sense to an 
expression but where once there may well have been, and the 
case where there appears never to have been a clear and 
coherent sense available. Sometimes to understand a concept, 
for Maclntyre, involves not sharing it. In the case of 
'taboo', for example, we can only grasp what it is for 
something to be taboo if we extend our insight beyond the rules 
which govern the use of the expression to the point and purpose 
which these rules once had but no longer have in a different 
social context. We can only understand what it is to use an 
incoherent concept such as 'a soul in a stick' if we understand 
what has to be absent from the criterion or practice and of 
speech for this incoherence not to appear to the user of the 
concept. In other words, we are beginning to notice 
requirements for the elucidation of concepts which are 
necessarily absent from Winch's account. We have not only to 
give the rules for the use of relevant expressions, but to show 
what the point could be of following such rules. (28) 
(55) 
Maclntyre does appreciate, however, that the fact that we 
cannot approach alien concepts except in terms of our own 
criteria could lead to distortion. In this way he argues that 
all interpretation has to begin with detecting the standards of 
intelligibility established in a society. But, he argues, as a 
matter of fact, no-one can avoid using clues drawn from their 
own society and these will often be helpful. Thus, while we 
must begin with the society's implicit form of self- 
description, it does not follow that the descriptions used or 
the standards of intelligibility detected will always be 
coherent; and, if they are not, a key task will be to show how 
this incoherence does not appear as such to the members of the 
society or else does do so and is somehow made tolerable. In 
detecting incoherence of this kind we have already invoked our 
standards. Since, however, we cannot avoid doing this it is 
better to do it self-consciously otherwise we shall project on 
our own studies an image of our own social life. If, suggests 
Maclntyre, we are sufficiently sensitive, we make it possible 
for us to escape, partially, from our own cultural limitations 
for we shall have to ask not just how we see the other society, 
but how they do or would see us. Perhaps, then, what hitherto 
looked intelligible will then appear opaque and question- 
begging. (29) 
(56). 
To sum up, therefore, Winch's thinking, according to Gellner, 
seems to be dominated by an image of small, highly bounded 
groups. His 'way of life' argument would only make sense in a 
world populated by a set of small tribes, discontinuous enough 
to have little to do with each other and of roughly equal 
cognitive power. (30) What, suggests Ryan, Winch seems to 
ignore is that ways of life are not clearly defined. They 
overlap and compete, share assumptions and serve different 
purposes. It is plain, he argues, that societies have 
radically revised their intellectual assumptions as the result 
of just this kind of overlap and competition. (31) 
Even within cultures we can find many ways of life. As Benton 
suggests, each participant or class of participants may 
conceive relationships differently and may even have competing 
conceptualisations of the whole social order. (32) For 
example, if we take an instance of the relationship between an 
employer and an employee, we may find that although they stand 
in a relationship to one another, the ideas which the one 
'expresses' in his relationship will not be the same as the 
ideas which the other expresses. They will differ in their 
relationship, and, even more seriously for Winch, one of the 
'partners' in the relationship may not conceive of it in terms 
(57) 
of rights and obligations at all but in terms of 'power' and 
'necessity' of what he or she is 'forced to do' in order to 
live or can 'get away with'. (33) 
The Winchian could respond to this by arguing that such 
competing conceptualisations are 'parasitic' on a deeper, 
primary fund of concepts which constitutes the 'core' of the 
culture. Benton, though, asks that if this is the case is it 
possible to speak of a single culture or way of life at all? 
Mutual intelligibility can be established by reference back to 
areas of culture which are held in common, but the existence of 
this 'common core' has to be demonstrated (remembering that 
such a 'core' in many cases does not exist). Its existence is 
an empirical matter, which cannot be legislated upon 'in 
principle', yet it apparently defies any empirical method of 
ascertaining its existence or non-existence. 
The Winchian, though, could simply concede the co-presence, in 
a single society, of incompatible conceptualisations of the 
social relations and practices constituting that society; but, 
Benton maintains, this would mean that these incompatible 
conceptualisations will be mutually unintelligible. Thus, if 
there are conceded to be even partial sets of incompatible 
conceptualisations of a single system of social relations (say, 
(58) 
that system which relates employer to employee) it follows that 
one or both of the sets of concepts must be rejected if we are 
to conceptualise the unity of the system of social 
relationships (or Winch would have to fall back on two 
different 'ways of life' and then have the problem of how they 
manage to interact). A corollary of this is that the concepts 
'culture' (symbolic universe) and 'society' (way of life) are 
not equivalent in meanings. 
The second implication of this is that even an adequate account 
of participants' understanding would have to make reference to 
the way in which social actors individually and collectively 
'negotiate' interactions in which incompatible 
conceptualisations are involved. Sometimes, of course, these 
interactions are best described as conflicts in which each side 
exercises power to attain its objectives, but, argues Benton, 
there are also procedures which involve the articulation of 
conceptualisations and the search for the presuppositions of 
existing practices in such a way that dialogue between 
competing conceptual systems may be constructed. These 
procedures are given more explicit formulation and may even be 
systemised in intellectual disciplines; but this aspect of 
'interpretative' understanding and the implications of it are 
unrecognised by Winch. (34) 
(59) 
Trigg also makes the point that Winch's emphasis on agreements 
in judgements would mean that basic disagreements are an 
indication of clashes between societies. The scientist, he 
argues, will belong to one society with one set of assumptions; 
and the believer in oracles to another. The Christian has one 
society, the atheist another. However, Trigg argues, many 
societies overlap. Some scientists will be Christians and 
others atheists. Every time a new basic disagreement appears, 
we can go on multiplying societies and it is difficult to know 
where to stop once this process is started. Every issue on 
which different groups cannot reach agreement seems to raise 
the question of whether we are encountering a fresh form of 
life. If we accept that apparently insoluble disagreement is a 
criterion of different ways of life, we shall eventually arrive 
at the situation where ways of life contain only one person. 
Thus, argues Trigg, to avoid starting on this 'slippery slope' 
we have to accept that one society can comprise individuals who 
disagree with others in the same society. The definition of a 
society, then, will not involve the condition that there will 
be agreement on basic issues. Some sharing of concepts will 
not imply unanimity. In this case judgements about what is 
true will be separated from the social background against which 
they are made, and personal understanding of social 
institutions cannot be identified with the way they work. 
(60) 
People, he suggests, (and this is vital to my arguments in the 
part three concerning 'external' reasons for actions) may even 
follow rules that they disagree with. (35) 
The Importance of Individual Understanding 
Once, argues Trigg, it is accepted that communities, 
institutions and social practices do not provide the sole 
context of social explanation, we see that individual 
understanding is also important. Winch, he maintains, wanted 
to combine 'Verstehen' with a Wittgensteinian view of concepts. 
The 'internal' perspective turns out, though, to be irreducibly 
social, rooted in modes of social life. It appears that this 
does not so much involve the situation from the point-of-view 
of the individual as participating in society, rather the 
emphasis has swung from the individual to society. Yet, all 
Winch said about the need for aesthetic sense seemed to demand 
not participation in social practices but the kind of empathy 
which a more individualistic theory would demand. Once, in 
Winch, the emphasis drifts away from individuals to society, 
the possibility of 'Verstehen' seems to be removed. Shared 
public concepts may need public criteria for their application, 
but we should not, argues Trigg, ignore the reality and 
importance of private mental events. (36) In other words, as I 
(61) 
shall argue, we do not need to reject internal reasons for 
actions just because we alloy that some actions result as a 
consequence of factors that exist outside the individual (more 
of this later). 
Summary 
The above discussion concerning the problems of contextual 
analyses and the apparently rigid boundaries around ways of 
life raises the fundamental problem of relativism. Is there 
any way, however, of overcoming this problem? Can we ever 
understand the actions of people who live in a society or 
culture different to our own? Indeed, can we understand anyone 
who has beliefs and attitudes different from our own? It is to 
this that the next chapter addresses itself. 
I want to emphasise, before doing this, the essential point 
Trigg has drawn out in his criticism of the 'way of life' 
argument. That is, that Winch's insistence on socially formed 
and enforced rules specific to a way of life does not only mean 
that we cannot ever, as sociologists, really understand or 
explain the actions of people who live in societies different 
to our own, but also that we cannot account for the actions of 
any individuals in terms of the reasons that agent has for his 
(62) 
or her own actions. The agent, in Winch, is acting in 
accordance with rules. These rules are given to the agent by 
the society in which the agent lives and the agent is incapable 
of constructing his own rules of conduct. Not only do I object 
to the idea that we cannot have private rules of conduct (as 
previously outlined) but I also take issue with the whole idea 
that reasons for actions can only be seen in terms of rules. 
The formation of reasons, I will suggest, involves much more 
than just adhering to socially prescribed rules. Such rules 
may exist, but it is the agent's own choice whether to abide by 
rules (if they exist) and reasons, as such, are in many cases 
not formed solely as a result of an acceptance of socially 
given rules. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSLATION 
Introduction 
As we have seen, Winch's theory concerning the idea that 
actions should be explained in terms of rule-following, and, 
specifically, that these rules are socially constructed and 
specific to certain forms of society has raised a number of 
problems. Not least of these, and one that has fundamental 
implications for sociology, is that, if we take this view, we 
can never really understand the actions of agents who live in 
societies or cultures different to our own. Indeed, if we 
adopt the Winchian view and take it to its logical conclusion 
we could be in the situation such that we could never explain 
the action of any individual who did not hold the same beliefs 
as ours. This, it seems to me, is an untenable position to 
arrive at. Thus, in this chapter, we are going to examine 
whether it is possible to translate concepts from one culture 
to another so that such an understanding is possible. 
Lukes - The Idea of Universal Criteria of Rationality 
For Lukes, beliefs are not only to be evaluated by the criteria 
that are to be discovered in the context in which they are 
held; they must also be evaluated by criteria of rationality 
(65) 
that simply are criteria of rationality - universal criteria. 
Let us assume, he suggests, we are discussing the beliefs of a 
society 'S'. One can draw a distinction between two sets of 
questions. First, what for 'S' are the criteria of rationality 
in general?; and, secondly, what are the appropriate criteria 
to apply to a given class of beliefs within that society? (1) 
In so far, argues Lukes, that Winch seems to be saying that the 
answer to the first question is culture-dependent, he must be 
wrong, or, at least, we could never know if he were right. 
Indeed, we cannot even conceive what it could be for him to be 
right. In the first place, the existence of a common reality 
is a necessary precondition for our understanding of 'S's 
language. This does not mean we and the members of 'S' must 
agree about all 'the facts' as any given true statement in 'S's 
language may be untranslatable into ours and vice versa. What 
must be the case is that 'S' must have our distinction between 
truth and falsity if we are to understand its language since, 
if, 'per impossible', it did not we would be unable even to 
agree about what counts as the successful identification of 
public objects. Moreover, any culture, scientific or not, 
which engages in successful prediction must presuppose a given 
reality. Prediction would be absurd unless there were events 
to predict, and both primitive and modern man predict in 
(66) 
roughly the same ways and, also, they can learn each other's 
languages. Thus, concludes Lukes, they assume an independent 
reality which they share. (2) 
In the second place, Lukes argues, 'S's language must have 
operable logical rules, and not all these can be pure matters 
of convention. Thus, Lukes asks whether Winch's statement that 
the logical relations between propositions depend on social 
relations between men, is implying that the concept of negation 
and the laws of identity and non-contradiction need not operate 
in 'S's language? If so, then it must be mistaken since if the 
members of 'S' do not possess even these, how could we ever 
understand their thought, inferences and arguments? Could they 
ever be credited with the possibility of inferring, arguing or 
even thinking? It follows, argues Lukes, that if 'S' has a 
language, it must, minimally, possess criteria of truth (as 
correspondence to reality) and logic which we share with it and 
which simply are criteria of rationality. The only alternative 
conclusion is that 'S's thought and language operate according 
to quite different criteria and that it is literally 
unintelligible to us. If the members of 'S' did not have our 
criteria of truth and logic, we would have no grounds for 
attributing to them a language, thought or system of beliefs, 
and would be unable to make any statement about these. (3) 
(67) 
The Necessity of Context-Dependent Criteria of Rationality 
Lukes does go on to say, though, that there are criteria which 
it is appropriate to apply to a given class of beliefs within 
'S'. The context, he argues, may provide criteria which 
specify which beliefs may acceptably go together. There are, 
therefore, contextually-provided criteria of truth. Such 
criteria may apply to beliefs which do not satisfy rational 
criteria in so far as they are in principle neither directly 
verifiable nor directly falsifiable by empirical means. There 
are also contextually-provided criteria of meaning which make 
particular beliefs appropriate to particular circumstances. 
Moreover, there are contextually-provided criteria which 
specify the best way to arrive at and hold beliefs. In 
general, Lukes argues, there are contextually-provided criteria 
for deciding what counts as a 'good reason' for holding a 
belief. For any class of beliefs in a society, therefore, 
there may be criteria provided by context according to which 
they are 'consistent' or 'inconsistent', I true' or 'false', 
'meaningful' or 'nonsensical', 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate' 
in the circumstances, soundly or unsoundly reached, properly or 
improperly held, and, in general, based on good or bad reasons. 
Likewise, the context may provide criteria against which the 
agent's reason for acting or even the ends of his action, may 
be judged adequate or inadequate. (4) 
(68) 
In summary, therefore, all beliefs, according to Lukes, are to 
be evaluated by both universal and context-dependent criteria 
of rationality. Sometimes universal rational truth criteria 
will not take the analysis very far and not reveal anything 
positive about relations between beliefs that are to be 
explicated in terms of 'provide a reason for'. Sometimes 
universal criteria of rationality appear less important than 
'what the situation demands'. In these cases, context- 
dependent criteria are illuminating, but they do not make 
universal criteria dispensable. They could not specify the 
ultimate constraints to which thought is subject, that is they 
are fundamental and universal in the sense that any society 
which possesses a language must apply them in general, although 
particular beliefs may violate them. It is only by the 
application of universal criteria that it is possible to see 
how beliefs which fail to satisfy them can come to be 
rationally criticised or fail to be. On the other hand, 
though, Lukes suggests that it is usually only by the 
application of contextually-relevant criteria that the point 
and significance that beliefs have for those who hold them can 
be grasped. (5) 
(69) 
Where is Context Relevant? 
Lukes' suggestion that beliefs must be evaluated in terms of 
universal and context-dependent criteria of rationality seems, 
however, to be somewhat unclear about the actual circumstances 
in which each should be applied. He seems to be suggesting 
that where beliefs do not seem to correspond to universal 
criteria, they may be understandable in terms of context- 
dependent criteria. But does this mean that they are or are 
not rational? In other words, can beliefs be rational in their 
context while not universally rational and, if so, in what 
circumstances can we, as observers, call then rational? This, 
then, appears to leave us with a similar problem to that 
suggested by Gellner in his discussion of contextual charity. 
In this he concludes that while contextual interpretation is in 
some respects inevitable, it is at the same time dangerous and 
liable to disastrous abuse. It is probably impossible, he 
argues, to draw up general rules for delimiting the legitimate 
and illegitimate uses of it and the best safeguard may be to 
admit of the possibility that the interpreted statement may 
contain absurdity. (6) 
The question is, therefore, whether there is any solution to 
this rather unsatisfactory state of affairs whereby there seem 
to be no guidelines as to how far context can be used to 
(70) 
justify beliefs that appear to us not to be rational. Hollis 
suggests that Lukes' universally rational criteria are not so 
much universally rational as necessary, and that his context- 
dependent criteria are not so much context-dependent as 
optional (since context-dependent criteria that just happen to 
apply in all societies should be universal without ceasing to 
be context-dependent). 
Rationality Cannot Be Relative 
Hollis maintains that if anthropology (and sociology) are to be 
possible, the natives must share our concepts of truth, 
coherence and rational interdependence of beliefs otherwise we 
are confronted with vicious circles. In other words, Western 
rational thought is not just one species of rational thought, 
nor rational thought just one species of thought. If we 
supposed it was, and so had to discover empirically which 
societies espoused which brand of rationality, we would destroy 
our test for the identification of native beliefs. In this 
sense, universal criteria of rationality are necessary, but 
anthropologists often come across beliefs that seem false, 
incoherent and unconnected. These beliefs are rendered 
harmonious by appealing to theoretical options - ambiguity, 
metaphor and local variations in context-dependent rational 
(71) 
criteria. They are options in the sense that the 
interpretations to be placed upon utterances are partly a 
function of the anthropologist's own view of the possible uses 
of language and the possible connections among beliefs. (7) 
If, Hollis argues, Winch's interpretative charity means merely 
making the native society as rational as possible then there is 
no objection. If, however, it means making the notions of 
reality and rationality relative to the native conceptual 
scheme in the belief that we should not claim the monopoly of 
these notions, then it would seem that anthropology (and 
sociology) is, in consequence, impossible. Without assumptions 
about reality and rationality we cannot translate anything and 
no translation could show the assumption to be wrong. (8) 
Incommensurability of Languages - The Outcome of Relativism 
Cultural relativism in this form, for Mattick, is, therefore, 
leading to what we may call incommensurability of languages: 
the view that there is simply no way in which an assertion, for 
example in Zande about the reality of witches, can be compared, 
with respect to truth value, with an assertion in English about 
the reality of witches. It is not so much that the Azande have 
(72) 
different explanations to ours for some class of phenomenon, 
but that they try to explain a class of phenomenon that we do 
not recognise to exist. (9) 
As Trigg suggests, it is significant that Winch specifically 
refers to science as a 'mode of life' in contrast to religion 
which he considers to be another and different mode; and that 
each has criteria of intelligibility peculiar to itself. This 
raises an important problem. A clear corollary of this view is 
that the rules of a particular practice determine what is to 
count as real. The reality of each is an internal matter for 
the mode of life concerned. There is, in fact, no neutral 
language in which the respective claims of each can be 
discussed and neither can either ever contradict the other. 
Yet, he argues, this means that reality is not what belief 
systems are about, but what is expressed in them. There is no 
one reality against which all putative knowledge can be 
measured, even if only in principle; there are as many 
realities as there are different institutions of belief. The 
conclusion can easily be drawn, therefore, that 'reality' is 
given sense only be the rules of particular social 
institutions. Such a view denies traditional definitions of 
knowledge which, Trigg maintains, insist that knowledge must 
involve true belief and reflect reality. Thus, far from 
(73) 
looking at the content of knowledge and trying to assess worth 
through reasons, exponents of this view will refuse to abstract 
what is known from its social setting. Any remaining contrast 
between knowledge and belief, therefore, would have to be what 
is socially accepted and what is individually held. The 
sociologist will wish to investigate the 'agreement in 
judgement' which is held to constitute social practice. 
Individual deviations from this would not then affect the 
general social setting. The social sources of authority and 
the institutional basis for what is counted knowledge are the 
focus of concern. Implicit in this is the assumption that 
social rules and public decisions are not the product of 
individual decisions; the judgements of the individuals gain 
their sense from a public framework and thus reality is the 
product of social agreement. (10) 
Viewing a body of beliefs as a social practice, argues Trigg, 
may be illuminating since it enables us to see social 
influences which we may have previously ignored, but we have 
not then given an adequate explanation of the belief, as this 
concentrates on the fact of rather than the content of the 
belief. (11) The idea that all standards are embedded in 
particular social backgrounds, he suggests, and that 
'objective' claims only have validity against a particular 
(74) 
social background is self-defeating. It destroys itself 
because it can no longer claim the kind of truth it needs if 
others are to take notice of it and it undermines the 
possibility of comparing different societies since there would 
be nothing in common to facilitate comparison. (12) It is this 
'incommensurability' that Hollis wants to overcome, and in 
doing so he goes some way to solving the problem of how far an 
analysis of context is useful is assessing the rationality of 
alien practices and beliefs. 
Is Translation Possible? 
Hollis claims that to understand native utterances the 
anthropologist must relate them to one another and to the 
world. To translate them, he needs to relate some of them to 
the world since in relating an utterance to others he does not 
learn what it means unless he already knows what the others 
mean. Thus, he argues, the anthropologist needs a class of 
utterances whose situation of use he can specify, and these, 
apparently, can be specified either as he perceives them or as 
the natives perceive them, and these two specifications might 
well be different. If, though, Hollis contends, he has to 
allow for this possibility he cannot begin since his only 
access to native perceptions and specifications is by 
(75) 
translating what they say about what they perceive. He would, 
therefore , have to translate 
before discovering what the 
natives perceive and to know what they perceive before 
translating. Having posed this problem, Hollis proceeds to try 
and overcome it by arguing that the class of utterances which 
form the bridgehead for the anthropologist's advance must be 
one for which his specifications and his informants coincide. 
His line of attack, then, is that a native sentence can be 
correctly translated by any, say, English, sentence which can 
be used in the same way in the same situation. Although 
sentences which are related like this need not be semantically 
equivalent, there is not more direct attack on meaning 
available to us. (13) 
In taking this line, however, Hollis argues that two crucial 
assumptions must be made: that the natives perceive more or 
less what we perceive, and that they say about it more or less 
what we would say. Some overlap in concepts and percepts, 
therefore, is a necessary condition of successful translation. 
The 'sine qua non' is a bridgehead of true assertions about a 
shared reality, but it is clear that societies differ about 
what is real and rational so the philosopher's problem is to 
see where the necessary limits on these divergences lie. On 
the one hand, there must be some test of success in 
(76) 
identifying, for example, 'supernatural beliefs', otherwise any 
account would be as good as any other. On the other hand, any 
test proposed looks parochial in that it forces other cultures 
to subscribe to a Western, twentieth century view of what is 
true. So, asks Hollis, can we find a test which is innocent of 
this parochialism? (14) 
f 
Hollis rejects the idea that we can test such beliefs for 
correspondence with reality since unless we believe in it we 
can only report that it does not. Nor is it helpful to say 
that the natives take the belief to be empirically true since 
we do not know yet what the belief is. Equally, we cannot 
invoke a wider reality to give the beliefs something to 
correspond to since we can only get at it through the beliefs. 
There is more point, argues Hollis, in testing the belief for 
coherence, but there are the problems that more than one set of 
beliefs about the supernatural, for example, may be coherent or 
that the belief system may contain incoherences. Incoherence 
may appear to be a reason for rejecting a belief, but it can 
always be removed by showing why the natives do not perceive 
it. A more promising requirement, he suggests, is that the 
everyday meanings of native words used in utterances expressing 
beliefs should have been firmly established, but this is, at 
best, inconclusive since words can have more than one meaning. 
(77) 
The anthropologist can invoke the notions of ambiguity and 
metaphor when he does not wish to be bound by the everyday 
meanings of native terms. Since, therefore, one way of putting 
the question at issue is to ask when an utterance may be given 
a special metaphysical interpretation we cannot, concludes 
Hollis, rest content that the words always carry the sense they 
were allocated at the bridgehead. (15) 
Rational Interconnection of Beliefs - The Bridgehead 
Thus far, therefore, we do not seem to have progressed very far 
in solving the problem of contextual versus universal criteria 
of rationality nor with the problem of translation. Hollis, 
however, puts forward the proposition that it is possible to 
find internal relations among the beliefs that make their 
identification plausible. Hollis rejects both deductive and 
inductive relations as a way of achieving this, and argues that 
we should, instead, test alleged native beliefs for rational 
interconnection. Each new identification of a native belief 
has to be plausible given what is already established. In 
other words, to justify an identification we must show that a 
native who believed what we already know he believes would have 
a good reason to believe what we now claim he believes. There 
is, however, a problem here since what counts as a good reason 
(78) 
appears to be a social matter and so has to be discovered by 
empirical investigation - we should have to know what the 
natives believed in order to find out what is a good reason for 
what; and we should have to know what the native criteria for 
rational belief were before we could find out what they 
believe. We can, however, avoid this circle, according to 
Hollis, if we distinguish between the definition of a concept 
and examples of its application. It would be fatal, he argues, 
to allow that anthropologist and native might have different 
concepts of what is meant by saying that one belief gives a 
good reason for holding another; but if we add to the necessary 
conditions for the possibility of anthropology a shared concept 
of rational belief, then we are free to admit that some 
societies find rational beliefs which others find to be 
irrational. (16) 
In Hollis' account, therefore, the anthropologist emerges as 
part chronicler, collecting observed facts of native behaviour; 
part philosopher, setting 
'a priori' limits to the possible 
interpretation of the facts; and part social theorist, deciding 
which of the interpretations consistent with the facts is 
empirically correct. We cannot, argues Hollis, understand the 
irrational and to suppose that we can is to run into vicious 
circles, but we can understand the rational in more than one 
(79) 
way. (17) Hollis, therefore, according to Archer, is 
advocating a rationalistic approach to translation which 
depends upon the establishment of a bridgehead between two 
languages; that is, a set of utterances definitive of the 
standard meaning of words. The investigator has to assume that 
he and the native share the same perceptions and make the same 
empirical judgements in simple situations and these serve to 
anchor communication and to get translation going by allowing 
the researcher to identify standard meanings for everyday 
native terms. (18) 
The Necessity of the Possibility of Translation 
Relativists, however, Archer argues, would deny these 
assumptions. Barnes and Bloor, for example, argue that 
learning, even the most elementary of terms, is a slow process 
that involves the acquisition from the culture of specific 
conventions - they are culturally influenced. There are, they 
argue, no privileged occasions for the use of the term, no 
simple perceptual situations which provide the researcher with 
'standard meanings' uncomplicated by cultural variables. In 
short, there is no bridgehead and, therefore, perfect 
translation cannot exist; there can only be translation 
acceptable for practical purposes. This, though, is no problem 
(80) 
for the relativist who claims that he can do without 
translation altogether. It is necessary for the rationalist 
because without it beliefs could not be ascribed to other 
people of other places and times which would mean nothing could 
be said about the formal logical relations of beliefs; yet 
relativists also want to assert things about alien beliefs - 
very different things like their relationship to local 
conditions and conventions - but still assertions. So, asks 
Archer, why is translation not necessary to them? Their answer 
involves circumventing translation and making a direct assault 
on alien language and culture. As a strategy it could be 
called 'becoming as a child' or 
'going native'. Archer, 
however, argues that, in the first place, such a strategy 
cannot be a complete alternative to translation for it can only 
be attempted with other living people. It deals only with the 
contemporary, with inserting oneself into some current alien 
context in order to assert its difference. It cannot thus 
dispose of the necessity of translation when attempting to 
ascribe beliefs to the majority of cultural agents - for these 
are the dead. (19) 
More fundamentally, for Archer, the relativist strategy cannot 
remove the necessity of translation. As Hollis argued, it is, 
where alien beliefs are concerned, the most direct attack on 
(81) 
meaning available. (20) Barnes and Bloor, however, argue that 
translation is not the most direct attack on meaning since it 
was not available, nor did it play a part in, the first attack 
any of us have on meaning when we acquire language. Firstly, 
they argue that language acquisition is not a translation 
process and nothing that is absent here can be a necessary 
ingredient in subsequent learning. Thus to understand an alien 
culture we can proceed in the way the native speakers do and 
any difficulties in achieving this will be pragmatic rather 
than 'a priori'. Problems arise, however, for Archer, because 
this statement about acquiring a second language obfuscates the 
undoubted truth that the presence of a first language is an 
ingredient in subsequent language learning. This leads to 
difficulties, which are 'a prioristic' and not just pragmatic. 
As language speakers, we simply are unable to become as pre- 
linguistic children. Since all knowledge is conceptually 
formed and, therefore, linguistically enshrined, then 
acquisition of a second language will be inescapably filtered 
through the first. It is not possible to 'go native' and it 
follows, 'a priori' there is no alinguistic 'entree' accessible 
to existing language speakers. Secondly, Archer argues that 
even if we suspend these points, there could be no 'return of 
the native'. Without the possibility of translation there is 
no way that the investigator of alien beliefs who had gone 
(82) 
through the business of 'becoming as a child' could then report 
back what the natives did believe. In other words, not only is 
there no 'entree', there would be no exit. (21) 
A description of the role of anthropology, therefore, would be 
reduced to saying that 'if you want to understand 'X', then go 
and live with them for five years and then we will talk about 
'X' in 'X's language, replete with its conventions, reasons and 
truths - that is, we will then talk together as natives'. It 
would, suggests Archer, remain impossible to ascribe beliefs to 
the natives and communicate these to others. Even more 
worrying is that if one tries to imagine this capacity to move 
from one linguistic skin to another, stating and believing one 
thing in one language and something incompatible in another, 
then if translation is, indeed, an impossibility, one could not 
know that one was doing this oneself. In short nothing 
comparative can either be privately known or publicly 
communicated about alien beliefs. (22) 
We thus come full circle back to the necessity of translation. 
If we cannot ascribe beliefs, Archer claims, the end result is 
that sociology has no role to play in explaining actions. 
Radical relativism, she argues, sought to undermine 
ethnocentric sociology, but taken to its logical conclusion it 
(83) 
undermines the discipline altogether. Unless we accept as our 
basic axiom that, as Hollis suggested, if the natives reason 
logically at all they reason as we do, we effectively abolish 
the human subject. (23) Translation, therefore, is essential. 
Trigg, too, suggests that when people enter an alien culture 
they must assume that they and the natives see the world in the 
same way. Even if they cannot translate from the native 
culture to their own, they must assume that they are able, in 
some pre-linguistic manner, to grasp what the natives are 
talking about. Thus, while conceptual relativists may try to 
undermine all possibility of translation, they are still forced 
to rely on the fact that they and the natives share common 
human reactions to a common objective world, otherwise teaching 
and learning would be impossible. (24) 
Trigg is arguing, therefore, that this means that translation 
is possible after all since different languages must refer to 
the same world. The relativist may wish to deny any basic 
similarity with the members of another society whose culture 
may have conditioned them to see things differently, to act 
differently and divide up the world differently. People in a 
culture would be similar enough to communicate but there would 
be a great divergence between cultures. This may be the case, 
admits Trigg, but such differences would not only undermine the 
(84) 
possibility of translation, but would prohibit participation by 
anyone in a society which is not their own. Thus, if 
relativists are correct we are locked into the culture into 
which we are born. If it is possible to leave one society to 
join another, then membership of a society is not the most 
important fact about people. Their conceptual schemes are not 
totally conditioned by a society, but depend, at least in part, 
on their membership of the human race; on the same objective 
world in which they find themselves. (25) 
Summary 
Here then we have an analysis of views that differ in many 
respects from that of Winch and his idea of 'ways of life'. 
What the above arguments suggest is that while different 
societies may have different sets of beliefs, norms, values, 
and so on, this does not mean that members of other societies 
with different sets of beliefs can never understand the beliefs 
and subsequent actions of the individuals of the first society. 
Relativists suggest that the only way we can ever comprehend 
the actions of peoples of a different culture is 'by going 
native', but as Archer points out this is unrealistic since we 
can never totally suspend our assumptions and beliefs which we 
derive from our own social structure; and, even if we could, we 
(85) 
could never then give any explanations other than in terms of 
the criteria that belonged to that society which would, again, 
make understanding and explanation impossible. 
Hollis' answer to the problem of translation, it seems to me, 
has much to recommend it. That is, that even though the 
members of different societies may have different beliefs and 
values, it is inconceivable that different societies have 
different concepts of what is meant by saying that one belief 
gives a good reason for holding another. In this idea Hollis 
is arguing that we should test alleged native beliefs for 
rational interconnection - that is, to show that a native who 
believed what we already know he believes would have a good 
reason to believe what we now claim he believes. In this way, 
while we may not be able to understand what we conceive of as 
irrational beliefs we can understand the rational in more than 
one way (or rather, we can understand the process of good 
reasoning which underpins the beliefs). But we do have shared 
concepts of rationality in the way outlined by Hollis so 
translation is possible. Rationality, in other words, should 
not be seen as relative to different cultures as Winch implied. 
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SUMMARY TO PART ONE 
As we have seen human action, for Winch, is best understood in 
terms of rule-following. Specifically, Winch maintains that we 
need to understand the rules followed by different people and 
cultures in order to explain their actions. Central to this 
idea of rules is the notion that they are socially constructed 
and reinforced so that the notion of obeying a rule presupposes 
the notion of making a mistake. People can only be said to be 
following a rule if it is possible for other people to 
understand the rule being followed and to assess if it is being 
followed correctly. I have indicated, however, that there are 
a number of problems associated with this view that cast doubts 
on the suggestion that action-explanations should be in terms 
of rules. Why then, it can be asked, have I devoted so much 
attention to the ideas of Winch? 
What Happened to the Subjective Understanding of Action? 
The answer to the above question lies in the fact that while 
Winch stresses the importance of a 'subjective' understanding 
of action, his insistence on rule-following resulted in the 
subjective being virtually ignored when explaining the actions 
of individual agents. Winch, in fact, stated that we should 
explain action in terms of the subjective meaning agents attach 
to their actions - that is, their motives or reasons. Yet when 
(88) 
we look at his theory in detail we find that agents really act 
in accordance with the dictates of rules; and, moreover, that 
these rules are socially and not individually constructed. 
This seeming contradiction led me to question what it was about 
Winch's theory of action that led him to this rather 
unsatisfactory conclusion. It seemed to me that the answer lay 
in the way in which Winch analysed how reasons for action are 
actually formed. 
In Winch, reasons are formed on the basis of an uncritical 
acceptance by individual agents of the norms, values, beliefs, 
and so on, which are given to those individuals by the 
collectivity. Thus the reasons why an agent acts in one way 
rather than another are socially prescribed and reinforced by 
the society in which that agent resides. But, can we really 
say that agents are so 'puppet-like' that they are incapable of 
forming their own reasons for their own actions? Yes, I would 
admit that in many cases agents are influenced in their actions 
by external factors that are not of their own making. However, 
I would not agree that agents are so uncritical in their 
acceptance of the rules, of whatever kind, that exist in the 
society or culture of which they are a member. Rather, I would 
argue that agents are capable of assessing the situation in 
which they find themselves, counting the costs that would have 
(89) 
to be paid as a result of their actions and making decisions in 
terms of these costs. Moreover, I would also argue that we 
should not see reasons for actions only in terms of the 
acceptance of rules whether individually or socially 
constructed. In other words, reasons are more than rule- 
following. In order to demonstrate how this conclusion was 
arrived at, I shall briefly examine the fundamental problems I 
see as existing in the idea of rule-following. 
Reasons Are More Than Rule-Following 
One of these problems is clearly indicated in Maclntyre's 
question 'What is the wrong way of going for a walk? '. While 
it is clear that some actions, like 'writing a letter' or 
'reading a book', are wrongly described as 'going for a walk', 
this does not mean that there is one correct way of going for a 
walk that is prescribed by a set of rules which were socially 
constructed and sanctioned. Some actions may, indeed, be 
governed by rules - for example, those actions of players in a 
game of cards - but this is not to say that the concept of 
meaningful or intentional action itself involves the 
application of rules. People do not have to obey rules, even 
in a game of cards (they may cheat), for their action to be 
intentional. People may be more or less committed to following 
(90) 
rules and there may be other facts which help condition whether 
or not they do so (they may need to win some money or gain 
prestige by winning). 
I would argue then that Winch's insistence that actions can 
only be explained in terms of following socially constructed 
rules produces an oversocialised view of man. It allows no 
room for the agent to make decisions about his or her own 
actions. People, I want to suggest, act for 'reasons' not 
because they are unquestioningly following the rules of the 
society to which they belong. 
What I am suggesting, therefore, is that when explaining 
actions we should firstly examine the agent's own reasons for 
his or her action. It could be that the agent is acting in 
accordance with socially prescribed rules, but this should not 
be assumed at the outset. Actions, in fact, as the example of 
the 'cheating' card player illustrates, may be explained in 
terms of the reasons why an agent chooses to disobey or ignore 
rules. How though could Winch explain this scenario? He may 
argue that this agent is acting in terms of a different set of 
rules, but it would be very difficult to show where rules for 
cheating, for example, came from and how they could all be 
(91) 
socially constructed, especially since some forms of cheating 
must be private to be effective. Rather than explaining the 
actions of this agent in terms of rules, then, I would argue 
that we should begin by analysing for what reason the agent 
felt it necessary to cheat - his reason for his action. It may 
be the case that his action is as a result of the objective 
situation in which he finds himself (for example, he may need 
to pay off a debt), but it is still the agent's own decision to 
act in this way faced with this structural situation (not 
everyone who owes money will resolve his problem by cheating at 
cards). In short, I want to maintain that reasons are more 
than rule-following. 
How Can Winch Account for Ideology and Social Change? 
Another aspect of the idea of rule-following which leads me to 
want to find a more adequate explanation of action also relates 
to the idea that learning why people act as they do involves 
learning the standards governing life in the society in which 
they live. Ideas, for Winch, cannot be torn out of their 
context since the relation between ideas and context is an 
internal one. For example, Winch would contend that the 
concepts employed by primitive people can only be interpreted 
in the context of the way of life of those people. Here, then, 
(92) 
we have the problem of cultural relativism which, taken to its 
logical conclusion, means that we can never understand the 
actions of people who live in a culture different to our own. 
This has already been discussed in some detail, but for the 
purposes of my own arguments I would like to concentrate on the 
failure of relativism to account for ideology and social change 
since this has a direct bearing on the role of 'emergent 
properties' or 'external reasons' to be discussed subsequently. 
To begin with 'ideology'. Whilst I would agree that it is 
important when we are examining other cultures that we 
appreciate that their 'ways of life', beliefs and attitudes may 
be different from ours and that this should be taken into 
account in our explanations, I would argue, with Gellner, that 
excessive indulgence in contextual charity blinds us to what is 
best and what is worst in the life of societies. For example, 
it may prevent us from seeing the possibility of social control 
through the use by elite groups of ideology. It is important 
to recognise, I believe, that institutions and beliefs, in any 
society, may not be fully or correctly understood by the 
members of that society and may play a different role, say, of 
the maintenance of the power of an elite group, than the role 
perceived by other members of that society. Such a role, if it 
exists, needs to be recognised, understood and explained if we 
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are to have any knowledge of that societal form; yet this is 
not possible if we take the Winchian contextualist approach. 
If we follow Winch, then the explanation of a belief or 
institution lies in the meaning it has for the members of that 
society to which it belongs, and only that meaning. Now, I am 
not denying that the meaning beliefs, and so on, have for the 
agents is important in action explanations. But, if it is the 
case that members of a society do not fully understand the role 
of that belief, as, say, a method of social control, then we 
are missing a fundamental aspect of the explanation of that 
belief. As I will argue later, an observer may be in a better 
position to see the picture more clearly than those involved in 
the situation in question but this is not to negate the 
importance of the agent's subjective understanding and 
responses to this situation when explaining his or her 
subsequent actions. 
The fundamental point I am making here is that Winch could not 
bring into any explanation of action the existence of 
ideological tenets that have been appropriated and internalised 
by agents and which, therefore, should feature in any 
explanation of their actions. He is, in fact, arguing that 
observers should never even try to analyse whether the function 
of the 'rules' an agent is supposedly following is correctly 
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understood by that agent nor even whether there are any 
apparent inconsistencies or incoherences in the doctrines that 
are being advocated. This, it seems to me, leaves us with a 
rather limited or partial account of the actions of these 
individuals. It is true that Winch is correct to argue that 
explanations of actions should involve examining the 
individual's reason for that action, but this does not mean 
that the explanation should end here. Rather, the explanation 
should be in terms of how this reason was formed and this 
necessarily involves an assessment of the role or function of 
any ideas or ideologies that may have served to influence the 
agent in his or her action. 
To return, however, to relativism. This position also seems to 
preclude any possibility of social change. Why is it that 
societies do not remain static unless changes arise, at least 
in part, from the fact that people can become aware of 
incoherences in beliefs and institutions or the falsity of the 
doctrines advocated, and proceed to reform or destroy the 
institutions that serve to justify them? How, in Winch, would 
people come to notice these inconsistencies if they rigidly 
accepted and obeyed social rules and had no contact with or 
understanding of (which involves the possibility of 
translation) other ways of life with different beliefs and 
(95) 
doctrines. In fact, Winch's 'ways of life' argument only works 
in a world populated by sets of small tribes with rigid 
boundaries and no contact with one another. Yet, I would 
contend that in most cases 'ways of life' do overlap and 
compete; and people often revise their beliefs and assumptions 
as a result of this. People, in other words, are capable of 
learning and may change their beliefs as a result of new ideas 
or additional information - but how could this happen if we 
accept the idea of socially constructed rules and 'ways of 
life'? 
Thus I would agree with Hollis and Archer that we are able to 
assess and understand the concepts or ideas that exist in other 
societies. This is by no means an argument for whether we 
should judge these as somehow right or wrong, rational or 
irrational. Certain beliefs and ideas may appear to us to be 
irrational and we may be able to demonstrate for what reasons 
they are so, but this is not the function of the observer who 
is trying to explain why people act in one way rather than 
another. What is important is that we assess to what extent 
these doctrines or beliefs influence the actions of the members 
of that society, but not only in terms of how the agents 
perceive them since this would only give a partial account. We 
(96) 
also need to understand the role and function of these ideas in 
order to explain fully the extent and influence they have on 
individual actions. 
Reasons Rather Than Rules as Explanations of Actions 
All these problems associated with rule-following, I would 
argue, point to the need to seek for a more adequate 
explanation of human action. I want to stress, however, that I 
agree with Winch to the extent that he argues that we should 
begin any explanation of human action with the subjective 
meaning the actor attaches to his or her action - his or her 
reason. It is then the case that I do not totally reject all 
that Winch argued for in "The Idea of a Social Science... ". 
Where the fundamental problem with Winch lies, in my view, is 
that reasons, for Winch, are not seen as, possibly, the product 
of the agent without the influence of external factors, nor 
really internal to the extent that they are influenced by 
social, cultural or structural factors and then appropriated, 
critically, by the agent. Rather they are seen as being formed 
by the social structure in which the agent lives. This has 
resulted in the unsatisfactory state of affairs where the 
agent, far from being the prime mover in action-explanations, 
is seen as simply a 'puppet' of society acting in terms of the 
dictates of the social structure. 
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My analysis of Winch, therefore, led me to the conclusion that 
while reasons should indeed be the starting point of any 
explanation of action, these reasons entail more than just the 
acceptance of socially prescribed rules. The question 
remained, therefore, as to how reasons are formed. Are reasons 
wholly 'subjective'? Can we also see reasons as external as 
well as internal to the agents? Is the formation of reasons 
the result of an interaction between a number of factors and 
not simply a product of the individual or the social structure? 
It is to answering these questions that the rest of this thesis 
is devoted. 
PART TWO 
REASONS AS CAUSES OF ACTIONS 
The first chapter of this section involves a brief examination 
of how we can see reasons as explanations of action. This 
involves an examination of the works of Davidson and Hollis who 
argue that reasons must be seen as the product of pro-attitudes 
or desires plus beliefs. Of fundamental importance here is the 
idea, put forward most strongly by Hollis, that both desires 
and beliefs must be included in action explanations in terms of 
reasons, particularly because a belief can modify or change a 
desire. 
This leads us on to the questions of why Winch, although he 
accepts the basic argument that 'reasons' provide the 
explanation of action, rejects any notion of causality when 
explaining actions. This, I am going to suggest, rests on his 
restriction of cause and effect to the Humean notion of 
causation which argues that the same cause always results in 
the same effect, which clearly cannot be applied to the actions 
of human agents. Within this area of discussion, I will also 
examine Davidson's arguments concerning how reasons can be 
causes. Whilst I agree with Davidson to the extent that 
central to the relationship between reasons and action is the 
idea that the agent performed the action because he had the 
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reason, and his idea that reasons, as beliefs and desires, are 
not identical with actions as Winch claimed; I would also argue 
that Davidson is mistaken to try and re-work the Humean idea of 
cause and effect in his attempt to explain actions causally. 
In this way, in the third chapter, I am going to examine 
Bhaskar's interpretation of causation and its application to 
both the natural and social sciences. In this he argues that 
intentional human action is caused, it is always caused by 
reasons, and it is only because it is caused by reasons that it 
can be conceived of as intentional. Bhaskar's fundamental 
claim is that we should see causes (both natural and social) as 
the tendency of things to happen given certain circumstances, 
but that other factors may intervene to alter the resulting 
action. In other words, causal laws are tendencies. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Introduction 
The following discussion will outline two fundamental issues 
involved in the analysis of reasons as explanations of action. 
That is, firstly, that the theorists considered seem to agree 
that the explanation of actions should be in terms of reasons; 
not, as positivists argue, in terms of social facts of one kind 
or another. There is, therefore, no real disagreement on where 
the focus of our understanding of action should lie. Where the 
disagreement arises concerns the question of from what source 
these reasons are derived and thus what the status of 
explanations in terms of reasons is - can they, in other words, 
be seen in terms of 'cause and effect? 
Reasons as Rules - An Externalist Account 
Winch's analysis of reasons begins, correctly, by examining 
what is meant by human action as opposed to the behaviour of 
inanimate or non-human subjects. Thus, he uses the definition 
of action provided by Weber who argues that we are concerned 
with human behaviour if and in so far as the agent or agents 
associate a subjective sense with it. The sense of which Weber 
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speaks is something which is 'subjectively' intended and the 
notion of meaningful behaviour is closely associated with 
notions like motives and reasons. Motive means, in fact, a 
meaningful configuration of circumstances which, to the agent 
or observer, appears as a meaningful 
'reason' for the behaviour 
in question. (1) 
Winch does not take issue with this definition of human action, 
indeed, he endorses the idea of acting for a reason when 
explaining the behaviour of human beings. However, the main 
crux of Winch's argument, as we have seen, is that the 
analysis of meaningful behaviour must give central role to the 
notion of rules: "that all behaviour which is meaningful 
(therefore all specifically human behaviour) is 'ipso facto' 
rule-governed". (2) 
In other words, even when we are talking in terms of reasons we 
must see these as somehow formed in terms of socially 
prescribed and sanctioned rules. The fundamental problem, 
therefore, with the Winchian view of action-explanations is 
that the subjective nature of reasons seems to be ignored. 
While Winch stated that he was concerned with the subjective in 
the explanation of social life, the argument that actions 
should be explained in terms of rule-following, and the 
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contention that these rules are socially not individually or 
privately constructed, is difficult to reconcile with his 
original claims. This problem stems from a rather limited view 
of how reasons for actions are formed. Can we really argue 
that the reasons the agent has for his or her action can only 
be seen as a product of socially constructed rules? Reasons, I 
would maintain, involve more than rule-following. Winch may be 
correct to talk in terms of reasons when explaining actions, 
but he is mistaken to restrict the concept of reason to an 
uncritical acceptance of socially prescribed rules on the part 
of the agent. 
Reasons as Pro-attitudes Plus Beliefs - An Internalist Account 
Davidson would argue, in opposition to Winch, that reasons are 
individually and not socially constructed. He begins his 
analysis by asking what the relationship is between a reason 
and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the 
agent's reason for doing what he did? Such explanations, he 
argues, can be called 'rationalisations', and a reason can be 
seen to rationalise the action. For Davidson, a reason can 
only rationalise an action if it leads us to see something the 
agent saw, or thought he saw, in his action. We cannot explain 
why someone did what they did simply by saying that the action 
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'appealed' to them, we must indicate what it was about the 
action that appealed. A person, in fact, can be characterised 
as performing an action for a reason: firstly, if he has a pro- 
attitude towards action of a certain kind; and, secondly, 
believes his action is of that kind. (3) In short, Davidson 
suggests that "'R' is a primary reason why an agent performed 
the action 'A' under the description 'd' only if 'R' 
constitutes a pro-attitude of the agent towards actions with a 
certain property and a belief of the agent that 'A' under the 
description 'd' has that property. " (4) 
To illustrate this point Davidson asks, for example, how my 
wanting to turn on a light be (part of) a primary reason for my 
turning on the light. It is easy, he suggests, to be misled by 
the verbal parallel between 'I turned on the light' and 'I 
wanted to turn on the light' since the second has the same 
event as the first as its object. Davidson maintains, however, 
that the event of turning on the light cannot be referred to in 
the same way by both sentences since the existence of the event 
is required by the truth of 'I turned on the light' but not by 
the truth of 'I wanted to turn on the light'. If the reference 
was the same in both cases, the second sentence would entail 
the first. But, in fact, the sentences are logically 
independent. Moreover, Davidson suggests, the event whose 
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occurrence makes 'I turned on the light' true cannot be called 
the object of 'I wanted to turn on the light'. If I turned on 
the light then I must have done it at a precise moment and in a 
particular way - every detail is fixed. However, we cannot 
demand that my want be directed at an action performed at any 
one moment or done in some unique way, since any one of a large 
number of actions would satisfy the want and can be considered 
equally eligible as its object. For example, 'I want that gold 
watch in the window' is not a primary reason, and only explains 
why I went into the shop because it suggests a primary reason 
such as 'I wanted to buy the watch'. Essentially, Davidson is 
arguing that because 'I wanted to turn on the light' and 'I 
turned on the light' are logically independent, the first can 
be used to give a reason why the second is true. (5) 
This, as will be shown, represents the important difference 
between Winch and Davidson, and is one reason why Davidson sees 
action-explanations in terms of cause and effect -a notion 
Winch totally rejects. What, though, is it about this account 
which leads me to argue that Davidson is stressing the internal 
aspect of reason-formation at the expense of more external 
factors? To answer this I will examine Hollis' contention that 
we must explain reasons by both desires and beliefs. 
(105) 
Reasons as Desires Plus Beliefs 
Hollis, in a similar way to Davidson, also argues that actions 
result from reasons and that reasons can be seen in terms of 
desires (which are similar to pro-attitudes) and beliefs. (6) 
But, in a very fundamental way, their accounts differ. While 
Davidson does argue that a primary reason consists of both a 
belief and a pro-attitude, he suggests that it generally serves 
no practical purpose to mention both. If, for example, he 
argues, you tell me you are 
'easing the jib because you think 
that will stop the main from backing', I do not need to be told 
that you want to stop the main from backing. Similarly, many 
explanations of action in terms of reasons that are not primary 
do not require mention of the primary reason and, thus, if I 
say 'I am pulling weeds because I want a beautiful lawn', it is 
fatuous to add 'and so I see something desirable in any action 
that does, or has a good chance of, making the lawn beautiful'. 
Why, asks Davidson, insist that there is any step, logical or 
psychological, in the transfer of desire to an end that is not 
an action to the action one conceives as means? It serves the 
argument as well that the desired end explains the action only 
if what are believed by the agent to be means are desired. (7) 
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There is, however, Hollis argues, an essential reason why such 
a step must be included in the action explanation - that is, 
that a belief can regulate a desire by sanctioning it or 
proscribing it. He maintains that most desires are premised on 
beliefs of many kinds and would change if the beliefs changed. 
For example, a desire to visit a zoo might not survive if a 
person discovered the zoo was closed or that the animals were 
cruelly treated. Thus, whenever it makes sense to ask why the 
agent prefers 'x' to 'y' and to expect a reason, the preference 
is not exactly given. One needs to know how an agent would 
respond to a change in his situation or in his beliefs about 
the situation. Not to consider the effect on his current 
preferences would be a mistake. In addition, it is also a 
mistake to fail to notice that the results of an action are 
prone to affect the desires that prompted it. For example, it 
is possible that clever advertising can persuade people to buy 
things which then leads to fresh wants (or to acquire the wants 
the advertiser has fooled them into supposing they had 
already). (8) 
In this way, Hollis is rejecting the Humean notion that only 
desire can move an agent (an argument we return to 
subsequently). There is, he argues, no obvious reason for 
regarding desire rather than belief as the determining 
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component of action. Both the desire and the belief are 
necessary to account for action and both must be included in an 
action-explanation. Action, in Hollis' view, results from 
desire plus belief in such a way that belief can be a motive to 
the will. Rational agents, he argues, act from objectively 
good reasons whose merits are conceptually independent of their 
current desires. The key question, for Hollis, is whether the 
rationality of action is always relative to the current desires 
of the agent as Hume argued? This involves asking what form a 
reason for an action must take if it is to move a man? The 
Humean view is that reasons for actions must be 'internal' to 
the desires of the agent whose reasons they are. Hollis, 
however, claims that man may 'sit in judgement' on his present 
desires and, when reason demands, decide to act against the 
balance of his 'internal' reasons. In other words, 'external 
reasons' can be effective. (9) 
The Importance of External Reasons 
While, as will be discussed in part four, I have some problems 
with Hollis' account of action, suffice it to say that the 
essential point I want to make here is that reasons may not 
only be 'internal' to the agent, but may derive from external 
sources. Trigg also raises this point, arguing that it is 
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impossible that we should only be concerned with individual 
motives since this leaves out of account the sheer complexity 
of society. Individualist accounts, he argues, are atomistic. 
The meaning of actions becomes the meaning given separately to 
them by individuals acting in isolation from each other. Each 
separate social happening can then be understood even when it 
is wrenched from its social setting which, for Trigg, is an 
impossible task for anyone to take to extremes since human 
beings are born into societies and made by them as well as 
making them. (10) 
Thus, Davidson and Hollis both argue that beliefs are essential 
to the explanation of human action. Desires, alone, cannot 
explain actions although they are an important element in the 
formation of reasons. Moreover, both agree that desires are 
not fixed - they can change as a result of a change in beliefs. 
Thus, Trigg argues that if we explain actions in terms of 
atomic individuals with fixed desires, then features of society 
are explained in terms of the desires and are not allowed to 
explain them. This, then, leaves no room for a sociological 
understanding of the way desires can be created by society or 
for the possibility that beliefs can modify desires. Refusing 
to accept that human reason has any control over desires 
strikes at the root of all freedom. It merely locates the 
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causes of our behaviour in whatever produces our desires. If 
our wants are fixed and unalterable we seem then to be mere 
puppets acting according to the dictates of something beyond 
our control. (11) On the contrary, in Hollis' words "the 
rational man is master of his passions and so his own free 
sovereign artificer". (12) 
Summary 
What the above arguments demonstrate is that, in my view, Winch 
is correct in his claim that meaningful behaviour is associated 
with acting for a reason and involves examining the agent's own 
reasons for doing what he or she did. Where he is mistaken is 
in proceeding to claim that meaningful behaviour must be seen 
as rule-governed, and that these rules are socially constructed 
and specific to 'ways of life'. There appears, therefore, to 
be a contradiction in Winch whereby, on the one hand, he 
stresses the importance of the subjective and the need for 
interpretative understanding of action; yet, on the other hand, 
his insistence about rule-following seems to emphasise the 
social over the subjective elements of explanation. 
The idea of reasons - as desires plus beliefs - as explanations 
of actions, therefore, has clear advantages over the idea of 
rule-governed behaviour, especially as it allows 'agency' back 
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into the notion of intentional action. However, as we have 
seen, there are various perceptions of how reasons are formed. 
On the one side, those in the Humean tradition and to some 
extent Davidson, see reasons as 'internal' to the agent - as 
purely subjective. This I will argue is not the whole picture 
either. On the other side, we have the suggestion made by 
Hollis that reasons cannot be seen as internal to the agent 
since they are influenced by factors that exist outside the 
agent's subjective desires. 
Here then we extend the idea of reason formation to include 
'external' factors as influences on how reasons are 
constructed. This, though, should not be seen in terms of 
socially constructed rules which are uncritically accepted by 
agents. As I am going to argue, while agents may be influenced 
by external factors they still retain the choice of whether or 
not they act in terms of them. Such 'external reasons' for 
actions, therefore, should be seen as influences on action 
rather than 'rules' of conduct. Moreover, it is to be my 
contention that by accepting the idea that reasons may be 
'external' we should not exclude the possibility that actions 
may result from internal reasons - either reasons that are 
purely internal to the agent or reasons that have been 
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appropriated from outside factors and then internalised. All 
these issues will be-raised in part three. For the purpose of 
this section, however, I want to discuss how these different 
views on how reasons are formed are reflected in the various 
authors' ideas of the possibility of a causal account of human 
action. In particular, I am going to argue that just because 
we accept the idea that actions should be explained in terms of 
reasons this does not mean that reasons should not be seen as 
causes of action. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CAUSES AND EFFECTS - THE PROBLEMS OF THE HUMEAN ACCOUNT 
Introduction 
In order to address the issue of whether actions can be 
explained causally, I shall return, for the moment, to the 
first fundamental statement made by Winch - that is, that the 
question of what is real involves the problems of man's 
relation to reality which is a conceptual not an empirical 
question. It is for this reason, he argues, that it cannot be 
understood in terms of the preconceptions of the natural 
sciences, nor can it be answered by generalising from 
particular instances. (1) 
This idea is extended to the notion of the relationship between 
reasons and actions - that is, that the connection between them 
is an 'internal' one whereas that between cause and effect is 
'external'. It is this argument and, as I will suggest, 
Winch's rather restricted account of causal explanations to 
that advocated by Hume, which leads him to the conclusion that 
the same methodology cannot be applied to the social sciences 
as can be applied to the natural sciences, especially 
explanations in terms of cause and effect. What I want to 
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argue, here, however, is that both these contentions are 
questionable and lead to a misconception of the relationship 
between reasons and actions and the status of the explanations 
that can be given in terms of reasons. 
The Humean Notion of Causation 
Winch accepts, in his discussion of J. S. Mill's argument that 
the methods of investigation of the philosophy of the social 
sciences should be seen as the same as those of science in 
general (2), that scientific investigation is based on Hume's 
notion of causation. That is, to say that 'A' is the cause of 
'B' is not to assert the existence of any intelligible (or 
mysterious) nexus between 'A' and 'B', but to say that the 
temporal succession of 'A' and 'B' is an instance of a 
generalisation to the effect that events like 'A' are always 
found in our experience to be followed by events like W. (3) 
Winch, however, with some justification, rejects the idea that 
explanations of social life can be seen as the same as those 
employed in the natural sciences (if we perceive science in a 
Humean way). He wants to demonstrate, and this is crucial to 
his whole theoretical position, that "the notion of human 
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society involves a scheme of concepts which is logically 
incompatible with the kinds of explanations offered in the 
natural sciences". (4) 
Can Reasons Be Causes? 
Winch argues that since human agents do not simply behave but 
act in accordance with reasons or motives and attach meanings 
to their actions, then the explanations of the natural sciences 
dealing, as they do, with simple behaviour of inanimate 
objects, cannot apply to the explanation of human actions. 
But, it must be asked, is this necessarily the case? 
Trigg, for example, up to this point, seems to agree that 
'reasons' must be included in the explanation of actions. 
Human actions, he argues, are endowed with meaning and it may 
appear that they cannot be properly understood unless their 
meaning is grasped. Human behaviour, viewed as a mere 
succession of bodily movements, and human actions performed 
with definite motives and intentions, are not the same. The 
bodily movements involved in signing a cheque, for example, can 
never by themselves explain what is occurring. We would have, 
in addition, to understand the agent's reasons for transferring 
the money - to buy a house, give a present, pay a bribe, or 
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perform countless other actions. But, asks Trigg, if the goal 
of social science is to discover 'meanings' should the 
conclusion be drawn that it is not concerned with causal 
explanation? (5) 
Davidson would say that this conclusion need not be drawn. He 
claims that, in the light of a primary reason, an action is 
revealed as coherent with certain traits of the agent, and the 
agent is shown in his role of 'Rational Animal'. There is, he 
maintains, a certain irreducible sense in which every 
rationalisation justifies - that is, that from the agent's 
point-of-view, there was, when he acted, something to be said 
for the action. (6) For Davidson it is pro-attitudes plus 
beliefs which give the primary reason for an action and he 
further states that the primary reason for an action is its 
cause. (7) 
Here, therefore, it seems that we have some agreement that 
reasons can explain actions, but two opposing views on what 
type of explanation this is. On the one hand, Davidson is 
saying that reasons can be seen as causes of actions, but, on 
the other hand, Winch denies this claiming that meaning is not 
open to causal analysis. How, then, does Davidson perceive 
reasons to be causal explanations? 
(117) 
Davidson - Reasons as Mental Events 
One argument for claiming that actions cannot be explained 
causally is that both causes and effects must be seen as 
events, but primary reasons consist of attitudes and beliefs 
which are states or dispositions and not events. They cannot, 
then, be seen as causes. Davidson, however, does not agree 
with this conclusion. One reply to this, he suggests, is that 
states, dispositions and conditions are frequently named as 
causes of events - for example, 'the bridge collapsed because 
of a structural defect'. But, he argues, this does not answer 
the problem that mention of a causal condition for an event 
only gives a cause on the assumption that there was a preceding 
event. However, Davidson argues that while states and 
dispositions may not be events, the 'onslaught' of a state or 
disposition is, and, thus, in many cases events are very 
closely related with primary reasons. Those, then, who have 
claimed that there are no mental events to qualify as causes 
have missed the obvious because they insist that a mental event 
must be observed or noticed (rather than observing or noticing) 
or that it be like 'a stab', 'a qualm', 'a mysterious prod' or 
an act of the will. 
(118) 
Some writers, Davidson argues, challenge those who want to 
explain actions causally to identify an event which is common 
and peculiar in all cases. Davidson maintains, however, that 
there is, at least, a mental event which can be identified. 
For example, if we consider the case where a man driving an 
automobile raises his arm in order to signal. At some moment 
the driver noticed, or thought he noticed, his turn coming up 
and that is when he signalled. The signalling driver, he 
argues, can answer the question 'why did you raise your arm 
when you did? ', and from that answer we learn the event that 
caused the action (not that his turn coming up 'caused' the 
driver to raise his arm in some mechanical fashion; for 
example, he might start to do it on his way home and then 
decide to go in a different direction). It may be the case 
that the actor cannot always answer such a question; sometimes 
the answer will mention a mental event which does not give a 
reason, and there may be causes of intentional action where we 
cannot explain why we acted as we did. In such cases, though, 
explanation in terms of primary reasons parallels the 
explanation of the collapse of the bridge from a structural 
defect; we are ignorant of the event or sequence of events that 
caused the collapse, but we are sure that there was such an 
event or sequence of events. Davidson does concede, though, 
that it is not possible to find an event that is common and 
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peculiar in all cases where a man intentionally raises his arm. 
(9) But, as we shall see, he does not perceive 'generality' as 
a precondition of causal analysis even in the Humean sense of 
cause. 
Davidson's ideas have some support from Goldman. It is 
important to notice, argues Goldman, that from the point-of- 
view of the agent, practical reasoning does not appear as a 
causal process. When an agent is trying to decide what actions 
to perform, he is trying to select the 'best' course of action. 
A decision of this sort usually requires attention to the 
probable consequences of alternative acts, and sometimes 
requires attention to moral principles and so forth. 
Considerations such as these seem very far from any question 
concerning the causation of his action. Thus, Goldman argues, 
'What will be the consequence of my doing 'A'? ' is very 
different from 'What will be the cause of my doing 'A'? '. 
Nevertheless, although the agent, when deliberating, does not 
normally worry about the causes of his actions, the process of 
weighing alternatives, or noticing their probable consequences, 
etc. - this process itself constitutes a causal process 
culminating in his actions. In other words, although the 
agent's reasoning does not focus on its own causal efficacy, it 
has efficacy 'vis a vis' his action. (10) 
(120) 
In this way, doubts are thrown on the claim that motives or 
reasons cannot be seen as events, although Davidson and Goldman 
concede that these are mental events associated with the 
'onslaught' of reasons or motives. 
Social Action and Generalisations 
Winch, however, insists that the fact that we cannot 
'generalise' in social science precludes causal analysis in the 
realm of action explanations. Suppose, he suggests, that 'N', 
a university lecturer, states that he is going to cancel a 
lecture because he intends to travel to London. Here we have a 
statement of intention for which a reason is given. 'N' does 
not infer his intention of cancelling his lecture from his 
desire to go to London. He does not offer his reason as 
evidence for the soundness of his prediction about his future 
behaviour. Rather, he is justifying his intention. His 
statement is not of the form: 'such and such causal factors are 
present, therefore, this will result'; nor yet of the form: 'I 
have such and such a disposition which will result in my doing 
this'; it is of the form: 'in view of such and such 
considerations this will be a reasonable thing to do'. (11) 
(121) 
Winch, therefore, is arguing that causal accounts involve 
making generalisations which is not possible when we examine 
social action. Ryan, however, questions whether, in fact, we 
do not make generalisations about human action in the course of 
our everyday lives. There is a plausible argument, he 
suggests, that everyday life already involves an immense 
knowledge, unorganised though it may be, of the regularities 
implied in human behaviour - in fact, social life would be 
quite impossible if we could not expect that people would 
behave in a (more or less) regular manner. Such 
generalisations may be approximate and subject to exceptions, 
but as much could be said about many of the generalisations 
found in the natural sciences. (12) 
Yet, Ryan agrees with Winch that explanations of human action 
appeal not to causes, but reasons. He states that an important 
difference between reason and cause is that reasons can be 
assessed as good or bad, proper and improper, whereas cause 
either is or is not the cause of whatever we are explaining. A 
second important difference is that a person who makes a 
decision is not engaged in causal enquiry into his own motives. 
A man making a decision may well enquire into the causal 
factors which led him to assess things as he did, but Ryan 
argues, causal enquiries are not basic to our making decisions 
(note, however, Goldman's answer to a similar point). (13) 
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The question remains, however, whether the apparent 
regularities we observe in human behaviour can be accounted for 
causally. Perhaps, suggests Ryan, social behaviour, as Winch 
argued, should be understood as rule-following rather than 
causally regular. Winch is claiming, in fact, that the 
connections that hold between actions are conceptual and that 
the terminology which we employ in talking about actions is 
indispensable to our identity of actions as actions - rather 
than mere bodily happenings or physiological events. Human 
actions, in this view, are meaningful and meaning is not a 
category open to causal analysis. Thus, so long as meaningful 
actions form the subject matter of social enquiry, the most 
important category for our understanding will not be that of 
cause and effect but that of rule-guidedness. (14) 
What Winch is saying is that we cannot causally explain 
meaning. It could be argued, for example, that much political 
behaviour is linguistic - people listen to arguments and 
produce counter-arguments, they look at accounts of current 
events and talk to friends, relations and candidates. Thus, it 
could be said that all these things are causal influences on 
the way people behave in political matters, but, nonetheless, 
this does not mean that the meaning of what they hear and read 
can be causally explained. Indeed, to try and do so, argues 
(123) 
Ryan, is to 'put the cart before the horse' since the causal 
relationship is parasitic on the meaning of the words heard or 
read. We cannot explain the meaning of the words in terms of 
causation because it appears that social causation rests upon 
prior identification of conceptual connections. What Winch 
insists on, therefore, is that we cannot analyse meaning in 
causal terms but only in terms of rules which are necessarily 
social. (15) 
The Weberian Notion of Cause 
While Ryan argues that Winch is right in the assumption that we 
should not causally analyse meaning, he maintains that there 
is nothing wrong with backing up our accounts of the meaning of 
actions with causal analysis. In the first place, he argues, 
it is true that if people endow their actions with a certain 
significance, and thus follow certain social rules, they will 
display regularities in their activities so that the absence of 
these regularities would mean that our account of the 
significance of their actions would be wrong. In the second 
place, it is also true that people will only endow their lives 
with certain significance under particular circumstances. If 
we claim that people do things which have a certain 
significance for them, we can also claim that there are causes 
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and effects of their behaving in this manner. Not only can we 
analyse the internal logic of a way of life, we can ask what 
the origin and result of its existence are; and thus restore 
causality to a central place in the social sciences. Why, asks 
Ryan, should we restrict ourselves? Winch's argument seems to 
distort the perception we have of the great variety of 
questions we can ask within the social sciences. (16) 
It is clear that Ryan's account is influenced by the works of 
Weber and his ideas of the possibility of causation in the 
social sciences. Weber, while recognising that causal laws, 
like those of the physical sciences (assuming, again, the 
Humean notion of cause), were not possible in sociology since 
the same conditions never recur and the same causal sequences 
are never repeated, did argue that a different kind of causal 
analysis is possible. This is achieved by hypothetical 
analysis based on the conviction that it will be sufficient if 
we can locate the factor which, when removed, would make the 
decisive difference in a given sequence of events. The 
presence of this factor may then be accepted as an adequate 
explanation of the event. Thus, a cause is adequate if, 
without it, the desired end would not have been achieved or the 
event being explained would not have occurred. There can, for 
Weber, be no one universally valid system of general theory in 
(125) 
the social sciences, only 'adequate cause'. In sociology, 
therefore, it is only possible to determine, with some show of 
plausibility, causes adequate to account for the events and 
consequences of human action. (17) 
Weber, like Winch, argues that a person's action is to be 
explained in terms of the consequences he intended it to have - 
his motive or purpose. Thus, he argues that "a motive is a 
complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor himself 
or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in 
question". We apply the term 'adequacy at the level of 
meaning' "to the subjective interpretation of a coherent course 
of conduct when, and in so far as, according to our habitual 
modes of thought and feeling, its component parts taken in 
their mutual relation are recognised to constitute a 'typical' 
complex of meaning". 
(18) 
The concept of 'Verstehen' or interpretative understanding, for 
Weber, refers primarily to the spontaneous and immediate 
recognition of acts and their meanings in everyday life. 
Actions, he argues, can only be related to one another and to 
their overall context in terms of logical or conceptual 
connections. Thus far, therefore, Weber's account is very 
similar to that of Winch. However, he goes on to say that all 
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action takes place in a context which is structural and which 
we also need to understand. Action must be put into context 
both historically and contemporarily, in order to understand 
people's motives. Therefore, both a subjective understanding 
of meanings and an understanding of structural conditions are 
necessary. Thus, Weber argues: "Not ideas, but material and 
ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet, very 
frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' 
have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action 
has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. ". (19) 
Having established the 'subjectively intended meaning', 
therefore, or, rather, having posited a plausible hypothesis 
about that meaning, Weber wanted to add a further level of 
explanation in terms of adequate cause. For Weber, an 
understanding of action not only involves it having 'adequacy 
at the level of meaning' but also it should be 'causally 
adequate'. He argued that causally adequate interpretations 
concern the statistical probability that, according to verified 
generalisations from experience, there would be a correct or 
erroneous solution of the same problem. Causal explanations, 
then, depend upon being able to determine that there is a 
probability that a given observable event will be followed or 
accompanied by another event. (20) 
(127) 
Rules Revisited 
Winch, however, would deny that we can speak of action in terms 
of any kind of generalisations and it is this that precludes 
any type of causal analysis. It could be argued, admits Winch, 
that just because explanations appeal not to causal 
generalisations about the individual's reaction to his 
environment but to our knowledge of institutions and ways of 
life which give actions their meanings, this does not mean that 
the understanding of social institutions should not be a matter 
of grasping empirical generalisations. An institution, after 
all, is a certain kind of uniformity and a uniformity can only 
be grasped in a generalisation. However, Winch argues, while a 
regularity or uniformity may be a constant recurrence of the 
same kind of event on the same kind of occasion and hence 
statements of uniformity presuppose judgements of identity, 
these criteria of identity are necessarily relative to some 
rule - with the corollary that two events which count as 
qualitatively similar from the point-of-view of one rule will 
count as different from the point-of-view of another. Thus to 
investigate the type of regularity studied in a given type of 
enquiry is to examine the nature of the rule according to which 
judgements of identity are made. in that enquiry. Such 
judgements are intelligible only relative to a given mode of 
human behaviour governed by its own rules. In a physical 
(128) 
science, the relevant rules are those governing the procedures 
of the investigators in the science in question. Therefore, 
someone with no understanding of the problems and procedures of 
physics would gain nothing from being present at a complicated 
experiment. (21) 
These rules, argues Winch, rest on the social context of common 
activity, so to understand the activities of the scientist we 
must take account, firstly, of his relation to the phenomena he 
investigates; and, secondly, his relation to his fellow 
scientists. These two relations belong to different types. 
The phenomena being investigated present themselves to the 
scientist as an object of study - he observes them and notices 
certain facts about them. This presupposes, however, that he 
already has a mode of communication in the use of which rules 
are already being observed, since to notice something is to 
identify relevant characteristic which means the noticer must 
have some concept of such characteristics. This is only 
possible if he is able to use some symbol according to a rule 
which makes it refer back to those characteristics. Thus, we 
come to a scientist's relation to his fellow scientists, in 
which context alone he can be said to be following such a rule. 
Hence, his relationship with his fellows is not simply a 
relation of observation. It cannot consist in the fact that he 
(129) 
has noticed how his fellows behave and decided to take that as 
a norm for his own behaviour, since this would presuppose that 
we could give some account of the notion of 'noticing how his 
fellows behave' apart from the relation between the scientist 
and his fellows which we are trying to specify. In the course 
of his investigation, Winch maintains, the scientist applies 
and develops the concepts germane to his peculiar field of 
enquiry, and this application and modification are influenced 
both by the phenomena to which they are applied and also by the 
fellow workers in participation with whom they are applied. 
The two kinds of influence are different because, whereas it is 
on the basis of his observation of the phenomena that he 
develops the concepts as he does, he is only able to do this in 
virtue of his participation in an established form of activity 
with his fellow scientists in which they have all learned in 
similar ways and are therefore capable of communicating with 
each other. (22) 
In sociology, however, Winch argues, the matter is complicated. 
While in the case of the natural sciences there is only one set 
of rules - those governing the scientist's investigation 
itself, what the sociologist is studying, as well as his study 
of it, is a human activity carried out according to rules. It 
is these rules rather than those governing the investigation 
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which specify what is to count as 'doing the same kind of 
thing' in relation to that kind of activity. For instance, 
(and here we return again to the idea of 'ways of life') the 
sociologist of religion will have to judge according to the 
criteria taken not from sociology but from religion itself. 
If, though, the judgements of identity of the sociologist of 
religion rest on criteria taken from religion, then his 
relationship to the performers of the religious activity cannot 
be just that of observer to observed. It must, rather, be 
analogous to the participation of the natural scientist to his 
fellow scientists in the activity of scientific investigation. 
Thus, even if it is legitimate to speak of one's understanding 
of social life in terms of a knowledge of regularities, the 
nature of this knowledge must be very different from that of 
physical regularities. For example, a historian of art must 
have some aesthetic sense if he is to understand the problems 
confronting the artists; and without this he will have left out 
of his account precisely what would have made it a history of 
art, as opposed to a rather puzzling external account of 
certain motions which certain people have been perceived to go 
through. Winch does emphasise that this does not mean that we 
should stop there. Rather, that any more reflective 
understanding must presuppose, if it is to count as genuine 
understanding, the participant's unreflective understanding. 
(131) 
The reflective student of society may find it necessary to use 
concepts which are not taken from the forms of activity being 
investigated and which are taken from the context of his own 
investigation, but these technical concepts of his will imply a 
previous understanding of these and other concepts which belong 
to the activities which are under investigation. (23) 
Whilst I would agree that a sociologist's subjects of study are 
different from those of the natural scientist, I do not agree 
that this means that the sociologist has to 'become as a 
native' in order to understand the actions of the people he or 
she is studying. I would suggest that it is perfectly 
conceivable that an atheist sociologist could understand the 
actions of religious converts, for example, in terms of their 
reasons for their actions. He or she would not have to become 
a convert in order to discover these reasons. I feel, 
therefore, that Winch is wrong to discount the possibility of 
causal accounts of action as a result of this type of argument. 
Where Winch is more justified in rejecting causality is in the 
situation where we are using the Humean account of cause and 
effect. 
(132) 
Davidson's Re-working of Hume's Causality 
The crux of the Winchian argument is that reasons as 
explanations of actions cannot be seen in terms of the Humean 
idea of cause and effect whereby a cause must be defined as an 
object followed by another where all the objects similar to the 
first are followed by objects similar to the second. (24) 
Winch, and I agree, argues that if Hume is correct in his 
notion of causality (and this is the point at issue), then the 
idea of cause and effect cannot apply to the relationship 
between reasons and actions. 
Davidson does not disagree that laws are not included in 
rationalisations. Generalisations, he argues, connecting 
reasons and actions are not - and cannot be sharpened into - 
the kind of law on the basis of which accurate predictions can 
be reliably made. In fact, what emerges, in the 'ex post 
facto' atmosphere of explanation and justification, as the 
reason frequently was, to the agent at the time of action, one 
consideration among many -a reason. 
The crucial point is (and here I am in total agreement) that 
any theory for predicting action must find a way of evaluating 
the relative forces of various desires and beliefs, it cannot 
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take as its starting point the refinement of what is to be 
expected from a single desire. It would appear, therefore, 
that if the above interpretation of Hume is correct, it is 
difficult to see how reasons can be the causes of actions. 
Davidson states, however, that ignorance of competent 
predictive laws does not inhibit valid causal explanations 
since, if it did, few causal explanations could be made. Thus, 
he argues, I am certain the window broke because it was struck 
by a rock, but I am not in command of laws on the basis of 
which I can predict what blow will break the window. A 
generalisation like 'windows are fragile, fragile things tend 
to break when struck hard enough, other conditions being 
right', is not a predictive law, it is a generalisation like 
our generalisations about behaviour and serves a different 
purpose. In fact, Davidson suggests, it provides evidence for 
the existence of a causal law covering the case in hand which, 
in Davidson's interpretation, is what Hume was arguing for. 
Hume, he suggests, could be saying that the idea ''A' caused 
'B" entails that there is a causal law instantiated by some 
true description of 'A' and W. This allows that single causal 
statements entail laws and that explanations involve laws, but 
also allows that no particular law is entailed by a singular 
causal claim, and, therefore, a singular causal claim can be 
(134) 
defended without defending any law. This version of Hume's 
claim, for Davidson, can be made to fit in with most causal 
explanations, and it suits rationalisations equally well. (25) 
Mischel too argues that, in general, one could say that a good 
explanation in terms of reason is one which the explanandum can 
be used to 'justify' the explanans. That is, 'R' is a good 
explanation of why 'A' chose to 'x'. In sum, Mischel argues, 
we can give responsible explanations of intentional actions in 
terms of the agent's reasons without using laws or theories 
about human behaviour in our explanations since, when we 
explain in this way, there is never any problem about when 
explanans and explanandum are connected. In fact, the only 
problem is that of discovering what the agent's reasons were. 
Discovering this is an empirical process which may involve 
inference based on laws and dispositions, but explaining the 
action by showing that the agent decided that this was the 
right, appropriate, thing to do for such and such a reason is a 
rational process which requires no empirical laws nor any 
theories of behaviour. (26) 
Likewise, Davidson maintains that the most primitive 
explanation of an event gives its cause; more elaborate 
explanations may tell us more of the story or defend the 
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singular causal claim, by producing a relevant law or by giving 
reasons for believing such exists. But, it is an error to 
think no explanations have been given until a law has been 
produced. (27) Davidson, however, claims that by his 
interpretation of Hume, he can still apply Hume's model to the 
explanation of action. 
A Rejection of the Humean Account of Causation 
Where, it seems to me, Davidson goes wrong is in trying to re- 
work the Humean notion of causation to 'fit in' with his 
account of explaining actions in terms of reasons. Thus I 
agree with Hollis who denies that it is possible to explain 
actions under the Humean 'covering law' model. He argues that 
rational actions do not have causal explanations in the sense 
where it is explanatory to subsume a case under a 
generalisation for similar cases with similar initial 
conditions, or in the sense which appeals to a natural law to 
account for particular instances. The chess player, for 
example, who plays 'Q-K5 ch. ' for the excellent reason that it 
gives him a smothered mate in five moves is doing what any good 
player would do in that position, but he does not do it because 
others would do it. There is no natural law of chess about the 
occurrence of smothered mates. Other good players would do the 
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same simply because they would have the same good reason for 
doing it. The particular explains the general and not the 
other way around. Hollis maintains that this contrasts with a 
natural science where there are still presumed to be laws of 
nature of an explanatory kind. There may well be some in the 
social world too, especially where social life is influenced by 
our biology or use of natural objects. AIDS, for example, is 
unmistakably a social fact, and the biological laws of its 
transmission and of the mutations of the virus affect people's 
behaviour. However, Hollis denies that social patterns are 
part of an explanatory causal order in the Humean sense. 
Whether they turn out to be depends on their not being 
traceable to individual reasons and their collective 
consequences. AIDS affects people; what people know (or 
believe) about AIDS affects its spread. (28) 
The fundamental point being raised here is that Hume's model 
of cause and effect, however, it is interpreted, cannot be 
applied to the relationship between reasons and actions, and, 
indeed, to many other relationships. Trigg, in fact, denies 
that even if generalisations can be made in terms of natural 
phenomena, they need have the status of general causal laws. 
It may well be true, he suggests, that the barometer falls when 
it gets windier, but it would not be right to say that the wind 
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makes the barometer fall. The wind and the barometer each have 
the same underlying causes. In other cases there is no genuine 
connection at all. The difficulty of sifting out 'real' 
empirical regularities from the coincidences arises because 
empiricists wish to stop at the level of observation. Their 
ideal of explanation is the association of different 
experiences on different occasions, but why should these be 
associated? Even appeal to counterfactuals so as to discover 
genuine causal connections merely pushes the question back a 
stage. What makes a connection a genuine causal one? 
Following Hume, he maintains, many philosophers deny the 
existence of 'hidden powers' and 'necessary connections' 
arguing that it is impossible to experience the way two events 
are causally related, as one can merely observe that one 
typically follows the other. Anything more, Trigg suggests, 
requires a theory which may need to posit unobservable entities 
as the source of the relevant causal power which seems, to the 
empiricist content to be successful in predicting observations, 
irredeemably metaphysical. But, argues Trigg, this is done at 
a cost. Explanation merely becomes a summary of actual and 
possible observations and the reasons why events are limited as 
they are can never be given. However, Trigg maintains that 
instead of facts being discovered in the world, our 
descriptions are governed as much by our interests and purposes 
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as by what is there. Human knowledge is not just a passive 
reflection of reality, but is itself partly constituted by 
human interests. (29) 
Here then the question is raised as to whether the Humean 
notion of causality is not only inappropriate to the study of 
social action, but also whether it is mistaken in accounting 
for the causal sequences that occur in the natural sciences. 
In other words, the Humean conception of cause and effect is 
not the only one, nor indeed the correct one, to be applied in 
the natural sciences. Thus, it is no surprise that there are 
problems in trying to explain the social world in these terms. 
It could be that an alternative perspective on causal analysis 
in the natural sciences would be more relevant to the 
explanation of action when applied to human agents. 
Davidson, though, tries to retain the Humean notion of 
causality, especially his model of 'causal laws'. But, I would 
suggest that in doing this he is restricting his analysis in a 
similar way to Winch. In particular, I find the argument that 
one case is of ten enough to prove a 'law' in the Humean sense 
rather difficult to sustain. 
(139) 
No doubt, Davidson concedes, our knowledge of our own 
intentions in acting will show many of the oddities peculiar to 
first-person knowledge of our own pains, beliefs, desires, and 
so forth; the only question is whether these oddities prove 
that reasons do not cause the actions that they rationalised. 
Davidson admits that a person may be mistaken about his 
reasons, and the fact that the person may be wrong shows that, 
in general, it does not make sense to ask him how he knows what 
his reasons were, or ask him for his evidence, since he usually 
has no evidence or makes no observations so his knowledge of 
his own reasons for his action is not generally inductive. 
However, he asks, does this show that the knowledge is not 
causal? Causal laws, Davidson maintains, differ from true but 
non-lawlike generalisations in that their instances confirm 
them. Induction is, therefore, a good way to learn the truth 
of a law, but it is not the only way. In any case, in order to 
know that a singular causal statement is true, it is not 
necessary to know that some law covering the event in hand 
exists, and it is not the case that induction alone yields this 
knowledge. Indeed, argues Davidson, Hume himself admitted that 
one case is often enough to persuade us that a law exists, and 
this amounts to saying that we are persuaded, without direct 
inductive evidence, that a causal relationship exists. (30) 
(140) 
While, as I have suggested, I have problems with Davidson's 
attempt to reconcile Hume's causal analysis with the idea of 
reasons for action (especially that we can see Humean causal 
laws as covering only one event), Davidson does go on to posit 
a very important argument about reasons as causes in response 
to Melden's claim that explanation by reason is redescription 
of the action and therefore cannot be causal. 
Reasons as Redescriptions 
Melden claimed that what makes the raising of an arm an act of 
signalling is that it is done against a background of an 
understanding of the conventions of signalling. It is 
'conditions' or 'circumstances' that constitutes or defines the 
bodily movement as the action that it is, and these are 
structured by 'social and moral institutions'. If, argues 
Melden, our mental states do not progressively reveal 
themselves, but are progressively 'constituted and defined' by 
ever broader social contexts, then, as the context changes so 
will their essential meaning. These issues involve not the 
inner nature of the actors since these have no determinate form 
other than that which is socially imputed. (31) Thus, suggests 
Bloor, Melden argues that the causal idiom of the sciences is 
wholly irrelevant to the understanding we seek in our everyday 
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description of behaviour. Such a view reflects Melden's (and 
Winch's) tendency to over-simplify the character of causal 
thinking in science. Motives, for Melden, explain by giving a 
fuller characterisation of an action whereas a causal 
explanation is not concerned with the identity or character of 
the effect. (32) 
The suggestion here is that reason-giving explanations have a 
special function which excludes causal analysis. The way in 
which citing reasons functions to explain is that the reasons 
justify the action or show that it is the appropriate thing to 
do in the circumstances. Such explanations, it is claimed, 
reveal that, at least from the agent's point-of-view, what he 
does or intends to do is rational. Discourse about reasons, 
therefore, belongs to the language of evaluation rather than 
the language of objective, value-free description of natural 
events. However, as Care and Landesman argue, even given that 
the premise of the argument is correct (that the function of 
reason is to provide a rationale for actions), the conclusion 
that reasons cannot thus be causes does not follow. Although 
being a cause may not be sufficient for something to be a 
reason, the opposite is not true. Its being a cause does not 
prevent it from being a reason: "Just as the same thing may be 
both blue and good, perhaps the same conditions may be both a 
reason and a cause". (33) 
(142) 
This is the very point, and one which is essential to my 
subsequent arguments, that Davidson wants to make. The idea 
that justification only means that the agent has certain 
beliefs and attitudes in the light of which action is 
reasonable, leaves out, he argues, the essential factor that a 
person can have a reason for an action, perform the action, and 
yet this reason not be the reason why he did it. Thus, central 
to the relationship between a reason and an action it explains 
is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had 
the reason. (34) 
Davidson concedes that whilst it is true that when we explain 
an action in terms of the reason given for that action, we are 
redescribing the action, and it is also true that redescribing 
the action gives that action a place in a pattern and, in this 
way, the action is explained; it does not mean that reasons are 
not causes of actions. In the first place, we should not infer 
from the fact that giving reasons redescribes actions and from 
the fact that causes are separate from effects, that therefore 
reasons are not causes. Reasons, being beliefs and attitudes, 
are certainly not identical with actions. Moreover, events are 
often redescribed in terms of their causes. In the second 
place, it is mistaken to believe that because placing an action 
in a larger pattern explains it, we consequently understand the 
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sort of explanation involved. Talk of patterns and contexts, 
he argues, does not answer the question of how reasons explain 
actions since the relevant pattern of context contains both 
reasons and actions. (35) 
For Davidson, one way we can explain an event is by placing it 
in the context of its cause. Cause and effect, he argues, form 
the sort of pattern that explains the effect in the sense of 
'explain' that we understand as well as any. Davidson 
illustrates this using the aforementioned example taken from 
Melden. A man driving an automobile raises his arm in order to 
signal. His intention to signal explains his action, raising 
his arm, by redescribing it as signalling. If, argues 
Davidson, the pattern that explains the action is the familiar 
one of an action done for a reason, then it does explain the 
action, but only because it assumes the relation of action to 
meaning is a causal one. (36) The interpretation of this 
pattern, however, given by Melden, is as follows: the man is 
driving, he is approaching a turn, he knows he ought to signal, 
knows how to signal by raising his arm, and now, in this 
context, he raises his arm and perhaps if all this happens, he 
does signal; then the explanation would be that if, under these 
conditions, a man raises his arm, then he signals. (37) 
(144) 
Reasons Must Be Causes To Have Explanatory Power 
The problem here, for Davidson, is that this explanation does 
not answer the question of why he raised his arm. He had a 
reason to raise his arm, but this has not been shown as the 
reason why he did it. If the description 'signalling' explains 
his action by giving his reason, then the signalling must be 
intentional, but on this latter account it may not be. If, 
therefore, as Melden claims, causal explanations are wholly 
irrelevant to understanding human action then, Davidson 
concludes, we are "without an analysis of the 'because' in 'He 
did it because ......; where we go on to name a reason". 
(38) 
Davidson's claim can, therefore, be summed up as follows: "In 
order to turn the first 'and' to 'because' in 'He exercised and 
he wanted to reduce and thought exercise would do it', we must, 
as the basic move, augment ... " the idea that reasons explain 
actions with the idea that a "primary reason for an action is 
its cause". (39) 
Winch, however, would object that this kind of explanation 
cannot be causal because the relationship between reason and 
action is internal and each cannot be identified as separate 
from the other. Consider, Winch asks, the case of an act of 
command and an act of obedience. In describing the man's act 
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in terms of obedience to a command, one is committing oneself 
to saying that a command has been issued just as if I hear a 
sound and recognise it as a clap of thunder. I commit myself 
to believe in, for example, the occurrence of electrical 
changes in the atmosphere or even calling what I heard 
'thunder'. However, an event's character as an act of 
obedience is intrinsic to it in a way which is not true of an 
event's character as a clap of thunder; and this is generally 
true of human acts as opposed to natural events. In the latter 
case, although human beings can only think in terms of the 
concepts they have of them, the events themselves have an 
existence independent of those concepts. It does not make 
sense, though, to suppose that human beings might have been 
issuing commands and obeying them before they came to form the 
concepts of command and obedience since their performance of 
such acts is itself the chief manifestation of their possession 
of these concepts. (40) 
Social relations, argues Winch, exist only in and through the 
ideas which are current in society, or, alternatively, social 
relations fall into the same logical category as do relations 
between ideas. It follows, therefore, that social relations 
must be an unsuitable subject for generalisations and theories 
of a scientific kind. Explanation is not then the application 
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of generalisations and theories to particular instances (as 
Davidson suggested), it is the tracing of internal relations. 
It is like applying one's knowledge of a language in order to 
understand a conversation rather than like applying one's 
knowledge of the laws of mechanics to understand the workings 
of a watch. (41) 
Here, therefore, we come to the basic argument Winch puts 
forward as an objection to the idea of reasons as causes of 
action. That is, that reasons and actions are internally 
related and so cannot be identified separately as causes and 
effects. It is, for me, Davidson's answer to this claim which 
is most persuasive in arguing that reasons may be causes of 
action in the sense that the reason provides the because in the 
statement 'He acted because' when a reason is cited. As 
Maclntyre argues, although nothing could count as a reason 
unless it stood in an internal relationship to an action, the 
agent's possessing of a reason may be a state of affairs 
identifiable independently of the event which is the agent's 
performance of the action, and, thus, it does seem as if the 
possession of a reason by an agent is an item of a suitable 
type to figure as a cause or an effect. In the light of this, 
he claims, we are entitled to treat with scepticism Winch's 
claim that understanding in terms of rule-following and causal 
explanations have mutually exclusive subject matters. 
(42) 
(147) 
It is in the idea that reasons and actions are separate events 
that we need to reintroduce the argument put forward by Hollis 
that beliefs and desires do not necessarily correspond. Care 
and Landesman, for example, argue that the way in which desires 
are often said to be logically connected to behaviour is that 
the form of the words used to describe the desire (for example, 
'wanting to eat') is also used to describe the ensuing action 
('eating'). But, they maintain, it is evident that this sort 
of connection may hold and yet the desire and action still be 
logically independent. It is surely possible for a person to 
want to eat and yet not eat, or for a person to eat and yet not 
want to. (43) Similarly, Hamlyn suggests that 'I may have the 
desire to go for a walk, and believe that this is the right 
thing to do, therefore, I go for a walk'. However, it is also 
possible that 'I want, and even intend, to go for a walk, but 
believe I should work instead, thus, in this case, I do not 
take the walk'. This is not because I no longer have the 
desire but because my belief that I should work has overcome my 
desire for a walk. This argument was precisely the same as 
that in Davidson's discussion of primary reasons, and which he 
now reiterates. To describe an event in terms of its cause, he 
argues, is not to identify the event with its cause, nor does 
explanation by description exclude causal explanation. (44) 
(148) 
As Hamlyn argues, it by no means follows that where two 
concepts are internally related, the things to which the two 
concepts may be applied cannot be contingently related. Thus, 
although the intention to write a letter can be described only 
as that intention, whatever goes on in the mind when the person 
has that intention might be represented as the cause of writing 
the letter. When a man forms an intention to write a letter, 
he may, though he need not, express the intention to himself 
saying 'I will write a letter'. There is nothing to show that 
it is inadmissible to argue that his saying these words to 
himself caused him to write the letter. It may be admitted 
that if we interpret the man's saying these words to himself as 
the formation of an intention, then the intention itself, 'qua' 
intention, can be defined only in terms of its object. But, 
what goes on in the man's mind is separately describable in 
terms of what he says to himself, and it seems quite 
permissible to say that the forming of the intention (rather 
than the actual intention itself) is the cause of the letter 
writing. (45) This idea of Hamlyn's corresponds well to 
Davidson's idea of the 'onslaught' of a state or disposition as 
being a mental event. However, I feel that Hamlyn's phrase 
'the forming of the intention' is more accurate than Davidson's 
word 'onslaught' since this seems to imply what he was, in 
fact, refuting - that mental events are like 'a stab' or a 
(149) 
'mysterious prod'. The idea of forming an intention allows for 
the possibility that an agent's desires need not necessarily be 
current desires which just happen. Indeed, for Hollis, the 
idea that desires must be current is false. People, he argues, 
are often moved by last week's desires or by tomorrow's. They 
are moved by the past, present and future desires of other 
people and by hypothetical desires of their own. (46) 
Reasons are More Than Rules 
The argument that reasons and actions are logically separate 
and that the reason may then be seen as the cause of the action 
introduces the fundamental issues raised in the next section. 
As Maclntyre suggests, clearly, if the citing of reasons by an 
agent, with the concomitant appeal to rules, is not necessarily 
the citing of those reasons which are causally effective, a 
distinction may be made between: those rules which agents, in a 
given society, sincerely profess to follow and to which their 
actions may in fact conform but which do not direct their 
actions; and those which, whether they profess to follow them 
or not, do in fact guide their actions by providing them with 
reasons and motives for acting in one way rather than another. 
The making of this distinction is essential to the notions of 
ideology and false consciousness, but to allow that these 
(150) 
notions could have application is to find oneself at odds with 
Winch's arguments at yet another point. It seems clear, argues 
Maclntyre, that the concept of ideology can find application in 
a society where the concept is not available to the members of 
the society, and this concept implies that criteria beyond 
those available in the society may be invoked to judge its 
rationality (or, indeed, give a fuller explanation of the 
actions of the members of that society). As such, though, it 
would fall under Winch's bar as a concept unsuitable for social 
science. (47) 
Winch, according to Maclntyre, is perfectly correct in arguing 
that unless we begin by a characterisation of a society in its 
own terms we shall be unable to identify the matter which 
requires attention. Description in terms of the agent's 
concepts and beliefs must, he argues, precede description in 
terms of our concepts and beliefs. However, the fact that 
explanations in terms of reasons ought not to be excluded by 
any initial decision of the social scientist does not mean that 
explanation is incompatible with causal explanation. Compare, 
he suggests, two situations: one in which managers minimise 
shop-floor trade union activity in a factory by concentrating 
opportunities of extra over-time and of earning bonuses in 
those parts of the factory where such activity shows signs of 
(151) 
flourishing; and, then, one in which managers similarly 
minimise trade union activity by a process of continual 
transfers between one part of the factory and another or 
between different factories. In both cases, it may be possible 
to explain the low level of trade union activity causally by 
reference to the managers' policies, but in the former case the 
reasons which the workers have for pursuing over-time and 
bonuses can find a place in the explanation without it losing 
its causal character; and, in both cases, a necessary condition 
of the managers being causally effective may well be that the 
workers are ignorant of the policy behind the actions. The 
causal character of the explanation can be brought out, argues 
Maclntyre, by considering how generalisations might be 
formulated in which certain behaviour of the managers can 
supply either the necessary or sufficient condition, or both, 
for the behaviour of the workers. In such a formulation, 
however, one important fact will emerge, namely, that true 
causal explanations cannot be formulated unless intentions, 
motives and reasons are taken into account. A true explanation 
in terms of reasons must entail some account of the causal 
background, but it is also true that a causal account of action 
will require a corresponding account of the intentions, motives 
and reasons involved. (48) Maclntyre is thus arguing that just 
because we understand actions in terms of reasons, this does 
not exclude causal analysis of those actions. However, he does 
(152) 
seem to be suggesting that explanation in terms of reasons and 
causal explanations are somehow different in form. As I will 
argue, though, I would contend that the reasons themselves must 
be seen as the causes of the actions of agents if we perceive 
causes in a different way to that advocated by Hume. 
Summary_ 
One of the fundamental questions that emerges from this 
analysis is whether the Humean notion of causality is 
appropriate to either (a) the natural sciences or (b) the 
social sciences? For Winch, the former is true whereas the 
latter is not. But why is this the case? I have argued that 
while Winch is justified in rejecting the Humean notion of 
cause (as the idea that similar causes always result in similar 
effects) when applied to the relationship between reasons and 
actions; this does not mean that we should reject causal 
analysis altogether. One of the problems with Winch, 
therefore, is his limited notion of cause. That is, that he 
perceives the possibility of 'cause and effect' only in terms 
of a Humean concept of what it is like in the natural sciences. 
Thus, it can be argued that Winch only considered one 
particular kind of causal analysis and failed to consider not 
only that 'cause and effect' relationships may take different 
(153) 
forms in the natural sciences, but also that explanations in 
terms of reasons could also be causal but not in the sense 
outlined by Hume. 
The reasons for Winch's refusal to accept any idea that actions 
can be explained 'causally' are not, however, restricted to 
this aspect of his arguments. They also lie in his contention 
that the relationship between reason and action is an internal 
one - that reasons and actions cannot be perceived of as 
separate events. This too would preclude any notion of cause 
and effect, however it is perceived. Yet, I would argue, with 
Davidson, that this is not the case. The reason we have for 
our action and our action are not the same. 
However, I would also argue that Davidson's reply to Winch is 
not completely satisfactory either since it also depends on a 
Humean notion of cause and tries to reconcile such a view with 
the idea of reasons as causes of action. Many of the points 
made by Davidson are valid, particularly that reasons must be 
seen as separate from actions as are causes separate from 
effects, but I am not convinced that his interpretation of Hume 
was completely satisfactory nor that he was able to bring about 
such a reconciliation. 
(154) 
The natural follow-on to this analysis of the Winch versus 
Davidson debate, therefore, is to try and formulate some 
explanation which would incorporate the valid points made by 
both in an attempt to try and establish how reasons can be seen 
as causes of actions. Here then I would look at the causal 
account put forward by Bhaskar which differs fundamentally from 
Hume and which, I shall argue, applies just as well to the 
social sciences as it does to the natural sciences. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CAUSES AS TENDENCIES - AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE HUMEAN ACCOUNT 
Introduction 
As the arguments in the previous chapter indicate, in terms of 
the Winchian notion of cause which follows that of Hume, the 
same cause will always result in the same effect. This, 
obviously, is not the case when we are talking about human 
action. So, if we see cause and effect in a Humean way, Winch 
may be right, to some extent, to claim that action cannot be 
explained causally. However, I want to argue that certain 
aspects of the Humean notion of cause not only do not apply to 
human actions but also do not apply in many of the causal 
relationships found in the natural sciences. In other words, 
it is not surprising that some aspects of human action fail to 
correspond to Humean causality since this, itself, is suspect. 
It is, therefore, the case that the generalisations which 
connect reasons to actions cannot be made into the kinds of 
laws advocated by Hume on the basis of which accurate 
predictions can be made. As Hollis argued, rational actions do 
not have causal explanations in the sense where it is 
explanatory to subsume a case under generalisations for similar 
cases with similar initial conditions or in the sense which 
(158) 
appeals to a natural law to account for particular instances. 
Winch, therefore, may be correct to argue that actions are not 
caused in the sense meant by Hume. However, his anti-causal 
stance depends on an acceptance of this empiricist theory of 
causality which, I want to argue, is not the only acceptable 
theory of causality in the natural sciences, let alone the 
social sciences. I shall now, therefore, examine the 
alternative view put forward by Bhaskar. 
The Problems With The Positivist View of Science 
Bhaskar maintains that both positivists and relativists are 
united in their acceptance of a positivist account of the 
natural sciences. In contrast, Bhaskar wants to argue for a 
qualified anti-positivist naturalism based on a realist view of 
science which maintains that science employs a causal criterion 
for ascribing reality and that causal laws are, in fact, 
tendencies. Under this, he argues, the methods of both the 
natural and social sciences can fall. Bhaskar is not going to 
deny the differences that exist in their subject matter and the 
relationship in which their sciences stand to them. Indeed, he 
maintains that ontological, epistemological and relational 
considerations all serve to qualify the form of naturalism. 
(159) 
But, it is in virtue of these differences that social science 
is possible. It is the nature of the object that determines 
the forms of its possible science. (1) 
Bhaskar proceeds to outline his proposals by asking how a 
philosophy of science is possible. He maintains that if the 
general form of the philosophical investigation is into the 
necessary conditions for social activities as conceptualised in 
experience, then two things must be recognised. Firstly, that 
the activity and its conceptualisation may be historically 
transient - it may depend on the powers people possess as 
material things rather than just as thinkers; and, secondly, 
that its analysis may establish transcendental realist rather 
than idealist conclusions. In this way, both the premises and 
conclusions of philosophical arguments remain central facts, 
the former being necessarily social and hence historically 
transient. It is, argues Bhaskar, only in this sense that 
philosophy can establish synthetic 'a priori' truths. 
Philosophy, then, operates by the use of pure reason on the 
basis of prior conceptualisations of historical practice. (2) 
On this conception, philosophy is distinguished by the kinds of 
considerations and arguments it employs. It does not consider 
a world apart from the various sciences, it considers just that 
(160) 
world, but from the standpoint of what can be established about 
it by 'a priori' argument, where it takes as its premises 
generally recognised activities as conceptualised in 
experience. It does not compete with science because its task 
is to show what must be the case for scientific activity to be 
possible and, in doing so, it analyses notions that denote only 
on the condition that they are used under some particular 
description in science. One difference, then, between 
transcendental realism and idealism, for Bhaskar, is that in 
the former what is presupposed in any given scientific activity 
is a possible object of scientific explanation so that what is 
clearly demonstrated or established is also scientifically 
comprehensible. Philosophy, though, does not constitute an 
autonomous order of being and, as such, is itself susceptible 
to scientific or sociological explanation. (3) 
One implication of this is that it suggests that there is no 
connection between what lies beyond sense experience and some 
special sphere of philosophy. Once a non-reductionist account 
of science is accepted then some 'transcendental entities' 
(such as magnetic fields) may be regarded as objects of 
scientific investigation. But, Bhaskar argues, their 
'transcendence' is a contingent fact and philosophy speaks with 
no special authority about it. Moreover, by making the 
(161) 
possibility of philosophical discourse contingent upon the 
activity of particular social practices, it provides a way of 
reconciling transcendental and sociological analyses of social 
activities such as science and philosophy. Another implication 
is that this conception situates the possibility of clearly 
established enquiries into non-scientific, even non-cognitive, 
human activities where these are conceptualised in the 
experience of the agents concerned. This is so because the 
possibility is bound to arise of posing the transcendental 
question in the form 'what must be the case for 'X' to be 
possible? ' for social practices other than science, and the 
answer will consist in a statement of necessary conditions for 
the particular activity (which I would argue are the reasons 
for the action). However, Bhaskar argues, such conditions are 
both real and subject to historical transformation so that the 
resultant hermeneutics becomes contingently critical. (4) 
In Bhaskar's conception of the philosophy of science, one 
assumes, at the outset, the intelligibility of science, and one 
asks what the world must be like for these activities to be 
possible. Traditionally, as we have seen, epistemology has 
been dominated by the dispute between experience and reason, 
but, for Bhaskar, both must play a part (as argued in Part Two 
in terms of internal and external reasons). The problem is, he 
(162) 
suggests, that neither have been sufficiently differentiated to 
yield the premises needed to produce a real definition of 
science. Bhaskar thus attempts their substitution by the more 
specific concepts of 'experimental activity' and 'scientific 
development'. (5) In addition, he argues, the orthodox 
tradition (as I have suggested) uncritically accepts the 
doctrine of causal laws and has interpreted these, following 
Hume, as empirical regularities which reduces them to sequences 
of events, and events to experiences. Anything more is then 
supposed to be contributed by 'mind'. Bhaskar claims that his 
analysis of experimental activity and applied activity will 
show that causal laws cannot be explicated as sequences of 
events, and considerations of the possibility of scientific 
change will show that events cannot be explicated in terms of 
experience. (6) 
Causality in the Natural Sciences - An Alternative View 
Here, then, we arrive at the possibility of a causal analysis 
which is not based on the Humean model. At this stage we will 
consider this in terms of the natural sciences, but we will 
proceed to analyse its applicability to the realm of the social 
sciences. 
(163) 
Bhaskar begins by examining experiment and application - what 
he terms the intransitive dimension. For Bhaskar, in an 
experiment, scientists produce a pattern of events. But what 
is so special about these is that they enable them to identify 
the mode of operation of natural structures, mechanisms and 
processes which they do not produce. What distinguishes the 
phenomena the scientists actually produce from the totality of 
the phenomena he or she could produce is that, when the 
experiment is successful, it is an index of what he or she does 
not produce. A 'real distinction between the objects of 
experimental investigation, such as causal laws, and patterns 
of events is thus a condition of the intelligibility of 
experimental activity. This, for Bhaskar, demonstrates (and 
this is an important point) that the Humean model depends on 
the misidentification of causal laws with their empirical 
grounds. As human activity is, in general, necessary for 
constant conjunctions, if one identifies causal laws with them 
then one is committed to the absurdity that human beings cause 
and even change the laws of nature in experimental activity. 
The objects of experimental activity are thus not events and 
their conjunctions, but structures, generative mechanisms, and 
the like, which are normally out of phase with the patterns of 
events which actually occur. (7) 
(164) 
Causes as Tendencies 
As Bhaskar points out, though, we must also apply our knowledge 
in systems that may be characterised as open - where no 
constant conjunctions of events obtain. If this activity is to 
be intelligible then "causal laws must be analysed as the 
tendencies of things, which may be possessed unexercised and 
exercised unrealised, just as they may of course be realised 
unperceived (or undetected) by people". (8) Thus in citing a 
law, we are referring to the activity of mechanisms as such and 
not making a claim about the outcome which will be co- 
determined by the activity of other mechanisms. This, it seems 
to me, is rather like Davidson's suggestion, although I still 
believe that it was not an accurate interpretation of Hume, 
that in a single case we can see that a particular cause 
resulted in a particular effect, but if other factors intervene 
the result may not be the same. We must, Bhaskar claims, make 
the ontological distinction between causal laws and patterns of 
events and, if we do so, this allows us to sustain the 
universality of the former in the face of the variability of 
the latter. It follows from the fact that causal laws must be 
analysed as tendencies, that deducibility despite empirical 
variance, depending upon the availability of constant 
conjunctions of events, can neither be necessary nor sufficient 
for a natural scientific explanation. There is an ontological 
(165) 
gap between causal laws and their empirical grounds which has 
previously been ignored. In this way, just as a rule can be 
broken without being changed, so a natural mechanism may 
continue to endure, and the law it grounds be both applicable 
and unfalsified, though its effect be unrealised (presumably 
because other factors have intervened to alter the outcome). 
If, argues Bhaskar, the objects of our knowledge exist and act 
independently of the knowledge of which they are the objects, 
it is equally the case that such knowledge, as we actually 
possess, always consists in historically specific social forms. 
Thus, changing knowledge of unchanging objects is possible. (9) 
This idea of scientific discontinuity and change, however, is 
difficult to reconcile with the idea that science involves a 
cumulative growth in our knowledge of nature. Bhaskar's 
analysis of experimental activity suggests that the objects of 
investigation are irreducible to patterns of events and active 
independently of their identification by people. How, then, 
can science come to possess knowledge of them? Here, Bhaskar 
turns to his ideas on discovery and development - the 
transitive dimension. He maintains that it is a condition of 
the intelligibility of scientific discovery that, in the 
intransitive dimension, what is discovered exists independently 
of its discovery; and that, in the transitive dimension, it is 
(166) 
not known prior to its discovery. If one is to avoid the 
absurdity of the production of such knowledge 'out of nothing' 
it must depend upon the employment of antecedently existing 
cognitive materials. In this way, science must be seen as a 
social process whose aim is the production of the knowledge of 
the mechanisms of the production of phenomena in nature. This 
involves the building of a model, utilising such cognitive 
materials and operating under the control of something like a 
logic of analogy or metaphor, of a mechanism which if it were 
to exist and act in the postulated way, would account for the 
phenomena in question (rather like showing 'why things are so 
and not otherwise'). The reality of the postulated explanation 
must then be subject to empirical scrutiny, and once this is 
done the explanation must then, in principle, itself be 
explained. (10) 
In science, therefore, there is a three-phase schema of 
development in which, in a continuing dialectic, science 
identifies a phenomenon, constructs explanations for it, and 
empirically tests these explanations leading to the 
identification of the generative mechanisms at work which now 
become the phenomena to be explained, and so on. In this 
process, Bhaskar argues, science must construct and test its 
explanations with the cognitive resources and physical tools at 
(167) 
its disposal which are, themselves, in the process, 
transformed, modified and refined. In this dialectic, science 
employs two criteria for the ascription of reality to a posited 
object. Firstly, a perception criterion; and, secondly, a 
causal criterion which turns on the capacity of the entity, 
whose existence is in doubt, to bring about changes in material 
things. On this criterion, to be is not to be perceived but 
just to be able to do. Both parties to the naturalist dispute, 
for Bhaskar, have assumed that the social must be either merely 
empirically real or transcendentally ideal. This has produced 
either a conceptually impoverished and deconceptualising 
empiricism or a hermeneutics drained of causal import and 
impervious to empirical controls. In contrast, this 
transcendental realist view of science argues for the movement, 
at any one level, from the knowledge of manifest phenomena to 
knowledge of the structures that generate them. (11) 
Bhaskar suggests that his conception of science sees it, in a 
similar way to positivism, as unified in its essential method 
and, in a similar way to the hermeneutic tradition, as 
essentially differentiated in 
(or specific to) its object. To 
posit an essential unity of scientific method, argues Bhaskar, 
is to posit an account which conceives the sciences as unified 
in the form that scientific knowledge takes, the reasoning by 
(168) 
which it is produced and the concepts in terms of which its 
production can be most adequately theorised or reconstructed. 
The transcendental analysis of science reveals that its essence 
consists in the movement of manifest phenomena to the 
structures that generate them. It shows: (i) that experimental 
and practical activity entails an analysis of causal laws as 
expressing the tendencies of things not conjunctions of events; 
(ii) that scientific discovery and development entails that 
scientific inferences must be analogical and retroductive not 
simply inductive and/or deductive; and (iii) that the process 
of knowledge-production necessitates a conceptual system based 
on the notion of powers. From this perspective, therefore, 
things are viewed as individuals possessing powers (as agents 
as well as patients); and actions are the realisation of their 
potentialities. Historical things are structured and 
differentiated ensembles of tendencies, liabilities and powers, 
and historical events and their transformations. (12) 
Basic Conclusions of Bhaskar's Concept of Science 
These, then, are the basic conclusions drawn out of Bhaskar's 
analysis of the ontology and epistemology of the natural 
sciences. The fundamental issue raised, for our present 
purposes is the idea of causes as tendencies. The question 
remains, however, as to how far this conception of causality 
(169) 
can be applied to the area of social action. In the light of 
this new conception of cause and effect, can reasons be causes? 
Bhaskar's answer to this question is in the affirmative. 
What Bhaskar is going to claim is that intentional human action 
is caused; that it is always caused by reasons; and that it is 
only because it is caused by reasons that it is properly 
characterised as intentional. Bhaskar does, however, want to 
stress that the agent, and others, may or may not be aware (or 
I would prefer to say fully aware) of the reasons that caused 
the action. He suggests that any explanation of the reasons 
that form the immediate explanations of human actions may have 
recourse to both psychological mechanisms unavailable to 
consciousness (a point I do not agree with, although, again, an 
agent may not be fully aware of these influences); and to non- 
psychological - say, sociological - ones (like ideological 
external factors). Moreover, he claims that the mechanisms 
delineated as 'psychological' may be radically non-homogenous 
and affected by the aspects of non-psychological mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, reasons, for Bhaskar, are and must be seen as 
causes of actions. (13) Let us then examine how Bhaskar 
reaches this conclusion. 
(170) 
A Generative Conception of Cause in the Social Sciences 
Bhaskar, like Davidson, argues that when a reason is cited in 
explanation of a human action any of a whole variety of mental 
items may be invoked. However, in any such explanation both 
cognitive and conative considerations are involved in that if a 
cognitive item, such as a belief, is mentioned, a conative one, 
such as a desire, is presupposed. Here, then, we have 
agreement as to what a reason actually consists of, but the 
question still remains as to what the causal status of reasons 
is? 
For Bhaskar, when something is cited as a cause it is typically 
viewed as that factor which, in the circumstances, so tipped 
the balance of events as to produce the known outcome -a non- 
Humean generative concept of cause. Bhaskar, though, not only 
wants to show that reason-explanations function in a causal 
way, but that reasons are analogous to the causal structures of 
nature and that empirical knowledge of them is possible. (14) 
In order to do this he, as did Davidson, begins with an 
analysis of the objections raised to seeing reasons as causes 
of actions. Although, as we shall see, he considers these 
objections in a somewhat different light since he, unlike 
Davidson, rejects the Humean notion of cause as the only one 
applicable to even the natural sciences. 
(171) 
Objections to the Causal Analysis of Action 
The first objection considered is the teleological argument 
that turns on the alleged logical difference between reason- 
explanations and causal ones. This contrasts (i) 'X' occurs 
for the sake of 'Y' and (ii) 'X' causes 'Y'. It contends, 
firstly, that in (i) the focus of interest is 'X' but in (ii) 
it is 'Y'. This, for Bhaskar, is arbitrary as will be shown 
subsequently. Secondly, this argument states that 'X' is 
consistent with the non-occurrence of 'Y' in (i) but not in 
(ii). This case, in Bhaskar's view, also fails because 
ordinary causal explanations, as well as teleological ones, are 
defeasible in open systems. The third case is that a change in 
'Y' in (i) will bring about a change in 'X' whereas in (ii) it 
will not. Bhaskar argues, however, that a change in 'Y' will 
only bring about a change in 'X' if the desired end-state is 
represented by a place in a series temporally prior to 'X', say 
'W', in which case the first statement also fails. Thus, he 
states, teleological explanations are a species of causal 
explanation where the cause is, as in the case of reasons, some 
antecedent state of mind. (15) 
(172) 
The second line of argument against the idea of reasons as 
causes of action is the one that attempts to show that human 
actions cannot have any cause of a mentalistic kind (the type 
of argument put forward by Melden and dismissed by Davidson). 
Bhaskar responds, in a similar way to Davidson, by saying that 
to have a reason for an action I do not have to have a reason 
for that reason. Moreover, possession of a reason should not 
be construed as an action, rather as a disposition to act; and 
the possession of a reason for an action can itself be 
sufficient for that action when appropriate circumstances 
materialise. (16) 
An even more damaging idea to threaten the status of reasons as 
ý C4u 
causes, for Bhaskar, is the behaviourist argument which cites 
either that the category of reasons is altogether otiose or 
that reasons are not mental causes but redescription of overt 
behaviour. Bhaskar responds to this by arguing that even if it 
were the case that the only grounds for ascribing reasons were 
overt behavioural ones it would not follow that reasons were 
not mental or could not be efficient causes of behaviour. To 
suppose the former is to confuse what a claim is about with our 
grounds for making it; and to suppose the latter is to commit 
the fallacy of holding that the only real causes are ultimate 
ones which makes all causal claims unverifiable. Bhaskar, in 
(173) 
fact, claims that appeals to ordinary usage are at best 
indecisive, and behaviour, no less than speech, has first to be 
interpreted in terms of a language in order to give grounds for 
a causal claim. However, as such interpretation is, or depends 
upon, a mental act or process, a behaviourist analysis of 
behaviourist practice is impossible. (17) 
The fourth argument against the idea of reasons as causes is 
that provided by the advocates of the hermeneutical tradition 
with their stress on 'Verstehen'. This, I feel, is not so easy 
to dismiss, particularly if the Humean notion of cause is 
accepted (not that I think it should be). Indeed, Bhaskar, 
himself, admits that inasmuch as the ontological claim is made 
that the social world is constituted as meaningful, prior to 
the application of scientific theory to it, then a clear 
difference between it and the natural world must be accepted. 
However, he goes on to say that inasmuch as the epistemological 
claim is made that the natural world cannot be made 
intelligible in a scientific redescription and explanation of 
it, then it must be rejected. Moreover, the significance of 
the difference between the human and the natural worlds must be 
carefully considered. Bhaskar, like Davidson, claims that the 
meaning of an action - its correct identification as an act of 
(174) 
a particular type in a particular language and culture - is 
always and in principle independent of the intentions with 
which it is, on some particular occasion and by some particular 
agent, performed. The immediate 'explananda' of reason- 
explanations are intentional acts and it is a necessary 
condition for an act to be intentional that the agent believes 
it to possess some quality that is desired or wanted (in other 
words, reasons consist of desires plus beliefs and must include 
both to be reasons for an action). Thus, argues Bhaskar, that 
which we want to discover in what a reason explanation allows 
us to immediately explain is not its correct social meaning 
(socially constructed rules), but the trait or quality that the 
agent believes his or her action to possess - the actor's 
meaning. The explanation then proceeds by reconstructing the 
set of beliefs that led the agent to want to perform the action 
manifesting that quality (to discover how these reasons were 
formed). Therefore, even though the reason for the behaviour 
is itself a belief, which differentiates it from physical 
causes which are not beliefs, this does not suffice to show 
that such reasons cannot be causes. (18) 
The strongest anti-causal claim, for Bhaskar, (although it was 
easily dismissed by Davidson), is the argument that reasons are 
not logically distinct from the actions they explain so they 
(175) 
cannot be causes which are logically distinct from their 
effects. However, Bhaskar maintains that it is quite improper 
to talk of events, as distinct from their descriptions, bein; 
logically connected or not. Logic, in fact, connects 
statements not events and actions, which are connected, when 
they are, by relations of natural necessity. The fact that it 
is sometimes sufficient to an explanation that we identify or 
redescribe a human action in terms of its cause in no way 
differentiates human action from other natural events which are 
often also so redescribed in terms of their cause. Moreover, 
their identification in such a way that the description of the 
cause logically entails the description of the effect is 
exactly paralleled by the class of physical action statements 
(such as 'he drank the coffee') that underlie our ordinary 
attributions of causality. The fundamental point, however, and 
one which we have already discussed, is that actions can 
normally be redescribed independently of their reasons. (19) 
Bhaskar goes on the say that the fact that the notion of 
wanting, desiring or intending to do 'X' logically presupposes 
the notion of doing 'X' (that intentionality presupposes 
agency), is exactly paralleled by the fact that the notion of 
cause logically presupposes that of effect ('X' cannot just be 
(176) 
a cause, it has to be a cause of something). Thus, if we say 
that there is an intentional connection between 'wanting to do 
'X' and 'doing 'X ", we must also say that there is an 
intentional connection between 'causing 'X'' and 'X'. Once set 
in motion a cause tends to issue in an effect that bears its 
trace, and a reason in an action that the agent believes will 
fulfil or satisfy it. This, argues Bhaskar, is a necessary or 
conceptual truth but it is contingent and up to science to 
discover, in any particular case, what the generative causes or 
reasons are. So where the logical connection theorist posits a 
radical dichotomy, there are instead exact parallels. (20) 
Another argument against reasons as causes typically runs that 
to cite a reason is to talk at a different logical level from 
that at which one talks of causes of natural events. This, for 
Bhaskar, is an argument compatible with the idea that all 
events are governed by a closed determinate system of (Humean) 
'laws' - empirical invariances. It is argued, in the first 
place, that criteria for identity are different in the case of 
human actions and bodily movements. In response to this, 
Bhaskar maintains that because, in general, open systems are 
characterised by both a plurality and multiplicity of causes, 
the fact that the same bodily movements may be used to perform 
different actions and that the same action may be performed by 
(177) 
different bodily movements is no surprise. It is a Humean 
myth, he declares, to suppose that for any given event there is 
a unique set of antecedent or concomitant conditions under 
which it is constantly conjoined, so one has no grounds for 
saying that there is not a real difference between a human 
action and a mere bodily movement because in the former case 
(but not in the latter) a determinate set of reasons figures 
amongst its causes. (21) 
The other argument put forward to support this thesis is that 
the contexts in which reasons and causes are cited are 
logically discrepant. This turns on the fact that reasons are 
typically offered in justificatory contexts. Now it would seem 
to be a necessary condition, argues Bhaskar, for any 
justification 'R' of an action 'At' that 'R' was the reason why 
the agent performed 'A' at 't', and it is difficult to see how 
this claim can be explained without making use of the notion of 
'R' causing it. However, Bhaskar concedes that there is an 
important consideration on the nature of reasons behind this 
argument - that is that, in contradistinction to other causes, 
we appraise reasons 'qua' beliefs for consistency, truth, 
coherence, etc., and we appraise them from a certain standpoint 
necessitated by the irreducibility of intentionality, that of 
their suitability for believing (accepting) and acting upon. 
(178) 
Such appraisals of beliefs, he argues, are necessitated by the 
conditions that 'what I am to do' can never be reduced to, or 
discovered by scrutiny of, the antecedents of 'what I will do' 
since 'what I will do' will happen not in spite of but because 
of any decision I take and the beliefs and purposes I have. 
The picture of the agent's situation is not that of two series 
of events: (Si) in which it is determined what is going to 
happen; and (S2) in which the agent has plans, beliefs, desires 
and intentions and generally cogitates his or her life. There 
is only one event, ontologically speaking, and it is continuous 
with (S2). It is wrong, Bhaskar maintains, to suppose that 
what is going to happen in the future is 
(epistemologically) 
determined before it is (ontologically) caused. This is 
because when it is caused, it will be caused by the action of 
bodies, preformed, complex and structured, possessing powers 
irreducible to their exercise, endowed with various degrees of 
self-regulation (and transformation) in thoroughgoing 
interaction with one another and subject of a flow of 
contingencies that can never be predicted with certainty. As 
for human agents, Bhaskar maintains that it is contingent that 
they exist and have the powers that they do, but given that 
they do they cannot help but co-determine the future. (22) 
(179) 
The third supporting argument for this thesis is that there are 
fundamental differences in the conceptual structures of 
paradigms of the two modes of explanation. Compare, Bhaskar 
suggests, the paradigm (a) 'I raised my arm' with (b) 'My arm 
went up'. In the future tense, (a) expresses an intention and 
(b) a prediction. The answer to the question 'why? ' in (a) 
will be a story about reasons, purposes and the like; in (b) 
one about reflexes, nerves and muscles over which the agent has 
no special authority. These differences are then taken to show 
that we are dealing with a difference in category or level of 
discourse. While, though, Bhaskar argues, they do show that in 
our conceptual system we differentiate actions from mere 
movements, and reasons from physical causes; they do not show 
how, or on what criteria, such a differentiation is made, or, 
indeed, how it could be made unless actions were regarded as a 
class of bodily movements with reasons as their causes. (23) 
Reasons and Natural Laws 
The problem, then, with the above thesis, according to Bhaskar, 
is that reasons are seen as not affecting the sequence of 
physical events that actually occur. They 'hover above' and 
unconnected to whatever it is that actually happens, playing no 
real generative role in the life of agents. This means, 
(180) 
firstly, that in any given context where it is deemed that 
reason-explanations are appropriate, there can be no grounds - 
independent of subjective preference or its socialised form, 
custom, or convention - for preferring one reason-explanation 
to another. Thus, the agent's authority and responsibility 
collapses. Secondly, the question must be asked - in virtue of 
what are reason-explanations deemed appropriate at all if they 
do not co-determine the states of the world? Given this, 
Bhaskar argues, there is as much sense in trying to discover 
the agent's reasons for his or her heartbeat as for his or her 
voting behaviour; the bodily movements are as little and as 
much determined by reasons in both sets of cases - not at all. 
In this way, our habits of investigation, ascription and 
persuasion appear as wishful illusions; and, if apparently 
motivated behaviour or its consequences are regarded as 
undesirable, the only way to alter them is by operating on the 
purely physical causes of the bodily movements involved. 
Denied ontological purchase on the phenomenal world of bodily 
movements and physical happenings, therefore, it seems that 
both the status of reason-explanations and the particular 
reasons adduced in explanation must appear as arbitrary and the 
practice they depend upon as illusory. Indeed, Bhaskar argues 
that the very distinction between (a) 'things that we do' and 
(181) 
(b) 'things that happen to us' becomes impossible to sustain 
because it is only if we are the cause of some but not other 
bodily movements that such a contrast can be made and that we 
can properly be said to act at all. (24) 
In contrast, Bhaskar maintains that the transcendental realist 
can sustain such a contrast whereby in the (a) case but not the 
(b) case, the agent's reasons are a necessary condition for the 
bodily movements that occurred. In this way, reasons are 
invoked in the former but not in the latter case and the source 
of the agent's authority is explained. Bhaskar stresses that 
this granting of causal status to reasons necessitates no 
exemption to natural laws. Let us, though, pause here for a 
moment and consider this point. What does Bhaskar mean by a 
'law'. I would suggest that his argument could go like this: 
'if an agent had not set her alarm clock she would not have 
woken up'. She would have slept on (one presumes) without this 
intentional action. No exemption also means that having done 
so she may well have been very tired. In fact, Bhaskar argues 
that intentional action may best be regarded as setting initial 
and boundary conditions for the operation of physical laws; and 
reasons for the operation of neurophysical ones. Contrary to 
the myth, he suggests, laws are typically universal in that 
they apply to all members of a kind without (and this is 
(182) 
important) being deterministic in the sense of completely 
determining the behaviour of the members of that kind (our 
agent may have intentionally set her alarm because she was 
tired and wanted to wake up at a certain time, but then ignores 
the alarm when it goes off because she feels that her need for 
sleep is more important than her getting up at a certain time). 
In other words, we should see causal laws as the tendency of 
things to happen given certain circumstances but that other 
factors may intervene to alter the resulting action. Further, 
that this applies both to the natural and the social sciences. 
This, and the previous arguments considered, also serves to 
negate the final anti-causal argument which asserts that laws 
are involved in causal but not reason-explanations since 
reasons but not causes are dispositions or states rather than 
events. (25) 
Summary 
Having thus dismissed these objections to the idea of reasons 
as causes of actions, Bhaskar concludes not only that reasons 
can be causes of actions but they must be so if: firstly, they 
are to discharge their explanatory function; secondly, if 
thought is to be possible; and, thirdly, if the concept of 
agency is to be saved. Thus, in a similar way to Davidson, 
(183) 
Bhaskar argues that a person may possess a reason 'R' for doing 
' A' , do 
'A', and yet 'R' not be the reason why the agent did 
it. It is, he argues, only if 'X' does 'A' because of 'R' that 
we are justified in citing 'R' as the reason for 'At'. 
Further, there would be no way of explicating the 'because' 
except in terms of cause since unless the reason was a 
necessary condition for the physical movements that occurred 
'CP' then both the decision to invoke a reason-explanation and 
the particular reason-explanation given must be totally 
arbitrary. In this way, if and whenever they explain, reasons 
must be interpreted as causes on pain of ceasing to explain at 
all. (26) 
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SUMMARY TO PART TWO 
Introduction 
The aim of this section has been to analyse, firstly, the ways 
in which 'reasons' can be seen to explain the actions of human 
agents; and secondly what the status of reason-explanations is 
- that is, can reasons be seen as 
'causes' of action. It has 
been my contention that whilst all the writers considered seem 
to be in agreement concerning the idea that reasons do provide 
the explanation of actions, there is no consensus of agreement 
on how reasons are formed and, therefore, whether or not the 
relationship between reasons and actions should be seen in 
terms of cause and effect. 
Reasons are More than Rules 
I have suggested that Winch is correct to argue that meaningful 
action is associated with acting for a reason, but that his 
stress on rule-governed behaviour led him to the unsatisfactory 
conclusion that reasons involve nothing more than the following 
of rules which have to be socially constructed and sanctioned. 
This resulted in the agent appearing rather 'puppet-like', 
unable to form reasons as the result of his or her 'internal' 
desires and beliefs. 
(186) 
In contrast to this, Davidson and Hollis both maintain that 
reasons could only be understood as the product of desires plus 
related beliefs. Of considerable importance here, for the 
subsequent analysis of reasons as causes of action, is the 
idea, advocated strongly by Hollis, that both desires and 
beliefs must be included in any explanation of action since a 
belief can modify or change the desires of an agent. However, 
even though I accept many of the arguments put forward by 
Davidson, it seems to me that he also restricts his account of 
reasons by implying that they are purely 'internal' to the 
agent. Having stated that reasons are the product of pro- 
attitudes (or desires) and beliefs he seems to leave out of his 
account the possibility that our beliefs need not be the same 
as our desires, and thus that 'external' factors may be 
involved in the formation of reasons. 
The crux of my argument here, and one which is considered in 
much more detail in the next section, is that reasons may be 
purely internal to the agent, but they may also be formed on 
the basis of the influence of factors that exist outside the 
agent's own internal desires (a possibility particularly 
excluded in the Humean account of reasons). However, I do not 
want to suggest that when we talk in terms of external 
influences on action we are referring to anything like 'rules' 
(187) 
which agents uncritically accept. External reasons may modify 
actions, but it is the agent's choice whether to be influenced 
by them so that no form of determinism is involved in this 
conception of externality. 
The Humean Account of Causality 
The second important issue raised, is whether, by accepting 
that reasons provide the best explanations of action, this 
means that reasons cannot be seen as causes of action. I have 
argued that Winch's rejection of the idea of a causal 
explanation of action not only reflects his insistence that the 
relationship between reason and action is 'internal' and thus 
not open to causal analysis, but also results from his 
restriction of the notion of cause to that advocated by Hume. 
Such a conception of cause would entail us arguing that the 
same reason would always result in the same action, which is 
obviously not the case when explaining the actions of human 
beings. Winch, then, is right to reject this notion of cause 
in the social sciences. But, is it the case that we can only 
perceive 'cause and effect' in this way? 
(188) 
The answer given to us by Davidson is 'no'. Davidson makes the 
totally valid claim that reasons must be seen as separate from 
the actions which occur as a result of the agent holding those 
reasons and that Winch is therefore 'wrong' to exclude 
causality on the basis of an argument which maintains that the 
relationship between the two is one of internality not 
contingency. Where, though, in my opinion, Davidson is wrong 
is that he too limits his account of cause and effect to that 
of Hume and thereby tries, not very successfully, to re-work 
the Humean notion to correspond with his ideas concerning 
reasons and actions. 
The problems associated with these two accounts of the status 
of reason explanations led me to question whether, in fact, we 
should only perceive causal analysis in this rather limited 
way. As Bhaskar argued, both positivists and relativists share 
a positivistic account of the natural sciences. But, he 
maintains, there is an alternative view of science - and the 
causal explanations that are involved in the natural sciences - 
which can be applied equally well to the explanation of action 
in the social sciences. 
(189) 
Reasons as Tendencies 
This alternative view argues that, while science employs a 
causal criterion for ascribing reality, the causal laws 
produced are in fact tendencies. Seeing causes as tendencies 
is important when we are trying to explain actions. The crux 
of the matter is that action occurs in open systems where there 
are no constant conjunctions of events. This would preclude 
the possibility of any causal account within the remit of 
Humean causality. If, however, we see causes as tendencies of 
things, then the fact that we are referring to open systems 
does not prevent us using causal criteria to explain events. 
In citing a causal law in Bhaskar's sense, with reference to 
actions, we are discussing the activities of mechanisms as 
such. We are not making a claim about the outcome of the 
activity since this may be co-determined by other mechanisms. 
Science, in the sense described by Bhaskar, is seen as a social 
process. Its aim is the production of the knowledge of the 
mechanisms of the production of natural phenomena. In order to 
gain this knowledge it is necessary to build a model of the 
mechanism in question which, if it existed and acted in the way 
it was posited to act, could account for the phenomena in 
question. Having done this then the explanation itself must be 
(190) 
tested and then explained. Throughout this process two 
criteria are employed; that of perception, and a causal 
criterion which involves the capacity of the entity whose 
existence is in question to bring about changes in material 
things. (1) 
This knowledge of structures applies also to social life. Many 
of the criteria of a causal account of action have seen the 
social in terms of the category of 'behaviour'. If, though, we 
adopt Bhaskar's view of the social we do not see the distinct 
subject matter of sociology as behaviour. Instead, we examine 
the structures that combine together in social life. It is 
this stress on the examination of structures that leads us away 
from examining reasons in a purely 'internal' sense and raises 
the possibility of the influence of 'emergent properties' or 
'external factors' on the actions of individual agents. 
The issues raised in Bhaskar's account of the social sciences 
are, as we shall see, considered in detail in the next section. 
Suffice it to say, however, for our present purposes, that his 
idea that causes must be seen as tendencies of things provides 
us with a causal analysis that can be applied to the social as 
well as the natural sciences. For Bhaskar, then, the law-like 
statements of the social sciences designate historically 
(191) 
restricted tendencies operating at a single level in the social 
structure. Because of this, and because they always operate in 
open systems, they designate tendencies which may never be 
manifested but which are essential to the understanding and 
changing of different forms of social life just because they 
are productive of them. Society, then, is not a mass of 
separable events, nor, as Winch suggested, is it constituted 
wholly by the concepts we attach to our physiological states. 
Rather, it is a causally efficacious whole which cannot be read 
straight off a given world nor reconstructed from subjective 
experience. It is in this respect, however, that sociology is 
on a par with the natural sciences. (2) 
The point I want to stress is that intentional action is always 
caused by reasons if we accept the definition of causes as 
tendencies. I would maintain, in fact, that if reasons do not 
cause actions then how can these actions be said to be 
'intentional' and how can we explain the relationship between 
reason and action if we cannot do it causally? This is not to 
deny that Winch is correct to argue that reference to beliefs 
and other concepts is necessary for an adequate explanation of 
action. What I am arguing is that this may not be enough since 
action also has a material and ideational aspect which cannot 
(192) 
be reduced to the internal states of the individual agent. In 
other words, the agents' own reasons for their actions are 
causally efficacious in producing that action. 
The Natural and the Social Sciences 
Where does this leave us in terms of the similarities and 
differences between the natural and the social sciences? I 
would contend, with Bhaskar, that because social subjects are 
thinking, conscious agents able to make their own decisions - 
unlike the subjects of the natural sciences - the predicates 
that appear in social explanations will be different as will 
the procedures used to establish them. Thus, while positivists 
are correct to say that causal laws do exist in social life, 
they are wrong to see these causes in terms of empirical 
regularities, as did Hume, since we are dealing here with open 
systems in which such regularities cannot be found. This, 
though, if we accept that causal laws in the natural sciences 
must be seen as tendencies, does not make social laws very 
different from natural ones. (3) 
Perhaps the main difference between the natural and the social 
sciences, as Bhaskar suggests, is that the latter are part of 
their own field of enquiry and are conditioned by developments 
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PART THREE 
REASONS AS EXPLANATIONS OF ACTIONS -A CAUSAL ACCOUNT 
The primary purpose of this section is to put forward my 
theories concerning how actions can be explained in terms of 
reasons. To this end, I will suggest that while I accept the 
idea that reasons can be seen as the product of desires (or 
pro-attitudes) plus beliefs, the tendency has been, within this 
debate, to argue that reasons are either external to the agent 
or are purely subjective. It is this suggestion, itself, which 
I challenge and will argue that on such a basis explanations of 
action become inadequate and restrictive. 
Thus, in chapters one and two, I want to suggest an alternative 
view of how reasons are formed. What I am going to argue is 
that we should not restrict our ideas of reasons to the debate 
between 'subjective' versus 'objective' reasons. Rather that 
we should take account of the possibility that the formation of 
reasons may be (a) 'purely' internal to the agent; (b) internal 
in the sense that they are appropriated from external sources 
and then internalised; or (c) influential on actions as a 
result of external constraining or facilitating factors which 
are processed by the agent (so being external without being 
deterministic). Later on it will be argued, in more detail, 
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(196) 
that; (d) reasons can be a combination of some or all or these 
factors, when the time dimension is introduced and taken into 
serious consideration. 
It is in these chapters, therefore, that I bring into the 
explanation of action the idea of my three categories of 
reason-formation. In doing this I hope to demonstrate that we 
can allow for the effect of external factors on individual 
actions without producing the type of explanation which 
produces an 'oversocialised' view of actors. Moreover, we can 
allow the agent back into the explanation, but avoid the 
pitfalls of totally individualistic accounts which, in contrast 
to the first scenario, allow insufficient place for societal or 
cultural factors. 
The final chapter is concerned with how my assessment of how 
reasons are formed can be allied with Bhaskar's contention that 
reasons can be seen as 'causes' of action, if causes are seen 
as tendencies. Here, I will suggest that seeing reasons as 
causes must be done in terms of my three categories. That is, 
that tendencies can be seen in terms of category (i) or (ii) 
reasons, and that the existence of external factors brings into 
play category (iii) reasons (as reasons for actions or for 
taking alternative forms of action and not as determinants of 
action). 
CHAPTER ONE 
HOW REASONS ARE FORMED - THREE CATEGORIES OF REASONS 
Introduction 
One of the fundamental issues raised in the previous section is 
that concerning the need to include both desires and beliefs in 
action explanations. Whilst I agree that reasons must be seen 
as desires plus beliefs, it is important to recognise that our 
desires may not be the same as our beliefs. Indeed, a belief 
can and often does regulate our desires by sanctioning or 
proscribing them. For example, a hungry man may have the 
desire to steal food to satisfy his hunger, but his belief that 
stealing is a crime or a sin may prevent his performing the 
action of stealing. Conversely, if he believes that his 
stealing the food is the only way he can survive, which he sees 
as a justification of his act of stealing, then his belief in 
this will sanction his desire and he will steal the food. 
What this illustrates is that we must understand both the 
beliefs and desires of an agent in order to understand his or 
her action or non-action. This reflects the aforementioned 
idea that man may 'sit in judgement' on his present desires. 
Moreover, it can also be true that desires and beliefs may 
change or be modified as a result of previous actions or 
(198) 
societal pressures. There may be reasons 'external' to the 
agent's own desires and beliefs why a person may or may not 
perform an action which would fulfil his wants - such as fear 
of breaking the law or religious sanctions or cultural and 
ideational pressures not to or to do something - and these may 
prove stronger than either his or her desire or belief. 
Reasons, I am arguing, therefore, need not only be internal to 
the agent. Here, then, I could be seen as departing, to some 
extent, from the contention that it is only desires and beliefs 
that produce actions. I am, in fact, introducing a third 
dimension to how reasons are formed in terms of external 
factors. I want to stress, however, that these external 
reasons work on the desires and beliefs of the agent; they are 
not external in the sense that the agent has 'no choice' 
whether or not to be influenced by these reasons (a point I 
shall return to subsequently). 
For the present, however, I want to suggest that the immediate 
explanation of an action lies in discovering the desires and 
beliefs of the agent in question. In contrast to the Winchian 
idea of rules, reason-explanations allow us to explain not the 
correct social meaning of an action but the quality that the 
agent believes his action to possess. We must, then, examine 
and evaluate the beliefs and desires which led the agent to 
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perform the action which displayed that quality. This, though, 
does not exclude 'external' factors since desires, for example, 
can be created by society (as the force of advertising 
demonstrates) and beliefs and desires can be modified by the 
presence of 'emergent factors'. 
There are a number of issues raised here which require some 
unpacking. I have, up to now, been making a contrast between 
'internal' and 'external' reasons and between the 'subjective' 
and 'objective' aspects of reason-forming. In both cases this 
type of dualism appears too simplistic and no consideration has 
been given to how they combine together in everyday human 
action. Let us then consider how we can analyse the 
interaction between internal and external factors in the 
formation of reasons. 
The Three Fundamental Categories of Reason Formation 
It seems to me that the most useful starting point for 
addressing the question of how internal and external factors 
can be seen to be involved in the formation of reasons is to 
divide reasons (for analytical purposes) into three main 
types: - 
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(i) Internal reasons which are the product of the individual 
and which arise out of the individual without the influence of 
any external factors; 
(ii) Internal reasons which are appropriated from outside - 
from structural or cultural sources; 
(iii) External reasons which are not appropriated and 
internalised but which influence actions in two ways - by 
operating negatively in limiting alternative courses of action 
or by restricting knowledge of such alternatives; or by 
operating positively in providing the conditions under which. 
people can fulfil their desires without encountering problems. 
Internal (Category (i)) Reasons 
The form of reasons I am referring to in (i) can be usefully 
described as the agent's own (in the sense of being internally 
generated) desires and beliefs. Thus, I may have the desire to 
read a particular novel and a belief that this will give ne 
pleasure -a belief based on having, say, read previous books 
by the same author pleasurably (as opposed to a belief based on 
'publicity' which could be seen as a socially constructed 
belief and not then my reason - that is, it is not internally 
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generated). I then read that book and my action in doing this 
can be explained in terms of reasons that arose out of my own 
wants and beliefs. There are, in fact, no external factors 
involved. 
It could be argued, however, that there is an external factor 
involved here in that my reading of another book by the same 
author depends on the availability of other books by that 
author. As I will suggest, though, availability of external 
factors is somewhat different from being influenced by external 
factors. Thus, while the availability of the book is an 
external factor which allows me to read that book, it is my 
decision whether or not I actually do read that book; and this 
is based on my pleasure - which constitutes my reason for 
reading the book - in having read a book, previously, by the 
same author. Moreover, I would suggest that my contention 
works equally well with one book, and thus I am immune from the 
above criticism. That is, having read chapter one of a 
particular novel, I then read on and complete the book because 
that chapter and the subsequent chapters gave me pleasure. My 
pleasure in reading each chapter was my reason for continuing 
to read the book. Thus, even though the book had to exist for 
me to read it, there were no external factors that influenced 
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my decision to do so, or to continue doing so. This, as will 
be seen, is very different from the type of reason I am 
referring to when talking of category (ii) reasons. 
Appropriated (Category (ii)) Reasons 
It may be the case that the reasons we have to act in certain 
ways may still be our own reasons, but we have appropriated 
them from our culture or from structural conditions and have 
then internalised them and, in Hollis' words, 'made them our 
own'. For example, the reason an agent may give for visiting 
an elderly neighbour on a regular basis and for doing her 
shopping is her desire to help that neighbour and a belief that 
the neighbour needs help. Yet, it may also be the case that 
the culture in which the agent lives is one which encourages or 
even obligates (by making people feel guilty or by rewards for 
such services) that people care for the elderly; and this is an 
ethic that the agent has been raised in and has internalised. 
In this situation, in contrast to the first, there are external 
factors involved, but the reasons are still the agent's own 
because although she has been encouraged to internalise them 
she still retains the freedom not to perform that action (not 
everyone in that 'caring society' will visit their elderly 
neighbour). 
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Moreover, as I shall argue later, the agent need not be 
completely aware of the fact that she has internalised this 
cultural ethic from outside for it still to be a factor in her 
reason-formation. But this does not mean that the reason she 
gives is not her reason for the action. In other words, as 
agents we do not need fully to appreciate the influence of 
structural or cultural factors on our decisions to act in 
certain ways for them to be influences. Indeed, it is often 
the case that we simply do not recognise from where we 
appropriated these reasons. This, though, does not mean that 
the reasons we give for our actions are not our own - they are 
because we have internalised them. 
This idea, it seems to me, can again be illustrated by the 
notion of ideology. It has been argued, for example, that in 
Britain today there exists an ideology of self-help and non- 
intervention by the state. One outward manifestation of this 
is the stress on community care especially for elderly people, 
the mentally ill and the chronically sick. Now, while the 
reasons given for this may be couched in terms of the benefits 
of non-institutionalised care for these people, it has been 
suggested that this stress on self-help and care in the 
community is really advocated and encouraged by a government 
wishing to reduce the costs of state health care provided by 
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the National Health Service (hence the closure of mental 
hospitals and state-run homes for the elderly). If this is the 
case, then the ideology of a 'caring society' may really be 
disguising a more financial motive for encouraging lay people 
to care for their elderly, mentally ill or chronically sick 
relations and friends. 
Let us then assume that the agent who is caring for her elderly 
neighbour is unaware of this underlying reason for the ideology 
of a 'caring society'. Does this then mean that her reasons 
for providing this care are not her own reasons? I would wish 
to deny this. It may be true that the agent does not fully 
appreciate the financial reasons for advocating community care, 
but she has internalised the ethic involved in this ideological 
stance and made it her own. Thus, it does form her reason for 
her action. However, it is also the case that an observer may 
be able to discover the underlying financial motive for this 
ideology and so give a fuller explanation of the conditions 
that have influenced the beliefs and desires of the agent which 
led her to act in the way in question. In other words, the 
explanation of the actions of this individual need not finish 
with the motives, desires and beliefs of the agent. These are 
important, but the 'external' influences on these desires and 
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beliefs must also be taken into account particularly if the 
agent is not fully aware of the way in which they affect her 
actions. 
Indeed, the effect of these 'external' factors could be 
demonstrated, in a hypothetical situation, where these 
influences were withdrawn. Thus, say the society in which the 
agent lived was radically altered - it became a socialist state 
in which all 'caring' became the responsibility of state 
agencies. I stress that this is an 'ideal' which would 
probably not occur in reality since even in socialist states 
today, the state does not have the resources or even perhaps 
the desire to undertake all caring functions. Nevertheless, 
say this was the case, is it not conceivable that the desires 
and beliefs of the agent may change - albeit over a period of 
time? If there are no external influences for the agent to 
appropriate, that is, no ideology of self-help and community 
care, then the agent may lose that desire to help her elderly 
neighbour and her belief that this neighbour actually needs 
help. I emphasise the point that she may change her desires 
and beliefs - this should not be seen as a necessary outcome of 
this change. It could be that once these external influences 
have been 'internalised' by the agent, then, even if these were 
then to be withdrawn, she may have made these reasons so much 
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her own that they still influence her actions. In fact, what 
were once category (ii) reasons may appear more like categor: 
(i) reasons even though they were originally appropriated frcn 
an external source (a point to which I will return). 
Whilst appreciating that this is a purely hypothetical case, it 
does seem to me that if the ideological stance of a societ-. ' 
changes or the moral attitudes towards certain groups or types 
of behaviour change that we may also change our attitudes, 
desires and beliefs. Perhaps, the changes in how societies 
view alcoholics or drug-users - that is that they are not 
deviants but people who need help - is. 'a case in point. Not 
everyone will cease to treat these people as some kind of 
'criminal' but many will alter the way in which they view 
individuals who have these problems and their actions towards 
them will also change. This response to 'external' factors, 
however, that is that they are appropriated and internalised, 
is very different from that found in category (iii). 
External (Category (iii)) Reasons - Constraining Factors 
The reasons for acting here are not our reasons for acting, but 
can still be seen as 'reasons' - or perhaps 'causes' - of our 
acting in one way rather than another. As previously stated, 
/ 
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within this category there are negative reasons which act 
either to limit what we can do or restrict our knowledge of 
alternatives. The most obvious example of the former are legal 
restrictions, but, religious doctrines or moral pressures can 
also serve as constraints on our actions. 
In terms of religious doctrines, for example, it may be the 
case that a couple, one of whom is divorced, desire a Church 
wedding and sincerely believe in the importance of a religious 
ceremony to bind their union. However, when they approach the 
minister in charge he refuses them this course of action based 
on his doctrinal belief that marriage is for life and that the 
divorced person is still, in the eyes of God, married. This is 
not a legal restriction since there is nothing in the law that 
prevents divorced people re-marrying in Church, but it still 
serves to restrict the action desired by this couple. In this 
case, then, the category (iii) constraint operates both as a 
reason and as a cause. This couple obviously cannot have a 
Church wedding and they know the reason why. I want to stress, 
however, that not all category (iii) reasons may be like this. 
As I will argue, actors may experience constraints to their 
actions - know that there are certain things that they are 
prevented from doing - but they may not, because of restricted 
knowledge, know the reasons why they cannot act in this 
particular way. 
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The idea of moral sanctions is more complex, though 
nevertheless as powerful. In talking of moral sanctions 
providing external negative reasons for actions, I am referring 
to something similar to Dahrendorf's idea of homo sociologicus. 
Dahrendorf suggests that for every position a person can 
occupy, 'society' has defined certain personal qualities and 
modes of behaviour as acceptable. The incumbent of this 
position must decide whether or not to behave as society 
demands. If he yields to society then he may lose some of his 
independence but he gains society's approval. If he does not 
act in accordance with society's wishes he may preserve his 
independence but only at the cost of incurring certain 
sanctions which arise from 'society'. In other words, one of 
the external influences on our actions is provided by society 
itself and the positions we occupy within that society. As 
Dahrendorf argues, every position carries with it certain 
expected modes of behaviour - to every social position there is 
a social role. By assuming a social position, the individual 
becomes a character in the drama written by society - with 
every position he assumes, society hands him a role to play. 
Social roles, in fact, represent society's demands on the 
incumbents of social positions. They are bundles of 
expectations directed at social actors. (1) 
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This is different from the reasons provided in category (ii) 
since in Dahrendorf's idea of social roles we are referring to 
expected behaviour over which we have no control. Our 
concerns, he argues, are with the individual as confronted with 
demands generated outside himself. Thus, social roles are seen 
as quasi-objective complexes of prescriptions for behaviour 
which are in principle independent of the individual. Their 
content is defined and redefined not by the individual but by 
society, and the behaviour expectations associated with roles 
are binding on the individual in the sense that he cannot 
ignore or reject them without harm to himself. (2) 
Perhaps, however, Dahrendorf is rather overstating the case 
when he argues that we have no control over these 'external' 
reasons. Even though the expected behaviour that corresponds 
with social roles is not generated by the individual but by the 
society in which the individual lives, this does not mean that 
the individual is forced to abide by these norms and values. 
We should not, in my view, see 'external reasons' as somehow 
determining actions or else we lose the element of 'choice' 
that my emphasis on the importance of agency demands. Thus, we 
do have some control in the sense that we are free not to 
conform to the type of behaviour that is expected of us by 
society. However, external reasons can act as constraints in 
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the sense that if we wish to fulfil a role that is desired by 
us then we must conform to the expected behaviour that goes 
with this role. In other words, if we choose to ignore the 
norms and values of the society in which we live we can expect 
some form of sanctions against us or the creation of a 
situation in which we are prevented from fulfilling some social 
role we desire. 
For example, the expectations of a society may be that 
neighbours in a community are considerate about noise levels 
especially after a certain time of night. That is, in our 
roles as 'good neighbours' we are expected not to play loud 
music until the early hours of the morning however much we may 
desire this and believe that it is a reasonable thing to do. 
This expectation, then, is external to the individual, and it 
is binding in the sense that if we do play our loud music we 
can expect sanctions - say, that we may be ostracised by the 
rest of the community and perceived as not fulfilling our role 
as 'good neighbours'. 
It could be argued, however, that this is more like a category 
(ii) reason than category (iii) since our reason for not 
playing loud music is that, on balance of reasons, we put 
'avoiding ostracism' ahead of 'our rights to be a disturbance'. 
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After all, people can and do play loud music despite the risk 
of ostracism if they do so - the idea of 'the crime is worth 
the punishment'. On the other hand, the agent may be aware 
that this action may prevent them from fulfilling a role they 
desire - say, being popular, or it may result in more physical 
sanctions such as being put out of their Halls of Residence. 
They know this, so they knowingly avoid creating this 
situation. Again, the example of ostracism could be perceived 
as a reason appropriated from outside but internalised. In 
response to this, however, I would argue, firstly, that 
ostracism is only the first of the risks taken by these agents. 
Being ostracised may prevent them from carrying out other roles 
they desire - such as becoming a local councillor or obtaining 
a job in the community in which they live - and this, then, is 
a practical constraining force on the individual not to perform 
the action which would result in ostracism. As previously 
argued, though, the agent has a choice of whether his or her 
desire to play loud music is more powerful than his desire to 
become a councillor. That is true. But it is also true that 
we have the choice of whether or not to break the law. We know 
that if we do we face fine or imprisonment, but people still 
break the law. 
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The two cases are similar and I would argue that legal 
restrictions are a constraining force in the sense of category 
(iii) reasons because even though we are aware of them and 
abide by them we need not necessarily have internalised them 
and made them our own. We do not have to agree with a law that 
prevents us from performing certain actions, but it may still 
serve, in most cases, to do so. Thus I would suggest that 
category (iii) reasons differ from those in category (ii) in a 
fundamental way. The reasons we have appropriated from outside 
and made our own are those which we basically agree with. We 
appreciate the 'rightness' of the law or the moral pressure and 
we internalise it and make it part of our own belief system. 
If, on the other hand, we do not agree with the law or moral 
dictate it may still constrain or modify our action because of 
the sanctions that will ensue if we flout it, but we have not 
internalised it in the sense of making it our own. We are 
influenced by it as an external factor but far from becoming 
part of our own reasons for acting, it actively prevents us 
from acting in a way we desire and believe to be acceptable. 
Thus, the person who does not play loud music at night because 
he believes that this is the wrong thing to do may have 
appropriated this ideal from the community in which he lives, 
but he has internalised this belief - it has become his own 
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category (ii) reason. Alternatively, the person who does not 
play loud music because he fears the sanctions that will be 
forthcoming if he does - not because he feels it is wrong - has 
not internalised the belief. Rather, he experiences it as a 
constraint upon his desired action over which he has little 
control if he is to avoid the penalties that will ensue if he 
fulfils his own desires and beliefs - category (iii). 
In this way, as Dahrendorf suggests, an individual's 
relationship to his social role is neither purely accidental 
nor alterable by his own free decision. It is a matter of 
necessity and constraint. Society then is not merely a fact, 
but a vexacious fact and one that we cannot ignore or flout 
without punishment. Social roles, therefore, are a 
constraining force on the individual, whether he experiences 
them as an obstacle to his private desires or a support that 
gives him security or positive advantages to his desired 
action. The constraining force, which we are considering here, 
of role expectations is due to the availability of sanctions - 
measures which society can enforce conformity with its 
prescriptions. The individual who does not play his role is 
punished, the man who does may be rewarded or, at least, not 
punished. (3) 
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Negative reasons or constraints to actions, though, may also be 
seen in terms of more structural factors - such as, for 
example, financial restrictions. Thus, we may have the desire 
to send our children to private school because we believe that 
this would provide them with a better education, but the cost 
of doing this is prohibitive so that form of action is 
prevented by the external constraints, say, of low wages, 
unemployment, and so on. This, then, is different from the 
case of the couple who desired a Church wedding since although 
we may know that we cannot afford private education we need not 
always know exactly why. That is, we may not be fully aware of 
all the social factors involved in determining, say, wage 
differentials but we are aware of the situation in which we 
find ourselves and we experience this as a constraint on our 
desired action. I am not suggesting, however, that we cannot 
change the situation that we find ourselves in. We may not be 
able to do so, but, in some cases, we may find this possible - 
perhaps a change in our occupation or our priorities over 
spending, will enable us to afford this private education. 
Thus, these external factors, at present, may confront us as 
constraints but I want to avoid the determinism of saying that 
they need always do so. Other factors may intervene to remove 
this obstacle to our desired action: yet often its very 
circumvention influences our action. 
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Another type of external negative constraint is restricted 
knowledge which is, perhaps, best demonstrated in the case of 
censorship whereby those in power, for instance, prevent others 
from possessing certain information which may enable them to 
see alternatives to the way the society in which they live is 
organised. Alternatively, it may involve a 'cultural 
situation' whereby the people of a certain form of society do 
not possess knowledge, say, of certain 'scientific' discoveries 
which would aid them to increase their crop yields - they do 
not have this knowledge so have no alternatives to their 
methods of farming. As Brodemeier stated, "ignorance of 
alternatives and of the popularity of alternatives prevents 
practice of alternatives". (4) 
External Category (iii)) Reasons - Facilitating Factors 
It is, however, true that external factors do not only 
influence our actions by providing negative sanctions. 
Emergent properties can also facilitate rather than constrain 
actions. As Dahrendorf suggests, there are positive as well as 
negative sanctions: society may bestow decorations as well as 
impose prison sentences, acknowledge prestige as well as expose 
unacceptable behaviour. (5) Thus, as social actors we may find 
that our desires and beliefs, and our subsequent actions, are 
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supported by the society in which we live. For example, a 
person may have the desire to improve their standard of 
education by, say, attending university. If this is a goal 
that is supported by the rest of society then that individual 
may find practical inducements available to achieve this - such 
as the provision of higher education facilities, financial 
support, etc.; and more psychological encouragement in the form 
added status given to people who achieve a certain standard of 
education. In this case, society is providing positive 
sanctions to the individual's own desires and beliefs by 
providing a situation in which this desire to improve 
educational standards is largely problem-free. 
Facilitating factors, however, may also be seen in terms of the 
position or status of an individual in the society in which 
they live. Thus, say the person who wishes to improve their 
standard of education comes from the type of background in 
which they have knowledge of the provisions available, have no 
need of paid employment because of their financial status, come 
from an area where the availability of higher education (and, 
perhaps, child-care facilities) is good, and so on. In this 
case the position in which they find themselves is relatively 
problem-free in terms of attending university and so, by virtue 
of their social position, they are able, without encountering 
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negative constraints, to fulfil their desires and beliefs. In 
contrast, another person, in the same society, may come froo 
the type of background where the knowledge of these 
opportunities is not available (nor, indeed, are the 
facilities). They too may have the same desires and beliefs 
but their situation is not problem-free. There are no 
facilitating factors to encourage the course of action they 
desire. This does not mean that they will not go on and attend 
university or college, just that 'external' or 'emergent' 
properties do not provide the facilitating factors we are 
discussing here. 
Again I wish to stress that the agents need not know why a 
situation is problem free/ridden for it still to influence 
their actions. The point is that they do know that it is and 
this affects their reasons (that is, it forms one of them) for 
their action or non-action. Moreover, it is clear that the 
emergent factors affecting these actions are something over 
which the agent, at present, has little or no control. They 
are purely 'objective' and serve to influence the actions of 
the agents by imposing constraints on or facilitating certain 
forms of action. The reasons here, then, are not the agent's 
own reasons - they are reasons but they exist outside the 
agent. Whilst these 'emergent properties' are important in 
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many action-explanations, they are not the only ways in which 
emergence affects the ways in which actors behave. We thus 
return to category (ii) whereby our actions are influenced by 
outside factors but where the reasons we give for our action 
constitute our own reasons for acting as we do. 
Emergent Factors Modify Actions 
The crux of my argument is, in fact, found in my contention 
that beliefs and desires can be modified by the presence of 
'emergent properties'. This is very different from the case 
where external factors prevent certain actions by imposing 
sanctions on them. In this case, the emphasis is on the 
agent's own reasons for their actions, but where these reasons 
are somehow altered or changed by the exigencies of external 
factors. To illustrate this I shall use the example of health- 
care. 
Let us, for instance, take the case where an agent begins to 
display symptoms which seem to indicate some form of disease. 
There are a number of options open to this agent in the light 
of this. He may, for instance, decide to ignore the symptoms 
hoping that they will just disappear; he may decide to 'wait 
and see' how the condition develops; or he may take the 
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decision to visit the doctor. If this agent decides not to 
visit the doctor this may also be for a variety of reasons. It 
could be that in the society in which he lives there are no 
health-care facilities - no doctors - available. In this case 
his not visiting the doctor can only be explained in terms of 
category (iii) reasons. There are 'external factors' over 
which the agent has no control. His action (or non-action) has 
nothing to do with the desires or beliefs of the agent. 
Alternatively, if the agent lives in a society in which there 
are health-care facilities he may also decide not to visit the 
doctor but for other reasons which are his own. He may, for 
example, have a distrust of doctors, based on past experiences 
of his own or others, and prefer to ignore the symptoms or 
treat himself. In this case, his decision is a product of his 
own reasons but these reasons have been influenced by previous 
experiences which were not of his own making. Similarly, his 
decision not to seek professional advice may be influenced by 
more structural factors, such as difficulty in travelling to a 
surgery, the waiting time when he gets there, fear of having 
time off work, etc. In all these cases, the decision taken has 
been affected by external factors, but it is still the agent's 
decision because he has the choice of whether or not these 
external factors will deter him from fulfilling his desire, if 
he has it, to visit the doctor. 
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Even having made this decision, however, the agent's subsequent 
actions may be modified by changing conditions. For example, 
the symptoms may become worse, overcoming his distrust of 
doctors; he may discover a means by which travelling to the 
surgery becomes easier; the doctor may institute an 
appointments system, and so on. In the light of these changing 
external conditions then the agent may make a new decision to 
visit the doctor. Again, it is the agent's own choice but one 
based on or modified by external factors. 
Summary 
What I am arguing, therefore, is that both 'objective' and 
'subjective' factors play a part in this type of decision- 
making. This, though, brings us to the question raised earlier 
as to whether there has to be a subjective aspect to reason- 
explanations. I have suggested that we can see reason- 
formation in terms of three categories internal, appropriated 
and external reasons. It has been my contention that reasons 
should be seen in terms of the desires and beliefs of the 
agent, but that these two elements may not always correspond. 
That is, that the beliefs of the agent can modify his or her 
desires and that both may be influenced by external factors 
that exist outside the agent. 
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However, I do not want to imply that there are no subjective 
factors involved in any of the three categories of reason- 
formation. The first case (category (i) reasons) obviously 
involves 'subjectivity' and the second (category (ii)) also can 
be seen to do so as the agent internalises reasons he or she 
accepts as somehow 'right'. But the case of category (iii) 
external reasons is somewhat different. As I have argued, 
though, even in the case of external constraining factors the 
agent does have a 'choice' of whether or not to abide by these 
constraints and this can be seen as the 'subjective' or 
internal aspect of this type of reason-formation. The 
question here is: does the agent have to be aware of the 
reasons for his action for them to be reasons or can something 
constitute a reason (that is, someone's reason) without any 
awareness of it? It is to this question that the next chapter 
addresses itself. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE INTERNAL/EXTERNAL ASPECT OF REASON FORMATION 
Introduction 
The thrust of my argument in this chapter, as a starting point, 
is that agents do have to have some awareness of their reasons 
(in some way which need not entail full discursive penetration) 
for these reasons to be their reasons for acting as opposed to 
a reason which while being a reason not to act is not the 
agent's reason for acting. Whilst I agree that agents may not 
be fully aware of all the factors involved in their decisions 
to act in one way rather than another, I still want to suggest 
that agents do not act for reasons of which they are totally 
unaware. 
The second contention, discussed here, is that while I have 
divided reason-formation into three categories, I do not 
consider that these are in any way rigid or unchanging. The 
categories I have outlined are intended for analytical purposes 
only and are not intended to imply that reasons are only formed 
on the basis of one 'type' or another. On the contrary, my aim 
is to remove the seeming 'fallacy' that we have to explain 
actions in terms of reasons in either one way or another. We 
can see reason formation as the result of a number of factors, 
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all of which are needed to be included in our explanation; or 
we can see reasons as originating within one category and 
evolving into another category, especially as a result of the 
agent undergoing some sort of 'learning process'. In other 
words, I want to get away from the restrictions of the 
internalist/externalist debate whereby we cannot see reasons as 
the result of both subjective and objective factors - or, 
indeed, one or the other with the possibility that both could 
be included. This is, as I shall argue, exactly what we should 
be trying to discover. 
The Problems of the Idea of Unconscious Motives 
Let us begin with the first issue. There are those who would 
argue that the agent need not be aware of his or her motives 
for these to be their reasons for acting. Freud and his 
supporters, for example, maintain that many actions can be 
explained in terms of 'unconscious motives' of which the agents 
are unaware. The argument is that even when an agent seemingly 
deliberates and decides to do something for a reason of which 
he thinks he is fully aware, his choice is really determined 
not by the reason he gives to himself but by unconscious forces 
of which he is not even aware still less in control of. To 
take an extreme example. The neurotic handwasher claims and 
believes that his hands are dirty and so he decides to wash 
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them for that reason. When he is told that they are not, he 
says that they still feel dirty. He thinks that he decides to 
wash them, but the psychoanalyst would say that his free 
rational decision is an illusion. His conduct is determined by 
unconscious motives and his alleged reasons are 
rationalisations. For Freud, according to Nowell-Smith, this 
is not only true of the actions of neurotics. In fact, many of 
our actions are due to unconscious motives - even the most 
carefully planned actions. What Freud argues is that the 
'reasons' an agent gives to himself do not really affect his 
decisions. His conscious mind and will are puppets activated 
by wires pulled by his subconscious. (1) 
Now, even if this were the case, the question could be asked as 
to whether the reasons the agents give for their actions cannot 
still be seen as reasons for that action, even if the 
psychoanalyst claims that they are not the real reasons? Take 
the case of the neurotic handwasher. It seems to me that we 
could still be perfectly justified in saying that the action of 
the neurotic can be explained in terms of the reason that he 
believes his hands are dirty even though we believe they are 
not. The fact that he does believe this constitutes the 
reason, his reason, for the action of washing his hands. As 
Nowell-Smith contends, the psychological causes of my believing 
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something (if they exist) are irrelevant to the question of 
whether I have good reasons for believing it. The man who 
accepts the well-paid job may have good reasons even though his 
action could be explained in terms of unconscious causes. 
There is a problem here, however, of whether the neurotic 
handwasher, for example, really has a good reason for washing 
his hands. It can be argued that the fact that his hands are 
not dirty means that his reason is not a good one since the 
belief his reason is based on is false. The point I am making, 
though, is that regardless of whether or not the belief he has 
can be seen as 'rational' or somehow correct, it is still his 
belief and we can explain his action, initially, in terms of 
it. Whether the belief is right or wrong, rational or 
irrational, the action of the individual is based upon the 
belief and the related desire so that the action is explicable 
in terms of the belief. Indeed, the agent's hands still feel 
dirty - which is a good enough reason for him - although the 
explanation of the action may be supplemented by the observer 
in terms of the medical condition that accounts for the agent 
having that belief. 
In this way, therefore, even if unconscious motives do exist, 
this is not to say that the reasons an agent gives for his 
actions should be discounted. However, I want to go a stage 
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further than this and question the whole concept of unconscious 
motives, specifically that we can have motives of which we are 
unaware. Psychoanalysts suggest that the beliefs and desires 
we recognise in ourselves and think are determinant of our 
actions are really only a substitute or mask for our true 
motivations which lie deep in our unconscious; and that because 
of early experience, indoctrination and our built-up interests 
we have powerful incentives for suppressing the very awareness 
of these motivations and for resisting any exploration that 
might lead us to our own enlightenment. In response to this I 
would like to ask the psychoanalysts how they are able to 
discover these if we have no awareness of them at all. It 
seems to me that unless we have some knowledge ourselves of 
these motives no-one could ever find out what they were. It is 
more likely, as Maclver suggests, that we can have motives of 
which we are only fitfully or dimly aware and do not realise 
their full significance, but that a dim light is still a light. 
There is some awareness, and to suggest that we are unconscious 
of a motive when we do not know its consequences and the 
function which it serves is to employ a mode of speech that 
plays havoc with any distinction between the conscious and the 
unconscious. (2) 
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Before continuing with this argument, however, I think a slight 
digression is in order concerning the point Maclver made about 
not knowing the consequences of our motives and the subsequent 
actions that arise from them. In fact, it is probably the case 
that we can never know fully all the consequences of our 
actions, but this is not to say that we do not know what the 
initial motives for these actions were. Rather, it is to say 
that the consequences of the actions that result may be very 
different from that which we intended. For example, say our 
patient displaying symptoms decides to visit the doctor for the 
reason that he believes that early treatment will result in his 
quick return to good health. One of the motives for this 
decision is that he feels that his work is suffering because of 
these symptoms. However, as a result of consulting the doctor 
and taking his advise and treatment the patient has to take a 
number of days off work. During this time a contract for which 
he has been working is clinched by his rival for promotion and 
he thus loses that promotion because of his action. In this 
case, then, the consequences of the action of this agent could 
not be appreciated by that agent, but this does not mean that 
he did not reason in terms of a good motive of which he was 
fully aware. In other words, we can never know all the 
consequences of our actions but this does not negate our 
understanding of the reasons we initially gave for our action. 
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To return, however, to the Freudian argument that we do not 
know the reasons for our actions. I feel that there is no 
justification for saying that we are unaware of these reasons 
even though they may not be fully appreciated by us. This is 
the important point. I do not wish to deny that we may not 
know the complete reason why we act as we do (as the force of 
ideology illustrates) but I do not accept the idea that the 
reasons we give for our actions are in truth only masks for the 
real reasons for that action which arise out of the unconscious 
mind. What I do suggest is that, in some cases, the agent does 
not fully recognise the 'external conditions' that influence 
their reasons. For example, the old age pensioner who cuts 
back on the amount of heating he uses is aware of the rising 
costs of electricity and gas. The cost of heating is then the 
reason - his reason - why he uses less heating. However, he 
need not be aware of the structural conditions, say, of 
inflation, which is the cause of this and which constitutes the 
structural conditions for the situation in which the pensioner 
finds himself. This may only be apparent to an outsider who 
has access to this information and who can then provide a more 
detailed explanation of the actions of the pensioner. 
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The Subjective/Objective Interaction 
The crux of my argument is that 'emergent properties' can serve 
to modify our actions by limiting or restricting what we can do 
or by providing the conditions which encourage certain courses 
of action. However, this, which I am calling the external or 
objective aspect of reason-explanations, is not the only way in 
which emergence affects our reason-formation. I also want to 
maintain that the individual is capable of internalising some, 
if not all, of these external factors. By this process of 
internalisation he makes these reasons his own and makes 
decisions subjectively in terms of them. As Maclver argues, 
motivations, subjective urges of all kinds, are the expressions 
of felt needs. But needs vary with external conditions, are 
responsive to them, in large measure depend on them. We thus 
need to conjoin motives with the relevant situations if we are 
concerned to discover their causal role. (3) How, though, do 
we conjoin these internal and external aspects? What is the 
bridge between the two? 
The problem is that, up to now, we have been discussing 
internal and external reasons as two separate entities. We 
need to know how they interact and affect each other in the 
course of everyday action. In doing this, however, I want to 
(231) 
avoid the individualism of Davidson whereby reasons are purely 
subjective and the other extreme whereby reasons are seen to be 
given us entirely from the societal structure in which we live. 
Opportunity Costs 
Perhaps the most useful way of seeing this is in terms of 
'opportunity costs'. A person, for example, may have the 
desire to go on to higher education and believes that this is 
the best course of action to take for their future happiness 
and security. However, before taking the decision to go to 
university, the person has to weigh up the costs of this 
action, say, in terms of deferring the earning of a salary, 
having to move away from home, and so on. If, in one case, the 
costs appear relatively low - there is parental encouragement 
and financial support - then, based on these structural and 
cultural factors and the agent's own desires and beliefs, the 
person will probably undertake that course of action. On the 
other hand, there could be the case where a person, while still 
having the same beliefs and desires, comes from a poor 
household where an extra income is needed and where there is no 
parental encouragement. In this situation, the costs of going 
on to higher education may be too high and the decision is 
taken not to pursue this action. In both cases, the reasons 
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for going or not going to university are the agent's own 
reasons. But, the decision has been modified or influenced by 
factors that exist outside the individual - by structural or 
cultural factors which serve to enable or prevent the course of 
action desired. 
It could still be argued, however, that the influence of 
external factors, in this example, seem to carry greater weight 
on the decision taken than the internal desires and beliefs. 
This, though, is not the case. People will and do vary in the 
way that they weigh up costs - otherwise how could we explain 
the fact that people from poor backgrounds with little 
encouragement do attend universities? It is the subjective 
choice of each individual as to how high a cost they are 
willing to pay. Moreover, it is an ongoing process whereby the 
costs may rise and fall and new decisions taken in the light of 
this over a period of time. Thus, a person may take the 
decision that despite the financial problems, etc., the costs 
of attending university are not too high to pay. After a 
while, however, the conditions may change -a family member may 
fall ill and need help. The opportunity costs then rise again 
and the individual subsequently takes the decision to leave and 
find work or care for their sick relative. The point is that 
the reason to do this is the agent's own reason but the 
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decision is taken in the light of the structural or cultural 
condition in which the agent finds him/herself which is not of 
the agent's own making nor even over which the agent has any 
control. 
Unacknowledged Conditions of Action: Is There Subjectivity 
Here? 
In this case, however, the actors do know something about the 
emergent properties which influence their actions. In other 
words, there is still a subjective aspect to the decision 
taken. It could be argued, though, that there are situations 
where emergent properties exist, which condition actions, but 
of which the agent is unaware - that is, unacknowledged 
conditions of action. This is particularly true where 
'facilitating factors' are concerned. Could it not be the case 
that if the actor is in a problem-free situation then he or she 
can take the bonuses of that situation without being aware that 
they are bonuses? If this is so then can we argue that these 
'emergent properties' constitute part of their reason for 
acting? Is there, in this case, a subjective element? 
For example, say our patient displaying symptoms of disease, 
comes from a particularly wealthy background. He is 
financially able to afford private medical care when convenient 
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to himself. He is aware, because he has always been able to 
avail himself of these facilities, where such medical services 
are available. This, then, is an emergent factor which will 
influence his action to seek medical advise. But, because he 
is in a situation into which he was born and which he has 
never considered any alternative to, he is unaware that this is 
a facilitating factor which is influencing his decision. Thus, 
can we not argue that, in this case, there is no 'subjective' 
awareness of the motives for his action of seeking medical 
advice? 
In response to this, however, I would argue that a course of 
action being problem-free is a reason in itself since it sets 
no costs on carrying out the agent's desire, say, to seek 
medical advice. In other words, the fact that the course of 
action is problem-free constitutes a belief that 'x' - the 
agent's desire for medical help - is possible. It is, 
therefore, this belief in the availability of the means to 
fulfil his desire which forms the subjective element in this 
explanation of the action of this patient. Thus, even if the 
agent is unaware of the bonuses of his objective position, 
because they can and do facilitate his desired action, they do 
constitute part of the agent's own reason for acting as he 
does. Moreover, even if the agent is not immediately aware of 
(235) 
the facilitating factors which condition his action, this is 
not to say that this will always be the case. He may, in time, 
perhaps by comparing his situation with that of others, begin 
to comprehend the advantages that he has and become aware of 
the factors that facilitate his desires. Thus, just because an 
agent may not be immediately aware of all the reasons for his 
actions, this is not to say that he will never be so. 
Awareness of reasons need not be instant, it may be that our 
comprehension of all the reasons why we act as we do is 
something that evolves over time and requires some kind of 
learning process. 
The suggestion, however, that facilitating factors do have a 
subjective element seems to indicate that they are an example 
of category (ii) rather than (iii) reasons. Yet, I have argued 
that facilitating factors can be an example of external reasons 
rather than appropriated ones - as factors outside the 
individual over which he or she has little control. I still 
believe this to be the case in the sense that the situation in 
which the agent finds him/herself is one that he or she was 
born into - he or she did not, as an individual, create it nor 
does he or she necessarily appreciate the bonuses of that 
situation. It is, in this conception of externality, an 
external factor that conditions the agent's actions. There is 
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an internal factor involved simply because the agent 
experiences no problems in executing his/her desired action, 
but it is difficult to argue that he or she is acting as a 
result of factors that have been internalised (the bonuses of 
the situation) especially if the actor remains unaware of them. 
This is not to say, though, that the agent will never do this. 
In fact, our patient, over a period of time and as a result of 
some kind of learning process, may come to appreciate the 
bonuses of his situation and why he has these bonuses. For 
example, he may be exposed, in his work or in his relationships 
with others, to the experiences of different people in less 
privileged positions; or he may come across material concerning 
inequalities in health care. In either case this could lead 
him to become aware that his status and financial position has 
given him benefits over others in terms of health care and even 
his whole quality of life. He thus becomes aware not only of 
the situation he is in, but what the bonuses are and why he has 
them. In this case, then, he may well internalise these 
factors so that they now form part of his category (ii) reason 
for acting because he is aware of them. He may not internalise 
these factors - that is, he may reject them once he has this 
awareness, but if he does not then it seems reasonable to 
assume that he perceives of these bonuses as 'right' and makes 
them part of his own value system. 
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Reason-Formation Categories Are Not Rigid or Static 
This idea of the possibility that the reason-formation category 
can be seen to change in this way - as a result of the agent 
becoming aware of the bonuses of his or her situation and 
internalising them - does raise the question of whether we 
should view the categories, previously outlined, in such a way 
that implies that they are rigid in their boundaries and 
somehow static and unchanging. This is not the conclusion I 
wish to draw. The categories, in some cases, are not clear-cut 
and there are areas where they may seem to merge into one 
another. Nor are they unchanging -a reason may, initially 
fall into one category but because people are thinking, 
learning agents their reasons may also change in form. Let us 
then examine in what circumstances this could occur. 
Firstly, I want to consider whether there are any situations 
where internal reasons can become appropriated or even external 
reasons. Remember that the definition of internal reasons 
given before is that they are the product of the individual and 
one derived from no external source. It is precisely because 
they are totally subjective - there are no external factors 
involved - that they are internal reasons. If, then, for any 
case, we can locate any external factor, these internal reasons 
(238) 
cease to be such. They become either category (ii) or (iii) 
reasons. It is difficult, then, to envisage how an internal 
reason can become an appropriated or external reason if it was 
initially a definite example of category (i). 
One way that internal reasons may be seen to become 
appropriated is if they are shared - but even in this case they 
can only be category (ii) reasons for 'other people' not for 
the individual who initially formed the reason. For example, 
say our individual who formed the desire to read a novel (based 
on a belief that this will give pleasure having previously read 
books by the same author) recommends it to other people. If, 
then, the other people read the novel they will have 
appropriated the desire and belief from an external source. 
The point is, though, the reason for reading the novel is only 
category (ii) for the 'others' - the reason why the original 
individual read it remains 'internal' to that person. 
Perhaps, however, we could argue that there can be a shift from 
category (i) to (ii) through a process of learning in the sense 
that the agent becomes aware of the effects of his or her 
action on the rest of society and the reactions of that society 
back on the individual. In other words, when we are examining 
category (i) reasons we should not only look at the origins of 
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the action that results, we should also ask the question of 
whether, regardless of the initial reason for the action, the 
social structure supports or rejects that action based on the 
individual's reason. Thus, if on the one hand, the agent's 
action is seen as acceptable or desirable then that agent will 
receive positive feedback from the society or culture in which 
he or she lives and this will reinforce the desires and beliefs 
that formed the original reason for the action. This is, then, 
at this next stage, an external input into the agent continuing 
to have that reason. On the other hand, if the agent receives 
negative feedback from the social structure this may (though 
not necessarily) lead him or her to revise their desires and 
beliefs and reject the reason he or she originally had for the 
action in question. What I am arguing, then, is that the 
formation of a reason is not static - it is an ongoing process 
which can result, because we interact with other people and 
take account of other ideas, in a revision of our initial 
reason for acting. 
It is still the case, however, that, in terms of the definition 
of internal reasons given, the agent is no longer acting purely 
in terms of subjective desires and beliefs - the category of 
reason has changed even though the reason itself may not have 
done. What, though, can we say concerning the possibility of 
(240) 
trying to envisage a situation where appropriated or external 
reasons can become internal reasons? Problems again occur 
because internal reasons should be seen as those that have no 
external factors influencing them. Thus, once we have 
appropriated a reason, even though we then internalise it, it 
cannot be said to have had no external input. 
The situation, however, may not be as clear-cut as this 
implies. If we are discussing how types of reason-formation 
can change then perhaps we are justified in arguing that, 
despite previous external influence, in the situation where 
this external influence is removed and yet the agent retains 
the internalised reason for acting, there is a change to a form 
of category (i) reason. Let us take the example in which the 
ideology of self-help and community care is replaced by that of 
state responsibility for care due to a change in the 
organisation of society. In this case I suggested that even 
though the external influence of one ideological stance is 
removed and replaced by another, the agent may have so 
internalised the former ideology, and made it her own, that she 
retains the belief that it is her responsibility to care for 
her neighbour despite new external influences on her reason- 
formation. Thus, despite the fact that the external factor - 
the ideology - no longer exists, the reason previously 
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internalised is influencing how that agent acts even in the 
face of the influence of new external factors which may 
actively discourage such actions. The question is, has her 
reason for continuing her action become a category (i) reason? 
I would argue that the answer to this is yes. In referring to 
category (i) reasons as internal to the agent - as 'personal' 
reasons -I am not suggesting that they have to be entirely 
'original'. For example, if an agent continued to be or 
actually became a Christian in Eastern Europe ten years ago 
then he or she was not appropriating these beliefs from current 
category (ii) approved beliefs (in fact, he or she would be 
accumulating (category (iii)) sanctions from the Party in 
power). But neither was he or she 'inventing' Christianity. 
Similarly, as a lone novel reader I have not invented the novel 
- it had to exist for me to read it, but it is as a result of 
my pleasure - which is my reason - that I continue to read that 
novel. This is not to say that no reason can ever be personal 
and original. Rather, that in many cases the personal element 
often consists in 'raiding' the cultural system for items that 
are not socially advocated. It is this that distinguishes 
category (i) reasons from those of category (ii). There is, in 
fact, a distinction between external availability and external 
influence (as I stated at the outset) when we are discussing 
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reason-formation. In the case of category (ii) reasons - as 
the example of ideology illustrated - the agent has 
appropriated and internalised current socially accepted 
external reasons and made them her own. She has accepted them 
as somehow 'right' and made them part of her own belief system. 
On the other hand, the agent who became a Christian in Eastern 
Europe has not appropriated and internalised the ideology of 
the society or culture in which he or she lives. This agent, 
in fact, has not been influenced by this ideology at all but 
has taken the personal decision to act in accordance with 
beliefs that are totally opposed to this ideology. It is the 
agent's own personal choice to select the particular beliefs 
advocated by Christianity -a set of beliefs available to the 
agent but not advocated by the society in which the agent 
lives. It forms then the internal reason of the agent even 
though the agent has not 'invented' those beliefs themself. 
This is very different from category (ii) reasons where the 
agent appropriates beliefs from the society and culture of 
which they are a member and then internalises them and makes 
them their own. 
What of the possibility of changing categories of reason- 
formation between (ii) and (iii)? It is important to be clear 
here about the basic difference between appropriated reasons 
(243) 
and external reasons which constrain actions. I have argued 
that the reasons we appropriate from outside and internalise 
are those which we believe to be 'right'. They are, for us, 
values and norms which seem to us rational and accord with the 
way of life we desire. External reasons, on the other hand, in 
the case of negative reasons, usually act as constraints on our 
desired actions. We do not agree with them or want to 
incorporate them into our value system, but we have to accept 
them as conditioning our actions if we are to avoid the 
sanctions which would be forthcoming if we did not act in 
accordance with them. Is it then, given this difference, 
possible for appropriated reasons to become external, 
constraining reasons, or vice versa? It is here, I suggest, 
that the effects of the learning process - of nev experiences, 
added knowledge, and so on - come into play. 
Let us, for instance, return to the case of the agent who cares 
for her elderly neighbour living in a society where community 
care is advocated. I have argued previously that in this 
situation the agent has internalised this ethic and made it her 
own. Thus, her reason for performing her role is that she 
believes that this is the right thing to do and her desire is 
to help. Her reason, therefore, is a category (ii) reason. 
However, there may be a change in her own experiences. She may 
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have added pressures on her time, she may find the neighbour is 
abusing her help, and so on. She may even begin to question, 
in the light of views that it should be the state's 
responsibility to care for the elderly and sick, whether her 
role is really allowing the state to shirk its responsibilities 
and is thus contrary to the real needs of this neighbour. 
Whatever the case, she begins to reject the ethic she has 
internalised. In this case, even though the agent still 
continues to visit the neighbour, it is for a different reason. 
In fact, rather than feeling that this is the right thing to 
do, she feels obligated to help for fear of censorship if s^e 
does not continue to do so - or through a feeling of 'guilt' as 
the state does not fulfil the role itself. In either case, she 
no longer desires the role; she does not believe that s: e 
should have to continue her caring, but because she fears 
sanctions if she does not do so she continues in her action. 
Her reasons, now, though, are category (iii) rather than (ii). 
She no longer sees this ideology as 'right' rather as a 
constraint on alternative courses of action. 
In a similar way, the motorist who has all his motoring life 
abided by the law in relation to speed restrictions has done so 
because he accepts the reasons why these laws exist - that is, 
for the safety of himself and others. He does not see it as a 
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constraint on his action because he has never desired to act 
otherwise. However, at some stage the need for him to arrive 
at his destination as soon as possible arises - his wife needs 
to get to the hospital, he is late for an important 
appointment, and so forth. In this case, perhaps, his not 
breaking the speed limit is not because he accepts the logic of 
the law but because he fears being stopped by the police for 
breaking the law. The law, in this instance, does constrain 
the action he desires. Thus, even though he has, in most 
circumstances, internalised the reason for the law, in this 
situation his reason for abiding by that law may not be as a 
result of this (category (ii)). Rather, it is as a result of 
the constraint imposed on him by an external factor (category 
(iii). 
The other side of the coin is where external reasons become 
appropriated ones. This is probably the most likely scenario 
of all. For example, our couple who desire marriage in Church 
and believe that this is the right thing to do, see the refusal 
of the minister as a constraint on their desired action. They 
do not agree with the dogma he advocates, but they have no 
option to the external force applied (category (iii)). 
However, perhaps due to the persuasive power of the minister or 
some kind of religious experience, they come to agree with the 
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religious doctrine of the minister. They may still want to 
marry in Church but they now begin to believe that this is the 
wrong thing to do. Their new beliefs, in this situation, 
overcome their desire for a Church wedding. Now their reason 
for not getting married in Church is very different from 
previously. It is no longer because they have no option, but 
because they have internalised the dogma involved and made it 
their own (category (ii)). 
Or, let us take the case of the person who wishes to play loud 
music but who is prevented by the moral sanction of ostracism. 
It could be that at some stage this person, themself, is 
disturbed, say, at a time when sleep is essential, by a noisy 
neighbour. Due to this experience, the agent how becomes aware 
of why this sanction exists - he internalises it and makes it 
his own. Again his reason for not playing the music has 
changed. A category (iii) reason - an external constraint 
forced on but not accepted by the agent - now becomes a 
category (ii) reason because the agent has internalised it. 
This can also occur in the case of legal restrictions. A 
visitor to Britain, who is a heavy smoker, finds that he is 
prevented from smoking on the underground. He does refrain 
from smoking because he knows that if he does he will be 
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prevented from travelling this way. However, when he discovers 
why this restriction is enforced, the danger of fires which 
had previously taken a number of lives, he can appreciate why 
this law is enforced - he internalises the reasons - and his 
subsequent reasons for not smoking may be as a result of this 
rather than because he fears sanctions. Thus, as a consequence 
of new information the reasons the agent has for his action (or 
non-action) has changed from category (iii) to (ii). 
Summary -A Reformulation of the Categories of Reason-Formation 
The implications of the foregoing arguments, as I see them, are 
twofold. Firstly, that the three categories previously 
outlined are too rigid in form. I would suggest, therefore, 
that, at the very least, we could revise the categories as 
follows: - 
(i)(a) Internal reasons which are the product of the 
individual and which arise out of the individual without the 
influence of any external factor at any time - 'original' 
reasons; 
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(i) (b) Internal reasons which are the product of the 
individual in the sense that they are not appropriated and 
internalised by the agent from current external factors present 
in the culture or society in which the agent lives; 
(ii) Internal reasons which are, and remain, appropriated 
from outside - from structural or cultural sources; 
(iii)(a) External reasons which are not appropriated and 
internalised but which influence actions by operating 
negatively in limiting alternative courses of action or by 
restricting knowledge of such alternatives; 
(iii)(b) External reasons which, where they are not recognised 
by the agent, are not appropriated and internalised but which 
influence actions by operating positively in providing the 
conditions under which people can fulfil their desires without 
encountering problems. 
In the second place, it seems clear that a person's reason for 
an action may originate within one category but change to 
another. In other words, a person's outward action may remain 
the same, but because of changing experiences, new knowledge or 
even different cultural or structural conditions, their reasons 
for this action may alter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REASONS AS TENDENCIES 
Introduction 
In this chapter I want to combine the ideas of reasons =_s 
explanations of action and reasons as causes of actio-. 
Specifically, to argue that seeing reasons as tendencies a-3 
thus causes of action must be done in terms of the thr 
categories of reason-formation previously outlined - that is, 
category (i) internal reasons, category (ii) appropriat_3 
reasons and category (iii) external reasons. 
Let us then begin with Bhaskar's contention, which is essential 
to the proposition that reasons as tendencies are causes 
action, that the possession of a reason conceived as a more :r 
less long-standing disposition or orientation to act in a 
certain way can be a cause; and that if we conceive of reasons 
in this way then they are clearly distinct from actions because 
they can be possessed even when unexercised and will only 
exercised under suitable conditions. (1) Here, then, we have 
two fundamental aspects of the role of reasons as causes c= 
action. Firstly, that agents having certain sets of beliefs 
and desires will tend to act in one way rather than another on 
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the basis of the possession of these beliefs and desires. But, 
secondly, that these can only be analysed as tendencies since, 
like any tendencies manifest in open systems, they are 
defeasible in special circumstances or under the pressure of 
counterveiling reasons. (2) 
My contention is to be that it is possible to deal with both 
the tendencies and the counterveiling reasons through using the 
three categories of reason-formation already considered and 
thus allow us to give the explanation of all actions in terms 
of reasons. In short, I am arguing that tendencies can be 
explained in terms of category (i) or (ii) reasons but if we 
perceive reasons as involving not only desires but also 
beliefs, then given the presence of external category (iii) 
factors, the agent may act against their desires in the light 
of the situation in which they find themselves. What I am 
suggesting is that an agent may have a 'tendency' to act in one 
way rather than another based on their own desires and beliefs 
(whether of a category (i) or (ii) type), but external or 
emergent facts (category (iii)) may intervene to modify or 
prevent the action that may have occurred on the basis of these 
reasons. 
It is important to note here the emphasis I place on category 
(iii) factors being reasons since I want to avoid the idea that 
external factors - that is, socially formed external factors - 
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are somehow determinants of action existing apart from the 
agent and over which he or she has no control. This is not to 
deny that some external factors may be determinants of action 
in the sense that they constitute 'things that just happen' to 
agents. Here we must bring in Weber's distinction between 
'action' and 'behaviour'. In his concept of action Weber 
includes 'all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting 
individual attaches a subjective meaning to it'. (3) By 
contrast, falling off a bike, being hit by a car, accidents 
caused by natural disasters, reflex actions, and so on, do not 
involve the individual agent in attaching meaning to them. 
They are not under the control of the agent - they are physical 
happenings which may be of interest to the natural scientist 
and be explicable in terms of physical laws but are not reasons 
in the sense of the category (iii) reasons we are discussing 
here. In other words, there is a fundamental difference 
between 'action' which results from the reasoning process of 
the agent and 'behaviour' which results from a physical source 
and is in no way under the control or influence of the agent. 
Thus, when I refer to external factors, I am talking in terms 
of 'action' rather than 'behaviour'. That is, to something 
that is brought about by the agent in response to the influence 
of external factors rather than something that 'just happens' 
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to agents over which they have no control. My argument is that 
whilst it is true that in any explanation of action we need to 
be able to account not only for tendencies to act in certain 
ways in terms of the beliefs and desires of the agent but also 
to explain how the same tendencies may produce different 
actions under different circumstances as a result of external 
factors, these factors often functioning as further reasons of 
the agent to act in one way rather than another. We must then 
explain all actions (as opposed to types of behaviour) in terms 
of reasons which are causally efficacious. Even if the beliefs 
and desires of the agent have been modified by external factors 
or if the desired action of the agent has been constrained by 
these factors, we should not perceive them as some 'hydraulic 
force' which determines how an agent behaves. Rather, they 
constitute other reasons. They can explain why an agent acts 
differently to the way he or she may tend to act - based on his 
or her desires and beliefs - under particular circumstances, 
but they are processed by the agent and thus form part of the 
agent's reason for acting. 
External Factors 
The essential point I am making is that a person may possess a 
reason to act in a particular way but not act in that way 
because of their reaction and responses to external factors. 
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For example, a person with a certain set of beliefs, say, in 
the rights of trade-unions, will tend to act in a certain 
manner based on the possession of these beliefs in terms of how 
trade-unions understand and perceive their role. In this way, 
we can explain the action of the trade-unionist in striking 
when his wage levels are reduced in terms of his tendency to 
act in this way - based on his own desires and beliefs - given 
these circumstances. His action can be explained, therefore, 
in terms of his internal reasons. It is probably true that 
these will be category (ii) reasons. That, due to the 
influence of family attitudes, the culture in which he has been 
raised or the experiences he has had in the work place, he has 
internalised the basic tenets of trade-unionist values and 
ideologies and made them his own. They have become his reasons 
for acting in a particular way when he is placed in a 
particular position. His reason for striking is his desire to 
maintain his wage levels and his belief that striking is 
legitimate and will be effective in achieving this goal. 
However, it is important to remember that actions do take place 
in open systems. Thus, such an orientation to act in this way 
can only be seen as a tendency to act thus. It may be that in 
certain circumstances and under the pressure of countervailing 
external reasons he may not act in this way. For example, 
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whilst the trade-unionist may still have the same beliefs and 
desires, he may also be aware that if he and his colleagues do 
strike there is a strong possibility that the company he works 
for will have to close and that he would lose his job. In the 
light of this he may then decide not to strike. His action in 
not striking then would be explained in terms of other 
counterveiling reasons which have intervened to lead him to act 
contrary to his internal reasons. 
As previously argued, the presence of external factors - 
especially constraining category (iii) factors - may serve to 
influence the actor not to act in the way he desires or would 
tend to act in the light of internal reasons. However, these 
external factors do not determine this since the actor has the 
choice of whether or not to be constrained by the pressure of 
open system factors. We thus return to the concept of 
'opportunity costs'. Our trade-unionist, for instance, may 
decide that his belief in the rights of trade-unionists 
outweighs the risk of losing his job. The cost of losing his 
job is not too high a one to pay to maintain the right to 
strike for adequate wage levels. He thus takes the decision to 
act according to his own beliefs and desires even in the light 
of other reasons which could serve to constrain him from such 
action. On the other hand, another trade-unionist may weigh up 
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the costs differently. This individual may take the decision 
that under the pressure, say, of a large mortgage, the need to 
provide for a young family, the high rate of unemployment in 
the area, and so on, the cost of losing his job is too high and 
thus will not strike. This does not mean that his tendency to 
act in this way no longer exists. Rather, that in the light of 
other external reasons he acts, in this case, against his own 
desires and beliefs. Moreover, this does not mean that under 
the pressure of new conditions his decision may not change. It 
could be that the financial problems associated with accepting 
lower wages, or the social pressures of becoming a 'blackleg' 
leads him to make a new choice to strike because there are yet 
further reasons for him to take into account. 
I want take the opportunity here of stressing that the 
'weighing up of costs' is not just a matter of objectively 
assessing, in some mathematical way, the positive and negative 
aspects of acting in a certain manner. It can also take place 
in the context of more emotional factors taking into account, 
say, the views of 'loved ones' or 'loyalty to workmates' and so 
on. Thus, the trade-unionist may have to take account of a 
number of variables to arrive at his decision of whether or not 
to strike - he has, perhaps, his own principles concerning the 
rights of trade-unions, his duty to provide for his family and 
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the emotional pressures from that family, and also his loyalty 
towards those he works with or towards the company who has 
employed him for a number of years; as well as the more 
objective considerations concerning the chances of him being 
able to obtain another job and the financial problems of paying 
his mortgage. All these factors, then, will come into play in 
taking the decision on how he should act when faced with this 
situation. 
What the above argument indicates, therefore, is that whatever 
the agent decides to do, the explanation of the action (or non- 
action) of the individual lies in the reasons the agent had to 
act (or not to act) in one way rather than another. The fact 
that an external constraining factor or a number of factors may 
intervene to influence the agent to act contrary to his 
internal desires and beliefs (category (ii) reasons) - to his 
tendencies - does not mean that the action cannot be explained 
in terms of reasons. The category (iii) external reasons as 
processed through the agent provide the reasons why the trade- 
unionist did not strike (if he did not); and because the agent 
had a choice whether or not he was influenced by this factor 
(or these factors) it still forms part of the agent's reason 
for acting. Open system factors may be external to the agent 
in the sense that they are not created by him or her and do not 
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form part of his or her own belief system in that they are not 
appropriated and internalised by the agent as are category (ii) 
reasons, but they are reasons because they are processed by the 
agent and decisions are made by his or her, subjectively, in 
terms of the weighing up of the costs associated with them. 
The Importance of the Subjective Factor - The Agents' Reasons 
I would also argue that unless we see external factors as 
reasons we could not explain why different agents act in 
different ways when faced with the same situation. It is the 
agent's subjective choice of how he or she reacts to the 
pressures of external reasons and it is this choice which makes 
open system factors a part of a reasoning process carried out 
by the agent. In other words, reasons, however formed, must be 
the causes of action. People do not just, uncritically or in a 
mechanistic way, accept the dictates of external forces. They 
are capable of second-order monitoring, evaluation, reflection 
- the weighing up of the costs involved - and make conscious 
decisions on how they will act in the face of external 
constraints. If this were not the case then we would all act 
in the same way in similar situations which we certainly do 
not. However, because actions normally take place in open 
systems, reasons, that is category (i) or (ii) reasons, must be 
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seen as causes only if causes are defined as tendencies rather 
than determinants of actions precisely because external reasons 
can and do intervene to modify the actions of some individuals. 
This, though, according to Bhaskar, does not mean that reasons, 
seen as tendencies, do not have a degree of manifest generality 
and are thus incapable of being subject to independent 
controls. (4) The question is, how we can discover what these 
tendencies are. How can we know if a person has an orientation 
to act in one way rather than another if, in certain 
situations, they act contrary to their internal reasons? 
It seems to me that we can only do this by discovering, via the 
agent, what his or her category (i) or (ii) reasons are. What 
his or her beliefs and desires actually consist in and how they 
influence their subsequent actions. Thus, presumably, it is 
possible to establish, independently by dialogue, if a person 
is, say, a socialist in orientation. Even if the agent is not 
explicit in saying 'I am a socialist' we can, by assessing his 
attitudes, beliefs, political preferences, ideological 
standpoint, and so on, through discussion, discover that he 
tends to act according to and react to situations in terms of 
socialist beliefs and doctrines. This, I would argue, is a far 
more satisfactory way of establishing tendencies to act in one 
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way rather than another than simply observing the outward 
manifestation of reasons - that is, the actual actions of the 
individuals. This is precisely because we cannot ignore the 
fact that people live in open systems and may act in terms of 
other reasons (category (iii)) whilst still possessing internal 
(category (ii)) reasons which, under different circumstances, 
would lead them to act in a very different way. 
For example, say we were trying to explain the actions of the 
non-striking trade-unionist. If we based our explanation on 
the overt action of not striking we may conclude that this 
individual was either against the action of striking or 
believed that it would not be effective in achieving his aims. 
This, however, as we have already illustrated, may not be the 
case. If, on the other hand, we go to the agent himself to 
discover his reasons for not striking we would, in many cases, 
obtain a far more accurate explanation of his action. Thus we 
would discover that under most circumstances he would strike 
because he believes in the legitimacy and efficacy of strike 
action, but in this particular case, having weighed up the 
opportunity costs involved, he has made the decision that 
maintaining his job is more important - perhaps for financial 
reasons or through pressures from his family - than the 
principles he believes in. This is then the reason he has 
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decided not to strike. He may still hold the category (ii) 
reason - he may still have an orientation to act in a certain 
way - but in the light of further external reasons, in this 
case, he has made the conscious decision to act against his 
desire to strike. His tendency to act in a particular way 
still exists, in general, because he will usually act in that 
way in most circumstances. It is only in the light of these 
particular conditions, when the external opportunity costs 
suddenly arise, that he does not do so. This, however, should 
not be seen in any deterministic way. The agent is still 
acting in terms of a belief that is his, namely, that this is 
not the appropriate time for him to strike in the light of the 
particular conditions in which he finds himself. This is still 
a belief albeit one that is different from his belief in the 
legitimacy of strike action. If this were not the case, if he 
did not subjectively reflect on the external conditions that 
exist, then these factors would indeed become determinants of 
not influences on his action - which is precisely the idea we 
want to avoid. 
Similarly, say we were evaluating the political tendencies of 
an agent and noted that this individual had paid for private 
health care for his child. If we merely based our assessment 
of his political beliefs on this action we may well conclude 
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that he was more 'conservative' than 'socialist' in his 
orientation. However, if we discussed his action with him we 
may discover that his child was suffering considerable pain due 
to a condition which could be easily treated but for which 
there was a long waiting list in the National Health Service. 
In this situation, then, he decides that the category (iii) 
opportunity cost of allowing his child to suffer was too hizh 
to pay. His emotional attachment to his child and his duty as 
a parent outweighs his socialist principles concerning the 
unfairness of a two-tiered system of health care. In all other 
respects his tendency to act will be based on socialist ideals 
and doctrines, but external reasons have intervened to lead him 
to take the decision to act against his internal desires and 
beliefs. Yet, had we not discovered, through dialogue, the 
reason why the agent had acted thus in this situation we may 
have placed a false interpretation on his actions. We would 
not know what his political beliefs were nor that he was acting 
contrary to them nor the reasons why he did so in this case. 
Reasons as tendencies, therefore, do have a degree of manifest 
generality to the extent that given a certain set of desires 
and beliefs an agent will tend to act in a certain way. 
Moreover, these are subject to independent controls in the 
sense that we are able to establish, by dialogue, in an 
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independent way, that someone is, say, a socialist in 
orientation even if under certain circumstances he has not 
acted in a very socialist way. Thus, our explanation of the 
non-striking trade-unionist or our socialist who pays for 
private medical care must begin with understanding the desires 
and beliefs of the agent - his desires and beliefs as perceived 
by him - in order to understand his tendencies to act in 
certain ways. If, then, he does not act in accordance with his 
desires and beliefs - his category (i) or (ii) reasons - we can 
then discover why this is so in terms of other category (iii) 
reasons that have intervened. In other words, we then see< 
further reasons - and they are reasons for not determinants of 
- his action. Even though the external factors involved are 
not of the agent's own making this does not mean that they do 
not form part of his reasoning process. The fact that the 
socialist pays for private health care to prevent his child 
suffering is his reason for his action because he has weighed 
up the costs of acting otherwise and found them too high. It 
is because the agent has a choice of whether or not to be 
constrained or influenced by external reasons that they cease 
to be determinants of action - the trade-unionist may still 
strike despite the hardship it would cause, the socialist may 
still refuse his child private medical care despite the pain 
this will cause the child. Rather, these external factors must 
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be seen as reasons why an agent acts which, though different in 
kind from internal or appropriated reasons, are still causally 
efficacious in producing that action. 
One of the fundamental points I am making, then, is that in 
explaining actions it is important to discover, initially, the 
internal desires and beliefs of the agent which will tend to 
lead him or her to act in one way rather than another. This, 
though, can only be achieved via the agent because the overt 
action of the individual may be co-determined by other factors 
which serve to modify the action which would have occurred had 
the circumstances been different - had external reasons not 
intervened. If we based our explanation on the interpretation 
of the action itself then we are in danger of misinterpreting 
not only the beliefs and desires of the agent - his or her 
tendencies to act - but also we may fail to discover what 
external reasons intervened which resulted in the agent acting 
in a way which does not correspond to these internal reasons. 
We would interpret the action - on its face-value - without 
discovering why - for what reason - that particular action 
occurred. 
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What Are 'Real Reasons'? 
It has been argued, though, that there are problems in basing 
our explanations on the reasons given by the agents themselves. 
Bhaskar, for example, suggests that it is possible that an 
agent may incorrectly describe some state of consciousness. In 
fact, he maintains that this is a condition of the possibility 
of any discursive thought since it must be possible to be in 
doubt, to conjecture, hypothesise or learn about states of mind 
of oneself or others. It must be possible to do so not only 
for rational argument about those states but also for the 
acquisition and development of a mentalistic vocabulary and 
hence any science or culture. Thus, the logical possibility of 
error about or misdescription of one's own states of awareness, 
and so one's reasons, is a condition of any reflective 
intelligence. In other words, reasons and consciousness of 
reasons must remain distinct. (5) 
Whilst I would agree that it is possible that we may act for 
reasons which appear to others not to be rational or based on 
false beliefs, this is not to say that the reasons we give for 
our actions are not real reasons for us at the time of the 
action. For example, the reason the neurotic handwasher has 
for washing his hands is that they feel dirty. They may not be 
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so, but that does not alter the fact that to him they are and 
so this explains his action of continually washing his hands. 
Even if an agent (presumably to himself) 'incorrectly describes 
some state of consciousness' this does not mean that, at the 
time the action takes place, this did not constitute his reason 
for his action. 
Before continuing with this argument, though, I want to stress 
that my interest, for the purposes of this thesis, lies in 
discovering the reasons an agent has for his or her actions 
based on the desires and beliefs of the agent and the influence 
of external reasons on his or her subsequent actions. I do not 
propose to try and discover why agents come to hold certain 
beliefs and have certain desires in the sense of why the 
neurotic handwasher becomes one or why the socialist decides to 
appropriate and internalise social principles and beliefs and 
make them his own. Whilst this is no doubt of importance in the 
explanation of action, I am limiting myself to the explanation 
of action in terms of reasons the agent actually possesses at 
the time of the action and which are causally efficacious in 
producing that action. 
To return to the idea that we can be mistaken about our 
reasons. I would also concede that it is possible that, in the 
light of new information, discussion and negotiation with 
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others, and the realisation of the consequences of our actions, 
and so on, we may come to realise or appreciate that the reason 
we had for our action at 'tl' is based on false beliefs or 
faulty information. This, though, is not to say that the 
reason we gave for our action at 'ti' is not the real reason 
for that action at 'tl'. The idea, however, that reasons may 
be formulated in terms of false beliefs, irrational desires, 
and the like, and the fact that we as agents may come to 
realise this at 't2', is very different from the idea that we 
know we are mistaken about those reasons at the time of the 
action. Here then we come to the distinction that is often 
made between real reasons and good reasons for actions. Is it 
conceivable, in fact, that we can have a real reason for an 
action which is not, at the same time, a good reason? 
Whilst I agree that it is possible that we can have a reason - 
a real reason - for acting which would appear to others not to 
be a good reason, it does not make sense to argue that an agent 
would say 'This is my real reason for acting but it is not a 
good reason for me'. In other words, a real reason for an 
action at 't1' must appear to the agent as a good reason for 
that action at 't1' otherwise we could not explain why the 
agent actually acted in terms of that reason. He or she would, 
in fact, have had no reason for the action in question unless 
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he or she perceived that reason as a good one. It seems 
senseless to say that we would ever act for a reason which was 
not, for us at the time, a good reason. However much we may 
think and even say to the neurotic handwasher that his hands 
are clean, he still has a real and good reason for washing his 
hands because - at the time of the action - they still feel 
dirty to him. 
In this way, I would want to ask Bhaskar what he actually means 
by being in error about one's state of mind and thus one's 
reasons. If he is referring to something like the concepts of 
ideology or false consciousness then is he arguing that if an 
agent appropriates ideological tenets from outside which are 
based on faulty or inadequate information, internalises them 
and makes them his or her own - they form his or her reasons 
for his or her action - then these reasons are not good reasons 
to this agent? This is a scenario which I would wish to 
dispute. Moreover, even if we could say that they were not 
good reasons does this make them any less efficacious in 
producing the subsequent actions of that agent? 
The fundamental point I want to make here is that a reason 
based on faulty or inadequate information can still be a 'good' 
reason to the agent at 'tl' and is capable of explaining the 
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action that results. However, I am not suggesting that it must 
be seen as a 'good' reason, in general, or that the agent at 
't2' will not come to realise that this is the case in the 
light of new information being made available to that agent. 
We can, therefore, argue that 'X' thinks 'Y' is a real and good 
reason for the action 'A' and because of this the action 'A' 
that results can be explained in terms of that reason even if 
the reason was not, in fact, a good one in general. It may be 
that 'Z', another agent, disagrees that this is a good reason 
and is able to show 'X' why this is so. If this were not the 
case then, indeed, all reasoned debate would disappear. In 
other words, however strongly I hold that my reasons were good 
ones, I remain open to the reasoning of others who may be able 
to demonstrate to me that they were ill-founded, badly thought 
out, ill-informed, and so on; and as a result of this I may 
then come, at 't2', to appreciate that they were not good or 
good enough reasons for my subsequent actions. This 
possibility of a revision of our reasons is essential if we are 
to avoid the type of relativism whereby it becomes the case 
that 'Y' is a good reason for me and something else is a good 
reason for 'Z' and each is as good a reason as the other 
despite evidence to the contrary. The agent thinking a reason 
is good may explain his action at 'ti', but it does not 
necessarily mean that the reason was actually a good one if it 
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were based on faulty information, nor does it mean that the 
agent is not capable of realising this through a process of 
learning or through acquiring new information. 
What I am arguing then is that whilst it may be true that the 
reason the agents have internalised may be based on false, 
incomplete or misleading information, this does not mean that 
they think it is not a good reason, at that time, for them to 
act as they do. At that stage, these reasons appear to the 
agents as both real and good reasons. This is not to say, 
however, that at a given moment the agents may not become aware 
of the inconsistencies or falsity, say, of the ideology which 
they have internalised. Thus, it is possible that through a 
process of learning - through reflection, discussion, the 
assimilation of new information, and so on -a real reason 
which appeared to the agent at 't1' as a good reason may come 
to appear at 't2' not to be a good reason for any subsequent 
action at 't3' . For while it makes no sense to say that an 
agent's real reason for an action is not for the agent a good 
reason, it does make sense for an agent to say 'This was my 
real reason for acting (at 'tl') and I thought it good, but now 
(at 't2') I realise that it is not a good reason and so it will 
no longer prompt my action (at 't3'). 
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For example, say a group of people or an individual always 
votes for the party of an elite group in that society. This 
could be for a number of reasons. It may be that they lack 
information concerning the possibility of alternatives to the 
pervading political structure through some form of censorship, 
or it could be that they have appropriated and internalised the 
ideology of that elite group and made it their own (category 
(ii)), or it is possible that they know that if they do not 
vote in this way they are likely to face some form of 
punishment (category (iii)). At some stage, however, these 
people may come to have access to new information - they become 
aware of alternatives, or the elite group may lose some of its 
power and thus the constraining factor loses some of its force 
(like in the current case of the former Soviet Union), or in 
some other way the people involved become conscious of the 
inconsistencies or unfairness of the social structure which has 
emerged as a result of the political system which currently 
exists. For whatever reason, having gone through this learning 
process, these agents may then decide not to vote for that 
party in the future. Does this then mean that the reason they 
had for voting for that elite group when they did vote for then 
was not a good reason at that time? 
(272) 
The answer to this, I would argue, is no. Just because the 
reason we gave for our action at 'tl' may, at 't2', emerge as 
based on false or incomplete premises and is thus no longer a 
good reason, this does not mean that, at the time of our 
action, it was not a good reason in terms of the criteria which 
were available to us when the action took place. Say, for 
instance, we are trying to plan a route on the London 
underground having never used this form of transportation 
before. From reading the map of the system we decide that the 
Victoria line provides the quickest route from point 'a' to 
point W. Our reason, then, for travelling on the Victoria 
line is that it seems to be the most efficient way of reaching 
our destination - it is a good reason for this action. 
However, having once travelled this way we discover that it is 
the line most used by commuters and thus the train is very 
overcrowded making the journey very uncomfortable. In the 
light of this we then decide that the opportunity cost of 
discomfort is too high a one to pay. Our need for comfort 
outweighs our need to reach our destination as quickly as 
possible. We then decide to take a longer route which is less 
crowded. The good reason we had for travelling on the Victoria 
line at 'ti' now, at 't2', because of our experiences in having 
travelled this way, is no longer a good reason or good enough 
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reason for our continuing in this action. What was a good 
reason no longer appears as a good enough reason for us to 
repeat that action. 
What I am suggesting, therefore, is that even though agents may 
come to appreciate that a reason they had for a previous action 
is not a good reason for subsequent actions, this does not mean 
that at 'tl' it was not a good reason for the agent in the 
light of the information available at the time. It was the 
reason the agent had for the action that ensued and it was 
causally efficacious in producing that action. However, 
because people are capable of learning - of evaluating new 
information and gaining experiences, and because people act in 
open systems where external factors may intervene to modify 
their actions, our reasons may change. What once may have been 
good reasons for certain forms of action may cease to be so as 
a result of these factors but, at the time of the action, it 
was a good reason and one which explains the action in 
question. Thus, even though an agent may act for a reason 
which in the light of new information or new experiences 
emerges as not a good reason for subsequent actions, this does 
not mean that the agent was mistaken about his or her reason 
for acting. Rather, it means that the reason was formed on the 
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basis of false beliefs, irrational desires (as in the case of 
the neurotic handwasher), faulty information, and so on, which 
the agent is capable or recognising at 't2'. 
Reasons as Rationalisations 
There is, though, another objection raised to the idea that the 
explanation of actions should be given in terms of the reasons 
the agent gives for his or her action. This is that reasons 
may merely be rationalisations. The argument runs that the 
reasons given by agents may not be the real reasons but ones 
which appear to the agents as the most socially or 
psychologically acceptable in the situations in which the 
agents find themselves. I would argue, though, that such 
rationalisations themselves have explanatory power and 
constitute part of the reasoning process undertaken by agents. 
We must ask ourselves why - for what reasons - agents need to 
rationalise their actions. In what situations do agents feel 
that they have to undertake such a process. The answer, it 
seems to me, lies in the presence of category (iii) external 
pressures and constraints. In other words, rationalisations 
can be seen as responses to category (iii) reasons. My 
argument here is that when an agent says 'X' was not my real 
reason, she or he is actually saying 'were circumstances 
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(category (iii) reasons) different I would have acted 
otherwise'. This, it seems to me, can account for much of the 
'mental anguish' that occurs over 'what to do for the best' in 
a given situation and the reflective experience we have all had 
of distinguishing what we would 'ideally' like to do and what 
we actually do do when faced with a set of conditions. The 
essential point is that the action that is performed - even 
though it may be seen in terms of a rationalisation - can be 
explained by reference to our not being willing to pay high 
opportunity costs. In other words, it can be explained in 
terms of category (iii) reasons. Thus, say our group of people 
who have always voted for the elite party do so because they 
know that if they do not they will be punished in some way. 
Their reason for voting in this way may be a rationalisation - 
they may 'ideally' want to vote for a different party - but 
their action in voting the way that they do can be explained in 
terms of a high (category (iii)) opportunity cost which they 
will not pay. 
There are two points to be stressed here. In the first place, 
even though external factors have intervened to lead the agents 
to act in this way this does not mean that such factors do not 
provide reasons for this action. They are, in fact, as 
previously discussed, category (iii) reasons. In the second 
place, the agent is still active in making the decision to act 
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in one way rather than another. The point is that it is not 
that the agents cannot pay these costs, rather that they make 
the decision not to do so. Indeed, the fact that in any 
dictatorship we can find dissident groups illustrates that some 
are willing to pay the costs sooner or later. It is true that 
high costs may produce regularities in a system - say, Fascist 
compliance - but they do not determine the actions of 
individuals - as the plot against Hitler, for example, 
demonstrates. 
Thus, even if agents rationalise their actions as a result of 
social, political, or other pressures this must be seen as 
forming part of their reasoning process. Their reason for 
acting in accordance with the constraints imposed on them is 
that they are not willing to pay the costs that will ensue if 
they act against these constraints. They have the choice of 
whether their actions will be influenced by category (iii) open 
system factors and it is because they have such a choice that 
we can argue that such factors are not determinants of action 
but are further reasons for the agent to act in one way rather 
than another. 
It could be argued, however, that the above assertion 
presupposes that the agent is aware that he or she is 
rationalising his or her action. That is, it assumes that the 
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agent is able to say to himself or herself and to an observer 
that had the circumstances been different I would not have 
acted in this way. What, though, of the possibility that the 
agent is not aware that he or she is rationalising what she 
does? For example, it could be that 'X' before her marriage to 
'Y' believed that married women had as much right to a career 
as married men. However, 'Y' holds completely opposite views 
to this believing that the role of a wife is to stay at home 
and care for her husband and children. In order to 'keep the 
peace' 'X' takes the decision to abandon her career and concede 
to her husband's wishes. Here, then, we have the situation in 
which 'X' makes a decision that the opportunity cost of marital 
disharmony is too high to pay. At this stage, she is well 
aware that she is making a conscious decision in deciding on 
this course of action, but it may be that after forty years of 
marriage she comes so to internalise the beliefs and desires of 
her husband that she has made them her own. She is thus no 
longer aware that had the circumstances been different she 
would have acted otherwise. She now, in fact, believes herself 
that married women should be housewives rather than career 
women. 
There are, it seems to me, a number of points to be made here. 
In the first place, I would contend that even though the agent 
may no longer be aware that she is rationalising her actions, 
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this does not mean that her action at 'tl' cannot be explained 
in terms of category (iii) opportunity costs. It was, 
initially, still the agent's decision as to whether the cost of 
displeasing her husband was too high to pay. In the second 
place, the fact that she has internalised the desires and 
beliefs of her husband and made them her own does not mean that 
her action can no longer be explained in terms of reasons. 
Rather, it means that her reasons for acting as she does at 
't2' (after being married for forty years) have changed from 
category (iii) to category (ii) - the explanation of her action 
is still given in terms of reasons even though the category of 
reasons which provides the explanation has changed. 
There is, though, a problem to be faced, and this can be seen 
in terms of methodological difficulties in knowing whether an 
agent is rationalising an action if the agent is no longer 
conscious herself that she is doing so. I would concede that 
in some cases we may never be able to discover if an action is 
a rationalisation. But in many cases we may be able to do so 
through, say, discussion with the agent. For instance, it may 
be that we can discover, through asking the agent what her 
views on married women having a career were before she was 
married, that she did believe that women had this right and 
that it was because her husband held such contrary views that 
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she did not work. In other words, although the agent may have 
internalised the belief that the place of married women is in 
the home, it is still possible that we can trace the origins of 
this belief back to external category (iii) reasons, and that 
the agent herself may become aware of this through the process 
of discussion. 
The third point I wish to make is that even though the 
methodological problems of discovering if an agent is 
rationalising an action do indeed exist - we, as observers, can 
never be entirely confident that the agent is telling or is 
able to tell us the whole story - this does not undermine the 
contention that rationalisations themselves, when we can 
discover them, do have explanatory power and are able to 
explain actions in terms of reasons. In a substantial number 
of cases we are able to elicit from the agents themselves that 
had the circumstances been different they would have acted 
otherwise even if this may not be apparent to the agents 
without some reflection on their part. We may not be able to 
establish this in all cases, but the number of situations where 
we are able to do so, it seems to me, is sufficient to justify 
such an approach. 
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The Problem of Self-Deception 
Critics of the idea that we can discover reasons for actions 
via the agents themselves, however could come back and say 
'what about self-deception? ' Do all agents correctly know why 
they do what they do? In response to this I would, firstly, 
question the whole idea of self-deception. Is it really 
possible that we are able to deceive ourselves (even though we 
may be able to deceive others) without some awareness that we 
are doing so - without some idea of the real reasons why we are 
acting as we do? Perhaps an example of this could run as 
follows. Say 'X' decides to take on some voluntary work caring 
for the mentally handicapped initially for purely altruistic 
reasons. In doing this work, though, she receives from those 
around her considerable praise and commendation for this 
action. It could be, then, that her continuing in this action 
is for the reason that she is enjoying this praise and added 
status in her community rather than for the altruistic reason 
she initially had, yet she still tells herself that her reason 
for caring for the mentally handicapped is that it helps them, 
not that it gives her considerable rewards. In this then an 
example of self-deception? 
My first response to this is that I find it very difficult to 
imagine that 'X' has no awareness of her reasons for continuing 
in her action. In other words, I would doubt that she is able 
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totally to deceive herself of her real reasons for her action 
even though she may not be totally honest with others about her 
true motives. The idea of self-deception, it seems to me, has 
much in common with that of unconscious motives. Agents may 
not be fully aware of all the reasons for their actions, but 
there is some awareness there which the agent can come to 
appreciate through some form of analysis concerning their 
reasons for their actions -a point I will return to. Again, I 
would argue that the problem of discovering the real reason for 
the agent's action is a methodological one. It does not alter 
the fact that the agent is still acting for a reason which is 
the agent's own reason albeit one which is influenced by the 
external factor of the responses of others to her action. The 
reason for the action, in this case, may have changed but this 
does not make it any less efficacious in explaining the 
continued action. 
Again, though, critics could argue that agents, while not being 
internally dishonest, may be incapable of knowing or 
articulating their reasons since they are merely acting from 
habit. There are, I would suggest, two possible responses to 
this. It could be argued that habitual behaviour is simply 
behaviour rather than action done for reasons. Thus it could 
be said that if we perform certain actions over and over again 
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without conscious decisions concerning those actions then we 
are not really acting at all we are just behaving without 
attaching a subjective meaning to what we are doing. In other 
words, we could bring in here the Weberian distinction between 
'action' and 'behaviour' and dismiss habitual action as an 
example of the latter and so not relevant to a discussion 
concerning action. 
However, it seems to me that this is 'ducking the issue' to 
some extent. I would want to suggest that while it is true 
that having formed a habit we may not consciously reason each 
time we act in terms of it, this does not mean that we did not 
have a real and good reason, at 't1', for forming that habit. 
I am not referring here to habits such as smoking cigarettes or 
taking drugs since these are physical addictions to certain 
substances which fall within the remit of the physical sciences 
(although the reason for becoming addicted in the first place 
may, indeed, have a social context). What I am referring to 
here is something like the agent who always cleans her house in 
the same order or the agent who always cleans his teeth before 
he does anything else in the morning, and so on. These may be 
seen as actions which the agents perform without consciously 
being aware of the reasons why they do so, but I would suggest 
that, in most cases, if the agents actively analyse their 
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habits they could see the reasons why they originally acted in 
this way and why they continue to do so. The person who always 
cleans his teeth prior to any other activity could probably 
explain why - say, because he is a smoker and wants to 
eliminate the foul taste in his mouth on rising - even though 
he may not consciously think of this each time he does so. The 
person who always cleans her house in the same order may be 
able to explain this in terms of the efficiency of doing it 
that way or because they dislike certain chores and want to get 
them out of the way first, and so on. In other words, I as 
arguing that even in the case of habitual behaviour it is 
possible to explain the actions of agents in terms of reasons 
in the sense that the agent had a reason which led him or her 
to form the habit in the first place. Further, that agents, if 
they are asked about their habits, will often be able to 
appreciate and articulate what these reasons were. Moreover, I 
would argue that if we dismiss habits as merely examples of 
unconscious behaviour we could not explain why people are 
capable of breaking habits. If we cannot appreciate the 
reasons we have for forming habits in the first place, how can 
we ever take the decision to act differently or even have the 
desire to do so. 
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Summary 
The crux of the above arguments, therefore, is that we are able 
to explain all actions in terms of reasons and that agents are 
active in this process of reason-formation. This is the case 
even when we are considering emergent factors (remembering the 
distinction between action and behaviour) which are not of the 
agents own making since such external factors must also be seen 
as reasons - category (iii) reasons - which are processed by 
the agent and so are not determinants of actions. It may be 
that the agents may not be fully aware of all the external 
factors that may constrain their actions, but they are aware of 
the situation in which they find themselves and to which they 
are responding and thus this information too is available to 
the observer via the agents themselves. In this way it is 
possible to explain actions in terms of the reasons the agent 
has, as perceived by the agent, whether we are talking in terms 
of internal, appropriated or external reasons. 
The other fundamental point is that reasons - if seen in terms 
of tendencies - are causes of actions. Thus, I agree with 
Bhaskar that a real reason 'R' may be defined as a reason 
possessed by some agent 'X' at 't' which was causally 
efficacious in producing 'X's behaviour at 't'. If this is so 
then the criterion for distinguishing intentional action from 
mere bodily movement is that in the former case a real reason 
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'R' is a condition for the bodily movement 'M' at 't' in the 
sense that but for the possession and exercise of 'R' at 't', 
'M' would not have occurred at 't'. If, Bhaskar stresses, the 
concept of human agency is to be sustained it must be true that 
we are responsible for some but not other of our bodily 
movements; and unless our responsibility is causal, agency 
follows in the wake of reason-explanations and intentionality 
is a 'fairy tale'. (6) 
Thus, Bhaskar maintains that it is analytic to the concept of 
action that the agent could have acted otherwise, but an agent 
is only free to the extent that she or he is capable of 
realising his or her real interests which means knowing, acting 
on and bringing about a state of affairs satisfying them (which 
I would argue involves them having some awareness of their own 
desires and beliefs). Bhaskar goes on to say, though, that all 
actions are not free in this sense. It is necessary, he 
argues, for the concept of action that the world is open, in 
the sense that the agent's activity makes a difference to the 
state of affairs that would normally otherwise have prevailed 
(and also, as I have indicated, that the actions of agents may 
be modified by factors that exist outside the agents 
themselves). As the world is open and agency is real, Bhaskar 
continues, and as society is only materially present in 
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intentional human action, it follows that social phenomena 
could only ever manifest themselves in open systems. It 
follows from this that any possible social laws, therefore, 
must be analysed as tendencies. (7) 
Finally, I want to agree with Bhaskar that Winch's argument for 
the conceptual nature of social reality is unsound and that his 
anti-naturalist stance is based on an untenable theory of 
science. Bhaskar, rightly, wants to retain the idea that the 
subject-matter of social science is concept-dependent, but he 
does not want to be committed to the position that it is 
exhausted by such conceptualisations or that such 
conceptualisations are incorrigible. Moreover, he wants to 
show that any adequate account of social science must accept 
that social causation depends upon the identification by the 
agents concerned of conceptual connections so that our 
knowledge of social causation depends on our identification of 
these connections. In other words, that social science depends 
on 'Verstehen' (that is, the interpretative understanding of 
the meanings actors attach to their actions - their reasons for 
their actions), but that 'Verstehen' does not exhaust social 
science (since, in all open systems, external factors may 
intervene to influence the desires and beliefs of individual 
agents). (8) 
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SUMMARY TO PART THREE 
Introduction 
I began this section by arguing that reasons for actions can be 
both 'internal' and 'external' to the agent and that the 
distinction between the two is not so clear cut as former 
debates have implied. Indeed, that, in many cases, both 
subjective and objective reasons are involved in action- 
explanations. Whilst I concede that it is possible to envisage 
an action which results purely from an internal reason or an 
external cause, I would suggest that, with the majority of 
actions, both types of reason exist. Thus, I am suggesting 
that, when we act, we are often (not always) influenced in that 
action by external factors or emergent properties that exist 
outside our subjective being. I am not advocating, however, 
that these external factors ever determine our actions. 
Rather, that they condition or modify the subjective beliefs 
and desires of individual agents. 
I would maintain, therefore, that when we are examining actions 
in terms of reasons we should, firstly, try and discover the 
agents' own reasons for acting as they do since it is for these 
reasons that the subsequent action occurs. However, our 
explanation should not end here. We must also try and discover 
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if the desires and beliefs of the agent have been influenced by 
external factors and, if so, what these external factors are 
(category (ii) reasons). Or, if the action of the agent has 
been the result of external factors which have constrained or 
facilitated the desired action of an agent (category (iii) 
reasons). 
The Influence of External Factors 
As I have argued, the influence of external factors on agents 
differs according to the type or category of reason involved. 
In terms, then, of category (ii) reasons, the agents have 
appropriated the reasons from cultural or structural conditions 
and then internalised them. However, it is the agents' own 
choice whether they accept the norms and values, forms of 
behaviour, and so on, which are associated with these reasons 
and then make them part of, their own belief systems. Thus, it 
seems to me, that in trying to explain the actions of 
individuals we should first take account of the agents' own 
desires and beliefs - of the agents' own reasons for acting as 
subjectively perceived by the agents themselves. But I do not 
think that this provides the whole of the explanation. 
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As agents, we need not have full awareness of all the 
structural or cultural factors that may serve to influence our 
internal desires and beliefs - as the force of ideology 
demonstrates. Thus, even though the reasons - desires and 
beliefs - of an agent may give part of the explanation of their 
action (it may form all the explanation but we do not know 
this), it may be the case that an 'observer', with access to 
other information, can give a fuller explanation in terms of 
the external factors which the agent has internalised. We 
cannot expect agents to be 'perfect sociologists' with a 
complete understanding of all the factors which may serve to 
influence their reasons for acting. Some aspects of the 
information may only be available to, or indeed sought for by, 
someone outside the situation in question. 
Methodological Implications - Begin With the Agent's Reasons 
I want to stress, however, that we certainly should not ignore 
the internal reasons of the agents. They, after all, have 
chosen to internalise these external reasons and make them 
their own. It is their reasons that direct their actions, even 
though they may not fully appreciate all the factors that have 
served to influence how these reasons were formed. 
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Say, for example, we are studying a group of first-year nurses 
in order to try and explain why they decided to take up nursing 
as a profession. Our initial enquiry should consist in asking 
these individuals, themselves, why they think they decided to 
become nurses - their reasons for their action. From this we 
may obtain a number of reasons. They might, for example, say 
it is because they enjoy 'caring for people', or they may see 
nursing as a 'worthwhile' career which fulfils their desire to 
be a valued member of society as well as their desire to be in 
a professional occupation, and so on. Each reason given, then, 
is the reason why that individual chose to become a nurse. 
However, further enquiry into the structural and cultural 
backgrounds of these nurses could reveal further information on 
why they came to have these desires and beliefs. 
It could be the case, for example, that a nurse has been raised 
in a 'caring' environment - caring is a value that she has 
internalised and made her own; she may be a member of a form of 
society that gives considerable prestige to the role of nursing 
which is something that individual desires; she may never have 
considered any alternative to nursing because most of her 
family are involved in medicine of some form or another, and so 
on. In all these cases the nurse may not be fully aware of 
these influences on her decision to become a nurse, but they 
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still are influences and should be included in the explanation 
of her action. The 'observer', therefore, in trying to explain 
the actions of these nurses should look beyond the immediate 
explanations given by the individuals. He or she should 
enquire into the cultural and structural conditions which these 
people have experienced and assess to what extent 'external 
factors' have influenced the desires and beliefs which form the 
reasons why these people decided on this course of action. 
Methodological Implications - Also Examine External Factors 
What, though, of category (iii) reasons? These, in a different 
way from category (ii), do constitute reasons for acting. They 
are different because they do not constitute the agent's own 
reasons - they are external to the agent. Thus, in the case of 
negative external reasons, the agents find themselves 
constrained in their choice of action by factors not of their 
own making. Factors which they have not internalised and made 
their own. In action-explanations, therefore, we must also 
examine whether such external factors have influenced the 
action of the individual in question. Say, for example, one of 
our group of nurses really wanted to be a doctor. However, 
because of the financial problems involved in the length of 
training a doctor requires - that is, the external structural 
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conditions - she is unable to undertake this training. In this 
case, then, this particular individual is prevented from 
fulfilling her own desires by factors over which she has little 
control. 
The situation is not as clear-cut in the case of moral, or, 
indeed, legal external constraints. Here the agents are 
constrained only if they want to avoid the sanctions that will 
be imposed if they ignore moral or legal pressures to behave in 
one way rather than another. It could be argued, then, that, 
as in the other case, the agent must be aware what these 
external factors are. We can obtain this information from the 
agents themselves. What, therefore, can the 'observers' learn 
that the agents cannot tell them? The answer to this, I would 
maintain, is that while agents may know that there are certain 
things that they cannot do (if they are to avoid sanctions) 
they may not have access to the knowledge of why they cannot 
act in this way - indeed, they may not even question why they 
cannot. In the case of censorship, as an extreme example, the 
members of a particular society may be faced with a number of 
regulations which they must abide by to avoid punishment, but 
they are prevented from knowing the reasons why these 
regulations exist - perhaps they are denied this knowledge to 
maintain the control of an elite group. Only an 'outsider' may 
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be able to obtain access to this information. At a more 
cultural level, a teenager may know that his parents will not 
allow him to go camping in Europe with his friends. He knows 
that he is prevented from this action if he wants to avoid 
punishment from his parents, but he may not be aware of the 
reasons behind this prohibition. He, as yet, is not aware of 
the dangers that may be involved in such a course of action. 
What I am suggesting, therefore, is that, at a particular point 
in time, an agent may not be fully aware of all the factors 
that serve to influence their actions. If, then, the 
'observer' relied exclusively on the information received from 
the agent then he or she may only be able to formulate a 
partial explanation. He or she may not include all the factors 
involved in the formation of the reason for an action or non- 
action. 
The 'Subjective' Element in External Reasons 
It could seem, though, that if we explain actions in terms of 
these negative external reasons, we are ignoring any 
'subjective' elements in our explanations. Are we saying, in a 
rather Durkheimian way, that these 'external factors' determine 
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the actions of the agents in question - that the full 
explanation of the action is provided by the presence of these 
external constraining factors? 
If this were so then human agents become like 'puppets' -a 
conclusion I certainly do not want to come to, even in the case 
of external constraining factors. What must be remembered is 
that agents still have the choice of whether to obey a law, 
conform to a moral sanction, obey their parents, and so forth. 
External reasons are only constraining to the extent that the 
agents are aware that if they do not conform to whatever 
restrictions are imposed on them they can expect sanctions. It 
is the agents' own subjective decision as to whether they do 
conform. They decide 'if the crime is worth the punishment' 
based on their own weighing up of the costs involved if they do 
'commit the crime'. Thus, our teenager may decide that his 
desire to go camping outweighs his desire to please his 
parents. He is willing to risk the sanctions that will be 
forthcoming if he disobeys his parents. 
If, then, people do submit to a constraint, it is important to 
discover vhy they do so. It may be that they come to 
internalise the ethic, value or reason involved and come to 
make it their own (category (ii)). Thus, the teenager may, 
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of ter his parents have explained the dangers involved in his 
planned trip, come to appreciate their reasons and accept these 
as valid and for his own safety. Alternatively, it may be that 
while agents disagree with the constraint, they feel that the 
sanctions involved if they flout it would prevent them from 
achieving something else they desire even more. For example, 
the teenager may not agree that his parents' reasons for 
preventing him camping are justified, but he knows that the 
promised motorbike that was forthcoming would not be so if he 
disobeyed his parents. His desire for the motorbike outweighs 
his desire for the holiday. He submits to the constraint but 
he has not internalised the reasons that lie behind the 
constraint. Therefore, even if we, as sociologists, can locate 
an 'external factor' which seems to explain the action or non- 
action of an individual, this cannot be seen as the whole 
explanation. Human actors are agents - they make subjective 
choices (albeit influenced by external factors) and we must 
discover why they make these choices. 
External factors, however, are not only constraining, they can 
also be facilitating. The 'observer' must, therefore, also ask 
'do agents act in one vay rather than another because the 
culture or society in which they live supports and reinforces 
their desires and beliefs; or provides structural conditions 
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that make their desired action problem-free? '. It is in the 
case of facilitating factors that we are most likely to find 
that the agents, at least initially, will not be aware of how 
these factors influence their actions. The person who wished 
to become a doctor, for example, can explain her action in 
doing so in terms of her own desires and beliefs. She may not 
appreciate, though, that her action is only possible because, 
say, she had financial backing, parental encouragement, the 
necessary educational qualifications, and so forth. This may 
be because they have never compared their situation with that 
of others who do not have these advantages. At this stage, 
then, the agents may not comprehend that the situation in which 
they find themselves provides these bonuses and that the 
presence of these forms part of the reason why they have chosen 
this form of action. An 'observer', on the other hand, may be 
able to perceive these bonuses and thus give a fuller 
explanation of the action not only in terms of the 'internal' 
desires and beliefs of the agent but also in terms of the 
'external' factors which support these desires and beliefs. 
As the preceding arguments illustrate, these external factors, 
both constraining and facilitating, are different from external 
factors that have been internalised 
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because they exist outside the individual and do not constitute 
part of the agent's own reasons. I am not denying the role of 
the 'subjective' in category (iii) reasons, but it seems to me 
that the interaction of internal/external reasons is more 
marked in the case of category (ii) reasons. This is because 
emergent factors have been internalised and it is through this 
process of internalisation that agents make these reasons their 
own and make decisions, subjectively, in terms of then. In 
other words, the presence of external factors, here, serves to 
modify the desires and beliefs of individuals. 
Agents' Awareness of the Reasons for Their Actions 
I would argue, further, that a necessary condition for this 
process of internalisation is that the agent has some awareness 
of what these external reasons are. The agents may not have 
the 'whole picture' - as the case of ideology illustrates - but 
they are aware of the essential values, norms, expectations, 
and so on, which are associated with these external factors and 
they accept them as somehow 'right' and desirable. The agent, 
therefore, has some knowledge of the external factors, but if 
we restrict our explanation to the agent's knowledge we may 
miss other important aspects of relevance to the effects of 
external factors on individual action and the responses of 
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individuals to these external factors. Thus, we need to 
examine reasons in terms of both the subjective knowledge of 
the agent and the more objective information available which, 
perhaps, only the 'observer' can discover. 
Agents Have Choices 
One danger, though, with the view that external factors modify 
individual actions is that too much emphasis may be placed on 
'externality' and not enough on 'subjectivity'. I do not want 
to suggest that, given the same structural or cultural 
conditions, all agents will react and act in the same way - 
they certainly do not. Even in the case of category (iii) 
reasons, it is the agents' individual choice of whether or not 
to conform to constraints or take advantage of facilitating 
factors (once they become aware of them). The criminal or the 
disobedient teenager has obviously made the subjective decision 
not to be constrained by external factors. The private 
patient, once he realises that he is 'advantaged' compared to 
other people, may reject this form of medical care and turn to 
the National Health Service. 
My point is that when we are trying to explain the actions of 
individuals we should not restrict the information we can 
elucidate to the purely subjective or the purely objective. We 
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must examine the agents' own reasons for their actions but also 
try and discover all the factors involved in the formation of 
these reasons. Individual agents are not and cannot be always 
fully aware of all the factors that form their reasons for 
acting. The reasons they give are their reasons and they 
explain why they act as they do. However, agents are also 
social beings influenced by the society and culture into which 
they are born. Thus, the reasons they have, in many cases, 
will be conditioned and modified by factors that exist outside 
them. Such factors, I am arguing, must also form part of the 
explanation for their individual actions. On the other hand, I 
do not want to give 'external factors' - societal or cultural - 
a force which they do not have. As the discussion on 
'opportunity costs' suggests, one agent faced with structural 
conditions that hinder a certain course of action may decide 
that the costs of performing that action are too high and thus 
he or she will not perform that action. Another agent, though, 
faced with the same conditions, weighs up the costs differently 
and makes the decision that his or her desired action is worth 
the costs he or she has to pay. In other words, people will 
vary in the way they perceive and react to external factors. 
In most cases we are influenced by factors outside ourselves, 
but we are by no means all influenced in the same way. Thus, 
sociologists cannot obtain a full explanation of an action 
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simply by observing the external factors that seem to affect 
that action, they must also observe the way the agents perceive 
these factors, react to them and make decisions in terms of 
them. Both internal and external reasons for an action, 
therefore, must be included in action-explanations. 
Reasons For Actions May Change 
One final point that must be made is that, although I have 
placed the different aspects of reason-formation into three 
main categories, I do not wish to suggest that these are in any 
way static nor that any particular action can be explained in 
terms of only one of these categories. For example, even if an 
individual acts from purely 'internal' reasons at one point in 
time, his or her desires and beliefs which formed that reason 
may be reinforced or modified in some way by the way in which 
the society or culture of which they are a member reacts to 
this action. Such a reaction may have no effect, but in many 
cases it will, even by simply reinforcing the desires and 
beliefs of the agent, or, more significantly, by modifying 
these in the face of new information being made available to 
the agent. Alternatively, an agent who may have acted or not 
acted because of an external constraint may eventually come to 
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accept this constraint as somehow right and justified. The 
agent then internalises this external reason and it becomes 
part of his own system of beliefs and desires. 
Reason-formation, then, is not static - it cannot be so as 
agents are continually undergoing a learning process. They are 
gaining new knowledge, obtaining more information, as a result 
of their interaction with other people and other ideas, and 
this may lead to a revision not only of the way they act but of 
the reasons they have for an action which, in its outward 
appearance, remains the same. Thus, the teenager having 
experienced the sanctions involved when he disobeys his 
parents, may take the decision that in the future he will not 
perform actions that are contrary to their wishes - he revises 
the way in which he is going to act. Alternatively, the 
teenager who did not disobey his parents may have done so 
purely because he feared the sanctions, but after gaining new 
knowledge, through explanation or experience, he becomes aware 
of why this restriction is imposed and he internalises the 
reason. His action or non-action remains the same but his 
reasons have changed. What were once category (iii) reasons 
are now category (ii) reasons. 
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Agents May Act For More Than One Reason 
Moreover, people often act for more than one reason. The nurse 
who initially wanted to become a doctor may have taken the 
decision to become a nurse for a number of reasons. For 
example, it could have involved a category (iii) reason in that 
structural constraints prevented her from becoming a doctor, 
but also a category (ii) reason in that she has internalised 
the cultural value of the importance of 'caring' for the sick 
and elderly. She thus decides to fulfil her desire to enter a 
caring profession and her belief in the importance of this by 
becoming a nurse instead of a doctor. Thus, I wish to 
emphasise that the categories I have formulated do not have 
rigid boundaries. Reasons may change from one category to 
another over time and an action may be carried out for more 
than one category of reasons. 
Towards A Causal Account of Action 
As I have previously argued, reasons may be 'purely internal' 
to the agent or may be internal in the sense that they have 
been appropriated and have become part of the agent's own 
belief system. Indeed, it would be unacceptable to say 
otherwise if we are to allow for the agency of human beings. 
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It is these reasons, then, that constitute the agent's tendency 
to act in one way rather than another. However, I do not 
consider that the attempt to discover the reasons given by the 
agents themselves for their actions always tells us the whole 
story. While such an attempt should be the starting point of 
any explanation of action since it is these reasons that prompt 
the particular action in question, it is also the case that 
some of the beliefs and desires an agent has do not arise from 
within the agent but from an external source. The question 
needed to be asked, therefore, as to what the effect of these 
reasons can be and where they actually derive from. 
It was in trying to answer these questions that I began to move 
away from Davidson's individualist analysis of reasons and 
towards the possibility of an external source of reasons - that 
is, society, which while being composed of individuals cannot 
be reduced to them. As Bhaskar argued, while a society would 
not exist without human activity, the agents themselves did not 
create it, they can only reproduce it or transform it. At this 
stage, though, it would be perfectly justified to ask the 
question 'Where does this society come from if it is not 
created by people? ' Indeed, when considering the claims made 
by Bhaskar this is one question for which he seems to provide 
no satisfactory answer. 
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Emergent Properties 
I agree that we are born into a social structure that already 
exists so, in this sense, we as individuals do not create it. 
But, the society into which we are born must have been created 
by 'other people' - it did not just occur. Thus, to say that 
society is irreducible to people, should not be to say that 
people did not create it. We want to avoid the impression that 
'society' is just there. Rather, we should see it as something 
that people did create, albeit people who no longer participate 
in it. But, I agree with Bhaskar that, once created society 
takes on certain 'emergent properties' that condition or 
influence the actions of the agents born into it. In this way, 
and only in this way, can society be seen to provide the 
material and ideational causes of action. 
There is still the danger, however, of seeing society as an 
'all powerful force' over which the agents have no control. 
This is not the case. As Bhaskar has suggested, society is 
both the material and ideational cause of action and the 
reproduced outcome of human agency. Emergence, though, is a 
reality and thus it is important to distinguish between people 
and society and recognise that the properties possessed by 
people may be different from those possessed by social 
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structures. People, then, in their everyday lives, often 
unconsciously reproduce and produce social structures (such as 
a certain legal system) which take on properties of their own 
which serve to condition the actions of the people who produced 
and reproduced them (by sanctioning or proscribing their 
actions). But, people are also able to transform these 
structures, even though this may not be possible immediately7 
and may take a period of time. 
A Causal Account of Action 
The point of stressing the idea of 'external factors' is 
twofold. In the first place, the idea of causes as tendencies 
corresponds well to my contention that people may have a 
'tendency' to act in a certain way, based on their 'internal' 
beliefs and desires, but that the situations in which they find 
themselves - as a result of external conditions, may serve to 
modify or change their actions. In other words, agents may 
have reasons (whether category (i) or (ii)) which provide the 
tendencies of the agent to act in one way rather than another. 
But, actions occur in open systems where other (external 
category (iii)) factors may intervene to modify the actions of 
individual agents by providing them with other reasons for not 
acting in accordance with their original desires and beliefs - 
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even for acting contrary to the way they would have acted had 
these factors not been present. Thus, in the second place, 
when explaining actions we must not end our account with the 
subjective reasons of the actor. We must also examine whether 
these reasons have been formed or modified as a result of the 
influence of external factors which exist outside the agent. 
To reiterate the point, when an agent honestly cites a reason 
for his or her action, then this is the agent's own reason and 
must form part of the explanation of the action. The reason 
the agent gives, therefore, is the cause of the action of that 
agent. But the sociologist must recognise that these reasons 
may be formed on the basis of the influence of external factors 
of which the agent may not be fully aware but which the 
observer can detect; and also, that the agents may not be 
acting in accordance with their own desires and beliefs because 
their action is being constrained or facilitated in some way by 
emergent factors not of their own making. This, however, does 
not deny a causal status to the explanation of action in terms 
of reasons since these external factors provide other reasons 
why an actor performed an action because he or she had a 
reason. 
PART FOUR 
METHODOLOGICAL COMPARISONS 
The aim of this section is to demonstrate and vindicate, via 
comparison with other approaches to the explanation of action, 
the arguments I have outlined previously. That is, that it is 
not only desirable but necessary to include in our explanations 
of action not just one category of reason-formation but all 
three categories, in conjunction. It is only by taking into 
account category (i) internal reasons, category (ii) 
appropriated reasons, and category (iii) external reasons that 
we can really gain explanatory purchase on the reasoning of 
people in society - of our very social selves as self and 
socially reflective (in both senses of the term). 
To this end I propose to examine three theories which seem to 
me to restrict themselves to only one of my three categories of 
reasons in order to show what the implications of such partial 
accounts are, why they provide an inadequate account of the 
actions of human agents, and how they can be marshalled as 
systematic illustrations of what is generically wrong with all 
that theorising which does not employ the three categories when 
dealing with agent's reasons for action. For this analysis, 
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therefore, I have chosen the 'holist' ideas found in some of 
Dur kheim's work, at one extreme; the methodological 
individualism of rational choice theorists, at the other 
extreme; and, finally the less extreme but still limited 
account provided by Hollis. 
It is to be my contention in chapter one that Durkhei© 
considers only the force of external society factors -a rather 
deterministic form of category (iii) reasons - rather than 
examining either individual reasons for action (category (i)) 
or even reasons which have been appropriated because they are 
seen as somehow 'right' by the agents - category (ii)). 
Chapter two argues that rational choice theorists restrict 
their analysis of reasons, through seeing them as the product 
of desires alone, to internal (category (i)) reasons. In this 
I will include the very persuasive criticisms made of such 
accounts by Hollis. However, in the final chapter, I will 
suggest that Hollis' re-working of rational choice theory is 
also restricted in that he really only talks in terms of 
category (ii) reasons. In fact, when we examine Hollis in 
detail we find that his external reasons turn out, in truth, to 
be appropriated reasons; and in his justifiable criticisms of 
methodological individualism he mistakenly excludes the 
importance of category (i) reasons. 
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The purpose behind examining these particular theories, in this 
order, is not only to point to the restrictive nature of such 
accounts; I also want to argue that the inclusion of three 
categories of reasons places a new light on the old 
internalist/externalist debate (clearly outlined by Hollis) 
which involves rejecting one type of reason just because we 
accept the existence of another. This, it seems to me, is 
mistaken and places severe limits on the explanation of action 
which can be formulated within social science. 
CHAPTER ONE 
DURKHEIM AND 'HOLISM' - THE STUDY OF RELIGION 
Introduction 
In order to illustrate the restrictive nature of the account of 
action provided by 'holists' I will examine the methods 
advocated by Durkheim in his study of religion which 
exemplifies, for me, an extreme form of explanation in terms of 
a form of category (iii) external factors. I am not suggesting 
that Durkheim, throughout his substantive works, displays such 
blatant holism, but that, in this case, we find a form of 
'emergence' that leaves little room for the 'subjective' 
interpretation and processing of external factors by agents. 
Nor, I shall argue, does it allow for the possibility that 
agents may act in terms of 'internal' reasons either of a 
category (ii) or category (i) type. 
Durkheim, as we shall see, wanted to establish sociology as a 
'science'. To this end he wanted to establish generalisations 
about the role of religion and its place in the social 
structure in a similar way in which general laws are formulated 
in terms of natural phenomena. Such generalisations, for 
Durkheim, could be applied universally whatever form or type of 
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religion was being analysed. It is to be my contention that no 
such sweeping generalisations can be made. Not only do 
religions reflect the type of society in which they are found, 
but religions can be seen to have different meanings for 
different agents. What I am going to question is the way in 
which Durkheim disregards the agents' own reasons for believing 
via an ontological judgement that they are wrong. Durkheim, in 
fact, legislates both on God and on agents' reasons for acting. 
But, what right has he to do this? Can sociology make such 
claims and if not how should we try and understand the beliefs 
and subsequent actions of agents who hold religious views? In 
order to address these questions let us first examine 
Durkheim's methods and the way in which these reflect his views 
on the relationship between structure and agency. 
Durkheim's Definition of Religious Phenomena 
Durkheim's starting point was to produce a scientific 
definition of religion which would cut through previous 
definitions put forward by other theorists from allied 
disciplines. Durkheim stated that any definition would be one 
that would adequately embrace all religions from the most 
primitive to the most recent, from the most 'materialistic' to 
the most 'spiritual'. Most importantly, he wanted to eliminate 
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all subjective ideas. (1) Durkheim's first definition of 
religion can be found in "On the Definition of Religious 
Phenomena' (L'Annee Sociologique, 1899) in which he argued that 
the general distinguishing criterion of religion was in terms 
of the obligatory character of the beliefs lying behind the 
practices. There was, in fact, a pressure exercised by a 
society on its members to prevent them from deviating from the 
common faith. In short, religious phenomena consist of 
obligatory beliefs united with definite practices which relate 
to the objects given in the beliefs. (2) 
Religion, in Durkheim's view, differed from law and morality 
because the latter cases represent obligatory practices without 
obligatory beliefs, whereas in the former case both the beliefs 
and the practices are obligatory. He further maintained that 
all that is obligatory is social in origin and thus conformity 
to religious rules involved the individual's deference to the 
moral power of society. (3) 
There are, it seems to me, a number of problems involved here. 
In the first place, I would question the idea of using a 
definition of a phenomenon as the starting point of any 
analysis. Durkheim, by doing this, is 'putting the cart before 
the horse' by delimiting what he expects to find the role of 
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religion to be before actually examining the phenomenon of 
religion itself. Surely, the way we should proceed is to try 
and discover what religion means to the agents who hold 
religious beliefs by examining why - the agents' reasons why - 
they hold such beliefs (whilst remembering that we should not 
succumb to a 'use' theory of meaning or to assuming that all 
there is to religion is what actors can articulate or that 
their beliefs are 'complete' articulations as they may not be 
fully conversant with the scriptures or myths they advocate -a 
point to which I shall return). My point is that we should 
begin with the agents' reasons, we can then go on to try and 
elucidate to what extent their reasons for holding these 
beliefs are conditioned by other factors - such as the 
influences of the culture or society in which the agents 
reside. In other words, we should begin by asking for what 
reasons agents hold religious beliefs and how this affects 
their subsequent actions. We can then go on to analyse to what 
extent they have appropriated these reasons from societal or 
cultural factors - we should not limit our account to category 
(iii) external factors. In particular, we should not restrict 
accounts of action to a form of category (iii) external factors 
whereby the agents do not seem to 'weigh up costs' in the light 
of the situations in which they find themselves. In other 
words, there is nothing in the notion of external 'reasons' 
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that leads us to exclude the agent, but the agent does seem to 
'disappear' in the Durkheimian notion of 'social facts'. 
Holism, thereby, is not only restricted in accounting for 
action in terms only of category (iii) factors, it is also 
limited in the form these factors take. 
In the second place, we can question Durkheim's definition 
itself. Presumably, when he speaks of law and morality having 
obligatory practices without obligatory beliefs he is referring 
to something like category (iii) external constraints. That 
is, that agents do not need to perceive the constraints imposed 
by moral or legal rules as somehow 'right' for them to act as 
guides to their actions (if they want to avoid sanctions). 
However, the idea of obligatory beliefs seems to be a rather 
doubtful concept. Whilst agents, who are raised in a strong 
religious community, may act in accordance with the rules laid 
down by that community this is not to say that they actually 
believe in the concepts or ideas of that community. They may 
do so - they may have appropriated these beliefs from the 
community and made them their own, but judging whether this is 
so from their outward actions may be misleading. If the agents 
wish to live in harmony with others in a community then he or 
she may act in accordance with religious rules and practices of 
that community. But the only way we could know whether they 
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actually believe in the religious ideals advocated is via the 
agents themselves. The beliefs they have are internal to the 
agents. They may have appropriated their beliefs from outside, 
but they are not obliged to do so. It is their choice based on 
their own desires, needs, wants, and so on. No community can 
ever force people to believe in anything even though their 
actions may be conditioned by the social structure in which 
they live - whether in the form of category (ii) reasons which 
have been appropriated because they are perceived as somehow 
'right' or category (iii) external constraints which influence 
actions by placing 'costs' on those who elect not to act in 
accordance with them. The point is that we cannot explain the 
effects of social structure on action in terms only of category 
(iii) reasons, the agents may be acting in terms of 
appropriated reasons and it is whether this is the case that we 
need to discover. We can, in other words, include the 
influence of external factors - in the form of category (ii) 
reasons - and still allow a place in the explanation for the 
human agent. 
I am not saying, however, that the social structure (in the 
form of category (iii) reasons) does not, in some cases, have a 
considerable influence on the beliefs of the agents in certain 
forms of society. For example, extreme censorship can heavily 
condition what people come to believe largely because they have 
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no knowledge of alternatives to that belief system. In this 
case then we can give to the social structure a great deal of 
force in conditioning or modifying the beliefs and actions of 
agents. But such cases are extreme, and even in societies 
where censorship is found not all the agents will 
unquestioningly adopt these beliefs - otherwise how could we 
explain the presence of dissidents. We cannot, as Durkheim 
seems to do, presuppose the extent of social pressure on 
beliefs, this is precisely what we should be trying to 
discover. What I arguing, therefore, is that adherence to 
religious creeds and the practices associated with them may be 
as the result of category (iii) reasons - the actions of the 
agents may be explained in terms of external constraints. 
Alternatively, such actions may be the result of category (ii) 
reasons whereby the agent has appropriated these beliefs and 
perceives them as somehow 'right' and so he or she acts in 
accordance with them. They may, indeed, be category (i) 
reasons - an individual's internal belief in the existence of a 
god or gods based, perhaps, on some kind of revelation. What I 
am arguing, therefore, is that we need to examine the 
possibility that any one of three categories (or a combination 
of categories) may explain the actions of individuals and not 
restrict our account to only one type of reason. 
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Durkheim further maintained that the determining cause of 
religious phenomena lay in the 'nature' of the societies to 
which they relate, and that if they have evolved in the course 
of history it is because social organisations have themselves 
been transformed. (4) Again, the content of religious beliefs 
is seen as determined by society. But how then do we explain 
the fact that not only in the same society can we find a 
plurality of different beliefs but also there are members of 
that same society who hold no religious beliefs at all. 
Moreover, what evidence does Durkheim have that the 
transformation of religious beliefs is as a result of the 
transformation of societies and not the other way around - as 
Weber suggested in his analysis of the protestant ethic? 
I would thus contend that Durkheim is mistaken to begin his 
analysis of religious phenomena by an examination of the type 
of society in which they are found. Rather, we should begin by 
analysing the reasons why agents appropriated certain beliefs 
(if they did so), how these beliefs affect their actions, and 
whether the holding of such beliefs can be seen to act back on 
and influence the type of society in which such beliefs are 
held. I am not denying that societal factors can modify the 
actions of individuals either as external constraints (category 
(iii) reasons) or by providing beliefs that the agents 
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appropriate (category (ii) reasons), but I object to the idea 
that societies determine what agents believe and the view that 
this is a one-way process. 
In this way, I feel that Durkheim, by starting with a 
definition of religion, was really outlining what he wanted to 
conclude rather than providing an 'objective' analysis of the 
function of religion. Surely we need to begin by studying the 
content of religious beliefs as perceived by individuals before 
we can understand the function of religious phenomena to the 
actors involved, and the consequences of religious beliefs 
being held for society -a two-way process. 
Durkheim's Use of the Crucial Experiment 
Another aspect of Durkheim's methodological approach which must 
be questioned is the idea of the crucial experiment. Durkheim, 
in order to arrive at a stage where the explanation of 
religious phenomena could be applied universally, claimed that 
it was necessary to examine carefully a particular society. In 
other words, to undertake one well-conducted experiment from 
which laws could be formulated as in the natural sciences. 
Thus Durkheim claimed that since all religions can be compared 
to each other, and since all are species of the same class, 
there 
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are necessarily many elements which are common to all. We do 
not mean, he argues, to speak simply of the outward and visible 
characteristics which they all have equally, and which make it 
possible to give them a provisional definition from the very 
outset since the discovery of these is relatively easy as the 
observation which it demands does not go beneath the surface of 
things. But these external resemblances suppose others which 
are profound. (5) 
Let us pause here for a moment. Such a statement can be 
questioned, firstly, at the level of meanings. For example, a 
complete 'fake religion' may look the same as other religions, 
such as the Protestant Church, from outside observation, but 
the actual content of the religious beliefs is not based on a 
genuine belief on the part of the leaders of the religious cult 
in a god or gods, but is a way, perhaps, of making money out of 
those who have faith in the 'false prophets'. In other words, 
the outward appearance of the religion may correspond to the 
appearance of other religions, but this is not to say that the 
meaning of the religion to the advocates of that religion is 
the same. The Protestant minister believes in the god he is 
worshipping, but the false prophet knows that his religion is 
false. Yet we could never know this if we presuppose that the 
similar external aspects of religious practices means that the 
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content of the religious beliefs are also similar. We need t: 
understand what the religion 'means' to those who are involve: 
in that religious activity. 
Durkheim, however insisted that at the foundation of al. 
systems of beliefs and of all the cults there ought necessaril-r 
to be a certain number of fundamental representations o_ 
conceptions and of ritual attitudes which, in spite of the 
diversity of forms which they have taken, have the sane 
structures everywhere. These, he maintains, are the permanen: 
elements which constitute that which is permanent and human is 
religion - they form all the objective contents of the idea 
which is expressed when one speaks of religion in general. 
How, he asks, is it possible to find, underneath the disputes 
of theology, the variations of ritual, the multiplicity of 
groups and the diversity of individuals, the fundamental states 
characteristic of religious mentality in general? (6) 
Durkheim's response was to examine a particular type of society 
- that of totemism - which he saw as a real social institutio: 
with distinctive characteristics. It was, moreover, the most 
primitive and simple religion which it is possible to find, 
found in its purest form among societies as close as possible 
to the origins of evolution with the most rudimentary 
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techniques and the most primitive and simple organisation known 
- namely organisation on a clan basis. (7) In focussing on 
totemism, conceived in this way, Durkheim, argues Lukes, was 
making the assumption that all the essential elements of 
religious thought and life ought to be found, at least in germ, 
in the most primitive religion. In making this assumption, 
though, he was influenced by an analogy taken from the natural 
sciences. Durkheim, in fact, argued that while an extended 
verification may add to the authority of a theory, it is 
equally true that when a law has been proved by one well-done 
experiment, this proof is valid universally. (8) 
I would argue, however, that such a methodological approach has 
many problems. Again, Durkheim is assuming, at the outset, 
that all religious beliefs have the same objective significance 
and meet the same needs for all agents despite the variations 
found within each type of religion and despite the different 
ways in which agents react to and at in accordance with 
religious tenets. This is his starting point which, again, 
reflects the fact that he restricts his analysis only to a 
restricted fora of category (iii) reasons. But I would argue 
that he could not know this without an analysis of what 
individual actors perceive these beliefs to be and what 
function they, the actors, see their beliefs as having for 
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them. In other words, we should begin with the reasons agents 
themselves have for holding these beliefs and try and discover 
how the holding of such beliefs influences the actions of 
agents in their everyday life - and this we can only do by not 
limiting our account to only one category of reason - if we did 
so there would be nothing to discover. Not only can we not 
assume (a) that all religions are based on the same kinds of 
beliefs and originate from the same source, but (b) we cannot 
know that such beliefs, in any one religion, are perceived in 
the same way by all those who hold them, nor (c) that the 
holding of such beliefs will influence the actions of agents in 
the same way. For example, two agents may believe in the 
religious tenet that 'thou shalt not kill', yet one may 
interpret this that killing under any circumstances is a sin 
and thus be against the idea of capital punishment; while the 
other believes that if someone commits a murder then he has 
sinned against God and so must atone with his life ('an eye for 
an eye, a tooth for a tooth'). 
Moreover, even if we accept Durkheim's 'scientific' approach it 
must be stressed that no scientist would claim that just one 
experiment proves a law. Rather, scientific certainty is 
derived from repeating similar experiments which provide 
similar results and so 'demonstrate' the law. I would object, 
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however, to the idea that any such law could ever be said to 
exist in social science - that is laws based on a positivist 
account of science. We cannot say, as I have already 
indicated, that all religions are the same. Religions vary a 
great deal both in their practices and in their beliefs. What 
can be explained from one religion also varies since certain 
facets of religion are absent in one religion but present in 
another. As Pickering suggests, Durkheim's intention was to 
choose a group in which religion was all-pervasive - where its 
influence was at a maximum; and at the same time to avoid 
societies where religion or world-views co-exist as a 
pluralism. (9) In fact, he selected a system that could be 
seen as 'closed' as possible, yet most religions work in open 
systems thus severely limiting the applicability of Durkheim's 
explanation. Indeed, it can be argued that totemism itself 
works in an open system since closure is never hermetically 
sealed. In other words, Durkheim's crucial experiment cannot 
be applied universally. And even within the particular 
religion he was studying, he is applying his presupposition 
that religious phenomena can be explained in terms of social 
factors, rather than trying to discover the 'meaning' that this 
religion had for those who held the particular beliefs in 
question. 
(325) 
As I have suggested previously, therefore, a more adequate 
theory of religious phenomena would be forthcoming if we began 
with an examination of the reasons agents have for believing in 
gods, totems and the like, taking account of all three 
categories of reason-formation rather than just category (iii) 
factors. In doing this we do not exclude an examination of the 
societal factors at work in the formation of these beliefs, but 
neither do we exclude the agent from the account. 
Neither does it mean that we cannot give a causal status to the 
role of religion if causes are seen as tendencies to act in a 
certain way. Thus we may discover that agents, given a certain 
set of beliefs, may tend to act in particular ways as a result 
of these beliefs (noting that in this explanation we do not 
need to judge the beliefs as right or wrong, false or based on 
inadequate information - what we need to understand is what the 
beliefs are, where they came from and how they influence the 
actions of those who hold them). Moreover, because agents live 
in open systems and are capable of weighing up costs and 
evaluating the situations in which they find themselves, we 
cannot assume that they will always act according to these 
beliefs. In other words, by accepting the idea of causes as 
tendencies rather than seeing causes in the positivistic way 
advocated by Durkheim, we can discover certain patterns of 
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behaviour associated with certain religious beliefs, but we 
cannot say that all the actors who have these beliefs will act 
in the same way when faced with the same situation, as other 
factors may intervene to influence the action of the agent in 
question. For example, a Christian Scientist may believe that 
it is wrong to accept the blood of another human being in the 
form of a transfusion, but when faced with the situation that 
his wife or child will die unless blood is given may give his 
permission for the transfusion to go ahead despite the fact 
that his belief that this is a sin still exists. The emotional 
cost of refusing such a course of action is too high a one to 
pay so he goes against his beliefs in this situation. Another 
agent, though, may take a different course and deny the 
transfusion because his belief that this is against the 
teaching of his religion is stronger than his desire to save 
the life of his wife and child or because he believes that it 
is in the hands of God whether they survive or die. 
Society as a God 
To return to Durkheim. In a typically Durkheimian way, he 
strongly criticised the definitions of religion which were 
associated with the theories of animism and naturism. He also 
rejected a definition which was based on beliefs and practices 
centred on 
(327) 
a god or gods or some conception of the supernatural. :o 
accept these definitions would be to admit to the existence of 
a god or some other that is not society - to admit to something 
Durkheim rejected as actually existing. What right, though, 
did Durkheim have to do this? Is it really up to sociology to 
deny the existence of a god and posit some alternative 
explanation to account for why people believe in the existence 
of such a phenomenon? I would suggest that, when trying to 
explain religious phenomena, instead of trying to posit an all- 
embracing theory of the origins and functions of all religions, 
it would be more profitable to focus our interest not on 
whether the belief the individual or group of actors has is 
empirically 'real' (that is, somehow able to be proved by 
empirical means) but how the agent or group came to hold such 
beliefs and how these condition their actions in their everyday 
life. By concentrating entirely on the idea that when 
individuals worship totems, animals, plants or gods they are 
really worshipping society, Durkheim excludes a very important 
aspect of any analysis of religion. That is, how the holding 
of such beliefs affects the actions of the agents involved. 
We, as sociologists, may not share the beliefs of the religious 
group we are studying, but this does not prevent us from 
analysing, via the agents themselves, how the holding of these 
beliefs serves to provide reasons for the actions of those that 
hold them. 
(328) 
What Happens to Agency? 
Why, though does Durkheim seem to ignore the individual actor 
in his analysis of religion? To answer this we must examine 
the principles he set out in "The Rules of Sociological 
Method". Namely, that sociology in general has as its subject 
matter social facts - ways of acting, thinking and feeling 
which are external to the individual, which control or 
constrain him, and which cannot be explained in terms of 
psychology (in other words, external category (iii)) 
constraining factors with no reference to either category (i) 
or (ii) reasons). Religious facts, for Durkheim, were also 
social facts and thus they were to be explained and understood 
in terms of the type of society in which they were found. 
In line with his definition of a social fact, Durkheim, as we 
have seen, initially held that a key characteristic of religion 
was that of constraint - its power or ability to produce some 
social effect. Thus the transgression of ritual regulations 
brings with it censure and feelings of guilt. Religious 
prescriptions, therefore, and with them religious behaviour 
patterns, carry with them a sense of obligation. We have 
already examined this idea in some detail, but I wish to 
emphasise that, for Durkheim, what is obligatory must come from 
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a higher power, from an authority which is 'ipso facto' a power 
more exalted than the individual. Since Durkheim rejected the 
idea that such a power comes from 'God' and the idea that 
individuals can act in accordance with their own beliefs and 
desires, then the answer must lie in society. 
Can we, however, accept the idea that religious phenomena can 
only be explained in terms of something like category (iii) 
external constraints? Are individuals really so 'puppet-like' 
that their only reasons for acting in accordance with religions 
tenets is because they are 'obliged' to do so? I would want to 
reject this scenario, arguing, instead, that while agents may 
be constrained by the religious doctrines that exist in the 
society or community of which they are members, they may also 
act in accordance with these doctrines because they believe 
them to be right (category (ii) reasons). Moreover, there is 
no reasons to exclude the possibility that the agent may hold 
beliefs that are not the product of some societal influence (as 
in the case of revelation) and thus act as a result of category 
(i) reasons. It is, I would argue, not up to sociology to 
decide that people's beliefs are somehow false or misconceived 
(accepting that in some cases this may be discovered to be the 
case where false religions are concerned), nor is it up to 
sociology to legislate, in advance, on the subject's reasons 
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for holding these beliefs. It is up to sociology to discover 
why, for what reason, agents do obey religious sanctions, if 
they do - to discover, in short, the reasons they have for 
acting in one way rather than another. 
It is true that Durkheim, in "The Elementary Forms" changes his 
definition of religion arguing that a religion is a unified 
system of beliefs and practices relevant to sacred things - 
that is, things set apart and forbidden, beliefs and practices 
which unite into one single moral community, called a church, 
all those who adhere to them. Thus, he comes to reject the 
notion of constraint or obligation as the criteria of religious 
phenomena. However, we can see that the concept of a moral 
community can be seen to imply some form of obligation in the 
sense of category (iii) reasons which constrain the actions of 
the individuals who reside in that community. What is 
significant in this new definition of religious phenomena, 
though, is the idea of the sacred. 
Pickering suggests that Durkheim views man as 'homo-duplex'. 
He has two irreducible components - the social and the 
individual. There is in man two 'consciences', one common to 
and derived from the group, the other unique to the individual. 
What man absorbs from the social is sacred; what is individual 
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is profane. Sacred things are thus those whose 
'representations' society itself has fashioned; profane things 
are those which each of us constructs from our sense data of 
experience. (10) 
Durkheim argues that, associated with each sacred item or class 
of items there is a 'representation' - an idea or ideal that is 
supported collectively. Thus, sacredness has at its basis a 
mental concept which is not dependent on the natural or 
utilitarian properties of the thing, idea or person which is 
held to be sacred. This means that the key lies in the ideas 
and values which are at the basis of society and which are 
collectively expressed by its 'representations'. In "The 
Elementary Forms" Durkheim spoke of the sacred character of 
something being superimposed on it - stamped on it. But, 
argues Pickering, who does the stamping? There can, in 
Durkheim, be only one answer - 'society'. The original cause 
can never be discovered. All we can say is that it happened 
within the context of a society and with its approval and 
acceptance. Here then we clearly see Durkhein's ontological 
judgement - that it has to be society which explains religious 
phenomena because it is society which determines what is 
sacred. 
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Let us examine these claims in more detail. In the first 
place, I would question the idea that it is society alone that 
ascribes sacredness to certain people or things. Sociology, I 
would argue, cannot and should not exclude the possibility that 
the original cause of sacredness could be God. What I am 
suggesting is that even though the original cause of sacredness 
could be a power that exists outside the individual, this does 
not mean that this power is necessarily social - it could be a 
supernatural power (we cannot, within the realm of sociology, 
know this). But, the only way we can come to an understanding 
of such beliefs is through discovering the reasons given by 
agents as to why they believe in the sacredness of that person 
or thing. 
It is also the case that to follow Durkheim means accepting the 
eternality of both the concept of the sacred and the existence 
of a meaningful content. But we can question the claim that 
the sacred exists in every society, whether or not the members 
of that society accept the concept and irrespective of the 
presence of sacred things within their society. To Durkhei© 
the answer is yes. Every society is based on collective 
'representations', and the sacred is not just a collective 
'representation', it is the symbol of the collective entity. 
Thus when man is worshipping God, he is worshipping the 
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collective entity - that is society. (11) I would suggest, 
though, that it is very difficult to explain why something 
becomes sacred or remains sacred unless a number of people in a 
society believed that it was so. The idea that 'society' 
stamps on something the label of sacred, it seems to me, 
presupposes an agreement between individuals that it is, in 
fact, sacred. This belief cannot be imposed on individuals - 
it emanates from them even though, once it exists, it may be 
seen as an emergent factor which influences the actions of the 
agents in the society in which these beliefs can be found 
(remembering that it is the agent's choice whether or not it 
does so). 
For Durkheim, however, the sacred is irreducible. It cannot be 
explained by reference to anything else (it is a category (iii) 
fact). The point is that the sacred, in Durkheim's view, 
cannot be broken down into its constituent parts - it cannot be 
explained at another level. The sacred is a social fact and 
that is all that needs to be said. But this does not really 
explain why individuals come to hold something as sacred. The 
sacred is imposed on the individual from outside. 
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I have already argued that I cannot see how we can understand 
the sacred unless we examine the reasons individuals have for 
holding something sacred. Thus, I agree, to some extent, with 
Parsons who argues that the sacred is located according to the 
declaration of the individual, the actor; though I would stress 
that this does not necessarily mean that it is dependant on 
nothing but this declaration otherwise I would be making the 
ontological judgement I accuse Durkheim of making that we 
should reject the idea of the existence of God altogether -I 
would be replacing 'society' with the 'individual'. What I am 
saying is that any kinds of beliefs need holders to proclaim 
them and it is via these holders of a belief that we can try to 
understand them. Thus I would also concur with Good who 
stresses the emotional and personal content of religious 
beliefs. Pickering suggests that the danger, for Durkheim, of 
using the actor's frame of reference is that such a subjective 
approach makes it difficult to differentiate the sacred from 
the profane (presumably because people would differ over which 
was which). (12) 
But, I would ask, why should we need to differentiate in such a 
way? The problem here, it seems to me, is in terms of the 
bipartite division between the sacred and the profane. Lukes 
suggests that this dichotomy derives from and is explained by 
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the basic dichotomy Durkheim sees between the individual and 
society. (13) In Durkheim's view society is not a mere sum of 
individuals; rather the system formed by their association 
represents a specific reality which has its own 
characteristics. It is, then, in the nature of this entity, 
not in that of its component units, that we must seek the 
immediate and determining cause of the facts appearing there. 
But, as Lukes argues, this sharp bifurcation into two levels of 
facts - social versus individual - was conceptually confused 
and led him to overstate his case. In fact, he need only to 
have claimed that social facts cannot be explained wholly in 
terms of individual facts. In other words, it would have been 
sufficient to have claimed that no social phenomenon, indeed 
few human activities, can either be identified or 
satisfactorily explained, without reference, explicit or 
implicit, to social facts. (14) This may be the case, but I 
would also maintain that there are reasons for action which 
fall into the category of internal reasons and, also, that 
external factors may be appropriated and then internalised 
making them very different from the category (iii) reasons 
that Durkheim restricts himself to. 
Here then we come to the fundamental differences between  y 
theoretical approach and Durkheim's which underlies our 
different methodological approaches. In the first place, I do 
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not accept the claim that all religious beliefs (or any other 
beliefs) have to be social in origin in the sense that they are 
the product of the culture or society in which the agent 
actually resides. As I argued previously, when I refer to 
internal (category (i)) reasons I am not suggesting that the 
reasons the agent has have to be entirely 'original' still to 
be personal reasons. Thus, an agent's belief in the tenets of 
Christianity can be said to be personal rather than social if, 
as in the example previously cited, he or she remained or 
actually became a Christian in Eastern Europe ten years ago. 
Yes, he or she is not 'inventing' Christianity, but neither are 
they appropriating their beliefs from current approved beliefs 
in the society in which he or she was a member. How, though, 
would Durkheim explain such a case. He would probably argue 
that it was a result of inadequate socialisation, but is this 
really an adequate answer? I would suggest that the only way 
we could explain the actions of this individual is by trying to 
discover, from the agent, what it was about Christian beliefs 
that led him or her to want to appropriate them and live their 
life in accordance with the doctrines associated with them. 
However, although I would argue that there are beliefs of this 
kind which are best analysed and explained on an individual 
level, I agree that in many cases the beliefs of an individual 
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can be seen as influenced or modified by the society of which 
the person in question is a member - that is category (ii) 
reasons. This is not to say, though, that such beliefs are 
determined by that social structure. The agent has to 
appropriate these beliefs because they see something positive 
in holding them - the agent has a choice of whether or not he 
or she agrees that the beliefs are somehow 'right'. It may be 
that lack of knowledge of alternatives may be a reason why an 
agent holds certain beliefs (a category (iii) reason) but we 
cannot assume this at the outset. The point is that it is u: ) 
to the sociologist to try and discover what reasons an agent 
has for believing in certain religious doctrines and that this 
must begin with the agents themselves not with examining the 
type of structure of the society of which they are members. 
Summary 
In this way, I would suggest that Durkhei., whilst being 
correct in emphasising the influence of societal or cultural 
factors, is wrong to try and explain religious activities and 
beliefs only in terms of external factors. Rather, I would 
advocate a method of investigation which begins with the 
individual actor while taking into account the force of 
external factors on the formation of the reasons of these 
individuals. 
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I would argue, in fact, that if we begin with an understanding 
of the agents' reasons for beliefs and then analyse how these 
beliefs are formed we can gain far more explanatory purchase on 
action than Durkheim's rather restricted account provides. In 
the first place, DurkheiR cannot explain religious beliefs of a 
category (i) kind at all. In Durkheim all beliefs stem from 
the social structure, but this cannot explain the plurality of 
beliefs found in many societies which depend on the meaning of 
these beliefs to the individuals who adhere to them. Nor can 
it explain situations where individuals adhere to beliefs that 
are not currently held in the society to which that individual 
belongs. Nor, indeed, can it explain how new religions are 
formed which may be the result of an individual revelation 
which may then come to be shared. 
In the second place, I would claim that my category (ii) 
reasons can explain how beliefs that exist in a society can 
come to be appropriated in a far less deterministic way than 
can Durkheim. In my conception of appropriated reasons there 
is no need to talk in terms of 'obligation' whereby the agent 
has no place in deciding what they are to believe in. In this, 
we are accepting that external factors do have an influence on 
the beliefs of agents, but rather than being forced to accept 
the beliefs the agents make conscious decisions to accept (or 
(339) 
reject) them on the basis of whether they conceive of the 
tenets of the belief as somehow 'right'. They have a 'meaning' 
for the agents concerned and thus they internalise them and 
make them their own. In this way I am able to allow for the 
influence of society on individual beliefs without excluding 
the agent from the account. 
Finally, I can explain religious beliefs as category (iii) 
beliefs - which they may be in cases, for example, where 
extreme censorship prevents agents being aware of alternative 
beliefs and so they have very little choice in what they 
believe - without committing myself to the Durkheimian stance 
that all religious believers are category (iii) believers or 
that category (iii) reasons are not 'subjectively' processed by 
the agents concerned. 
The point I am making, therefore, is that we should not assume, 
as Durkheim does, what in fact we are trying to explain. 
Instead of stating, at the outset, that all beliefs can be 
explained in terms of category (iii) reasons, we should begin 
by trying to elucidate the agents' reasons for believing what 
they actually believe and then make an assessment of how these 
reasons are formed - which may be in terms of category (i), 
(ii) or (iii) reasons. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY - METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM 
Introduction 
In this chapter I am going to analyse the arguments put forward 
by rational choice theorists as an example of methodological 
individualism. Here we will see the suggestion that the 
explanation of human action should be purely in terms of the 
internal reasons of the agent - that is category (i) reasons. 
There is, in these accounts, no consideration of external 
factors at all either in terms of appropriated (category (ii)) 
reasons or constraining/facilitating category (iii) reasons. 
As in the previous chapter, my aim is to demonstrate how 
perceiving reasons in terms of only one 'type' (in this case, 
category (i) reasons) severely limits or restricts the possible 
explanations of action that can be given. Indeed, I will argue 
that many of our actions cannot be explained by methodological 
individualists because these actions are influenced or modified 
by factors that exist outside us and are either internalised or 
act as restraints on, or facilitators of, our actions. Such 
reasons, of necessity, because of the claims of rational choice 
theorists, cannot ever be included in action explanations. 
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To this end this chapter will be concerned with 'traditional' 
views on what rational choice theory entails and the perfectly 
valid criticisms of this theory outlined by Hollis in The 
Cunning of Reason. I shall argue that the idea that it is 
desires alone that move us to action not only dismisses two 
fundamental categories of reasons as explanations, but also 
provides a restrictive and misconceived notion of what internal 
reasons actually are. What I am going to contend is that 
category (i) reasons are not only to be seen in terms of 
desires, but should also involve the beliefs of the agent, as 
has been discussed previously. 
This chapter also provides the second element of the debate 
between externalists, such as Durkheim, and internalists, such 
as those we will be considering shortly. As will be discussed 
in chapter three, it is my view that such a debate takes on a 
different dimension if we refrain from taking either internal 
or external reasons as the explanation of action, and consider 
the possibility that both objective and subjective elements may 
be involved. Moreover, I am going to suggest that internal 
reasons may be seen in more than one way (that is, as purely 
'internal' in the sense that they are not appropriated from 
external factors, or as reasons that have been internalised and 
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then form part of the agents' own belief systems); and that 
external reasons are by no means as 'deterministic' as 
positivists would seem to imply. 
Only Desires Can Move an Agent! 
Rational choice can be defined as choice which is instrumental 
in securing the agent's goals. According to the traditional 
view of rational-choice theory these goals need to be internal 
to the agent and they need to be fixed, since otherwise 
expected utilities cannot be calculated. Thus, Hollis argues, 
they take the form of given preferences. In the simplest case 
they can be seen as 'tastes'. Since, then, it is obvious how 
tastes or sentiments can move us to action, should we then 
conclude that only desires can move an agent to action? (1) 
Hollis' answer to this (and it is one with which I completely 
concur) is no. But let us first examine, in more detail, what 
'rational choice' theory, in this form, is suggesting. 
The fully rational agent of the ideal-type case has complete 
and consistent preferences, whose domain is the consequences of 
his feasible actions. He knows his preferences and enough 
about likelihoods and costs so that he can assign expected 
utilities to his options. He thus makes, what Hollis calls, a 
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maximising choice in the sense that he always avoids the 
inferior options. He is a bargain hunter who never gets less 
than he could or pays more than he must. (2) 
The Limits of Choice for the Rational Man 
Does, though, rational choice theory allow for as much choice 
as it implies? Flam, for example, argues that although, in the 
model, rational man is posited as a free man and a free 
decision-maker, this freedom is in fact constrained because he 
is obliged or compelled to follow certain rules in making his 
choices. In the first place, he is constrained by his own 
cost-conscious calculating rationality - the fact that he holds 
the criteria of cost and benefit and has to compare marginal 
utilities attached to each good in order to maximise his 
overall utility as sovereign guidelines for choosing among 
different options and in rank-ordering his preferences. In the 
second place, he is constrained by the pursuit of internal 
consistency of choice. He has, to be rational, not to have 
contradictory desires or beliefs. He is to be exacting and 
careful in his comparisons, exercising the utmost effort to 
comply with the rule of consistency. Finally, as Hollis too 
points out, rational man is selfish. Thus, the final 
constraint on his action is exercised by his unrelenting 
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pursuit of self-interest which informs all his choices. In 
sum, then, rational man is desirous, calculating, consistent 
and selfish; and the three criteria of rationality - calculus, 
consistency, selfishness - organised his desires. (3) Let us 
examine, therefore, the latter of these points - that is, that 
rational man is selfish. 
The Selfish Rational Man 
A current trend, Hollis argues, is to argue that to call an 
agent rational is to say merely that he reasons correctly in 
identifying the actions likeliest to satisfy his preferences 
(this, as I shall argue subsequently presupposes two 
assumptions that can be questioned - that is, that the agent 
has complete and consistent preferences and that he knows 
exactly what these preferences are). One version of this idea 
is the 'theory of egoism', a crude form of which identifies 
costs and benefits as costs to the agent and benefits to the 
agent. This theory then goes on to argue that no agent will be 
moved to action unless his benefits outweigh his costs. He can 
thus be kind to animals and helpful to old ladies, provided 
that what moves him is the satisfaction which he expects from 
the result. Here then we have the type Hollis calls 
'Solitary'. But is this really an adequate conception of what 
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human agents are like? For instance, it is a slight nuisance 
for 'Solitary' to remove his own litter after his picnic on the 
beach, but the total utility of a clean beach to all users is 
greater than the utility of a beach spoilt by 'Solitary's' 
litter. Plainly, argues Hollis, beaches are sometimes left 
clean, so it looks as if there must be people about who do not 
reason like 'Solitary'. That also might explain why people 
save water in droughts and keep the social world moving in 
apparent defiance of their dominant choices. (4). In other 
words, it is a mistake to view agents as always acting in order 
to satisfy their dominant desires, without taking account, for 
example, of the desires and preferences of other people. Human 
agents are not purely 'egoistic'. 
An alternative idea, for Hollis, involves the notion of 
'altruism'. Thus, Hollis suggests that we can call an agent 
'altruistic' if he sets the costs to himself against the 
benefits to all. This gives us a second homunculus - Poor - as 
a claim about motivation. 'Solitary' fits in with Hobbes' 
version of the social contract and 'Poor' to Hume's. In Hobbes 
human nature starts as strictly self-regarding whereas Hume 
credits us with enough natural sympathy to one another to keep 
the social world moving. (5) Writers such as Blau argue, 
however, that beneath this seeming selflessness an underlying 
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egoism can be discovered. A basic reward people seek in their 
associations is social approval. (6) Hollis argues, though, 
that even given that people commonly do what brings them social 
approval, it does not follow that they are doing it for the 
sake of approval (in other words, social approval can be an 
unintended consequence of their action). The other argument is 
that 'Poor' and 'Solitary' are both moved to seek whatever 
rewards are important to them. (7) 
Both views, however, as Hollis will argue, are too simplistic 
and are based on the mistaken idea that only desires can move a 
man. The theory of rational choice, in fact, depends on four 
contentions. Firstly, the idea of 'given preferences' which 
regards rational choice as the use of instrumental reason in 
the service of the passions. Secondly, the idea that the 
rational agent's desires must be current. Thirdly, the idea 
that preferences are homogenous. A preference order has to be 
complete and consistent and must be an order of preferences. 
Finally, the idea that preferences are determining. An agent's 
choice is determined by his order of preferences. Here the 
information or belief component of the decision is thought of 
as universal - standard equipment - and the desire component is 
what varies between individuals. (8) 
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The Problems of Complete Information and Consistency 
Flam, rightly, points to the fact that the rational actor model 
has problems in assuming that all actors have complete 
information concerning their choices and are fully consistent 
in their desires. This, as we shall see, rests on the 
assumption that it is desires which alone moves a man or woman 
to action without taking account of the possibility that 
beliefs can and do modify our desires. In other words, a 
fundamental flaw in the rational choice argument is the failure 
to consider the possibility that agents can appropriate beliefs 
from external sources which serve to influence their desires or 
even lead them to act against their desires - (category 
(ii) 
reasons. Even within the rational actor model these problems 
have been perceived. For example, Simon's model of bounded 
rationality rejects the assumptions of complete information, 
certainty and perfect calculability. In fact Simon's man is 
defined as limited in his capacity to handle either complexity 
or uncertainty. Yet, as Flam argues, he still remains rational 
even in this model - (sub)goal-oriented, cost-conscious, 
calculating and (under)informed - although his capacities have 
been considerably reduced. (9) 
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If, Flam argues, Simon removes the assumption of complete 
information, Schelling and Elster considerably weaken that of 
consistency. They argue that individuals have cognitive 
coordination problems and experience some motivational conflict 
and that they are engaged in a constant battle to remain 
rational and to maintain self-control. In other words, human 
reason and/or human will often cave in under the weight of 
contradictory desires, momentary impulses or norms. Both 
Schelling and Elster do try to improve the concept of 
rationality by evoking the image of multiple selves - 
individual and organisational - but both stay with the model. 
(10) The question is, therefore, why do these theorists, 
having appreciated the problems with the model insist on 
retaining it, albeit in a modified form. It is to be my 
contention in chapter three that this is also a problem with 
Hollis' account. It seems to we that if we replace the 
rational actor model with the idea that the explanation of 
action should be in terms of reasons, then we can overcome the 
problems of incomplete information and the fact that people 
often have contradictory desires or beliefs without making the 
actor 'irrational' in the choices that he or she makes given 
the situations in which he or she finds themselves. Moreover, 
we are able to account for both individual and organisational 
factors in our explanations of the reasons for actions. 
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Voluntary Collective Behaviour 
It is the notion of 'irrational' behaviour which is considered 
by Flam in her final criticism of rational choice theory - that 
is, that the model cannot adequately address the explanation of 
voluntary collective behaviour or the voluntary creation of 
public goods. Here she considers Olson's theory which relies 
on the rational man model and makes a strong argument for why 
neither cooperation nor public goods should exist in the 
absence of selective incentives and/or coercion. Olson argues 
that the rational man model implies 'rational' free-riding when 
it is applied to collective action. Each rational actor is a 
potential free-rider who is concerned about not wasting his 
contribution so that he always calculates whether his 
individual contribution is likely to be futile. The reason why 
collective action does sometimes come about is that the 
association between calculus, sense of futility and free-riding 
can and is at times broken. For example, either the presence 
of selective incentives or a measure of coercion can persuade 
the individual on rational grounds that his cooperative efforts 
would not be futile and thus motivate him to contribute to 
collective action. In Olson's view, however, when this sort of 
'rational' calculation is not made at all, that is, when 
individuals are 'irrational' there is no reason to apply the 
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rational man model. It is not useful when ideological 
inspiration and altruism counter the sense of futility or when 
self-disciplined commitment and heightened emotional resources 
accomplish the same task. In other words, not only coercion 
and selective incentives can solve the free-rider problem and 
motivate participation on 'rational' grounds. Ideological 
inspiration, altruism, commitment and heightened emotional 
resources accomplish the same task. The implication, though, 
of Olson's account, as Flam argues, is that both normative and 
emotional resources belong to the residual category of 
'irrational' action. (11) 
Yet why see normative and emotional resources as 'irrational'? 
This is the problem of defining 'rational' in the limited sense 
as outlined in the rational actor model. If, instead we talk 
in terms of reasons for actions - based on the idea that 
reasons are the product of desires and beliefs - and taking 
into account that reasons are not only formed on the basis of 
internal desires (category (i)) but also take account of 
external factors which can include the appropriation of reasons 
from the social or cultural sphere (category (ii)), or, indeed, 
external constraining or facilitating factors (category (iii)), 
then we can have an actor taking rational decisions in terms of 
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the situations in which he or she is living. That is, making 
decisions in terms of 'opportunity costs' each will have to 
pay. 
Desires Alone Cannot Move an Agent 
This brings us back to one of the basic problems with the 
theory of rational choice - that desires alone move an agent to 
action. As Hollis argues, when one thinks about preferences 
which are very unlike tastes (for instance principles) or which 
change as a result of choices made, the presumption that 
desire, rather than belief, as the only motor of action is 
questionable. (12) The traditional idea of rational action 
suggests that there cannot be action unless motivated by desire 
and done in order to satisfy that desire. Such a theory of 
rational choice involves interpreting all sorts of actions as a 
contest between different desires. However, as Hollis 
maintains, most desires are premised on beliefs of many kinds 
and would change if the beliefs changed. Thus, we should not 
only speak of 'current preferences', we also need to know how 
an agent would respond to a change in this situation or in his 
beliefs about that situation. (13) This is something I have 
stressed before. It involves the idea, for example, that a 
starving man may have the desire to steal food, but if he 
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believes that this is wrong he may not steal that food. In 
short, we need an analysis of the effects of external factors 
on the formation of reasons in terms of either category (ii) or 
category (iii) reasons. 
Hollis is thus arguing, correctly, that agents are wrongly 
perceived as throughputs. There is, in fact, no obvious reason 
for regarding desire, rather than belief, as the determining 
component. A belief would not move an agent unless he had the 
desire, but a desire would not move an agent unless he had the 
belief. (14) Rational choice theory, therefore, as it stands 
needs to include some committal thesis about what moves 
rational agents to action. Old contentions about selfishness 
and self-interest cannot be replaced with a bland silence. Yet 
motivation is not self-evidently a matter of desire. It is 
thus time to challenge the approach shared by Hobbes and Hume. 
(15). In this way we come to Hollis' arguments against the 
idea of a purely 'internalist' approach to action explanations. 
Hollis argues that rational choice theory need not be committed 
to the presumption that only desire can move an agent. He 
wants to argue that it is possible to construe the proposition 
that action results from desire plus belief in such a way that 
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belief can be a motive to the will. Rational agents, in fact, 
act from objectively good reasons whose merits are conceptually 
independent of their current desires. (16) 
Internal versus External Reasons 
Neo-Humeans argue that reasons for actions must be internal to 
the desires of the agent whose reasons they are. Neo-Kantians 
argue that external reasons can be effective. This, for 
Hollis, is the basic difference between the two views of how we 
explain actions. The internalist way of answering the questicn 
'how are we to construe sentences of the form 'A' has a reason 
to 'q' is to say that 'A' has some motive which will be 
furthered by his 'q'ing. This, for Hollis, implies the thought 
that reason is and can only be the slave of the passions. 
Williams, in Moral Luck, 1981, wants to rework this 
individualistic account whilst still advocating the principle 
that men act in terms of their desires. Williams states that a 
"subjective motivational set" (as he re-names 'the passions') 
need not be static. A man can acquire new motivations through 
new information or further deliberation provided that he 
already has a motivation to deliberate from. Furthermore, 
motivation can be conceived as the same thing as 'desire'. A 
motivational set can contain such things as dispositions of 
(355) 
evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties 
and various projects embodying commitments of agents. Reasons 
for actions, therefore, must depend on an existing desire. (17) 
Let us then look at these claims in more detail. 
Hollis' account of the internalist view, that is that the 
reason 'A' performs an action is that he has a motive which 
will be furthered by that action, does not, it seems to me, 
imply that the motive in question has to be a desire. It may 
be that internalists claim that motives and desires are the 
same thing, but there is nothing in this particular statement 
that presupposes the idea that motives or reasons are only to 
be analysed in terms of desires; they may also include beliefs 
of one kind or another, albeit beliefs that are internal to the 
agent and not affected by outside factors. 
I would maintain that Williams' stress on the possibility of an 
individual acquiring new motivations indicates that an agent, 
in his view, is capable of 'learning' (and therefore not be 
restricted to his or her present desires), so long as the 
things learned stem from and batten on to present desires. For 
example, having tasted spaghetti bolognaise, then, on the basis 
of this taste, I may come to discover that other pasta dishes 
are just as desirable. But does this exclude the possibility 
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that 'learning' may involve factors other than the present 
'desires' of the agent? Is it not possible that as the result 
of a recommendation from a friend, having never tasted pasta 
before, we try and enjoy a pasta dish? Where in this case is 
our 'subjective motivational set'? Surely, the reasons we 
have for our action derive from an 'external source'. We 
should not assume, from the outset, therefore, that all new 
motivations come from 'internal desires', we must take into 
account the possibility that these may be the product of an 
external source. Yes, it may be the case that we 'learn' as a 
result of our 'internal' reasons, but this is not to exclude 
the possibility that 'external' factors may come to influence 
our decisions. 
It could be argued, also, that a change in desires could be 
explained, without using the notion of external reasons, via 
the idea of developmental biology. For example, children can 
be seen to have desires for the 'thrills and spills' of 
fairground rides, whereas many pensioners have a greater desire 
for stairlifts, and so on. In other words, our desires may 
alter not from factors that exist outside the agent but from 
factors which are 'innate' because they are a function of 
biological changes. I would argue, nevertheless, that this 
does not affect my basic argument as these biologically 
(357) 
anchored desires are limited in scope when we come to explain 
how desires may change. What I am saying is that while we do 
not need to assume an external element in changing desires and 
beliefs, this is not to negate the possibility that this may be 
the case. Why assume that just because we accept that there 
may be an 'internal' aspect to reason-formation, do we need to 
reject the idea that there may also be external influences as 
well? 
In other words, I am questioning Hollis' interpretation o: 
Williams to the extent that he is claiming that Williams is 
focussing entirely on the 'current desires' of the agent. If, 
though, as Hollis maintains, Williams is stressing that only 
desires can move an agent, then I would argue that Williams is 
restricting his analysis of how agents can acquire new desires 
or change these desires by not taking into account the effects 
of outside factors on the possibility that a change in our 
beliefs can result in a change in our desires. 
This, though, is somewhat different from the Kantian claim that 
beliefs can lead us to act against our current desires. As 
Hollis asks, 'then what about duty, that stern voice that can 
cut across our desires? '. For example, might not a man from a 
military family have a duty, and hence a reason, to become a 
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soldier, even though he has not the slightest wish or feelin; 
of prior commitment to deliberate from? If so, duty would be 
an external reason. But, he argues, internalists could say 
'how then could this external reason come to motivate him? ' 
The obvious link would be his coming to believe the truth of 
the external reason statement. But since he could come to 
believe it only by deliberating from an existing motivation, 
the link consists in the emergence of an internal reason. 
Thus, according to Hollis, Williams is arguing that 'external 
reason statements', when definitely isolated as such, are 
false, incoherent and really something else misleadingly 
expressed. (18) 
Whilst I would agree with the Kantian notion that man may 'sit 
in judgement' on his present desires and when reason demands 
decide to act against the balance of his 'internal reasons', I 
would also argue that the type of 'external reason' (the idea 
of duty) that Hollis is giving must be seen to contain an 
internal aspect in that the agent conceives of duty as an 
adequate reason for acting - he sees it as somehow 'correct' 
and this belief is internalised by the agent and forms part of 
his belief system. Indeed, Hollis argues that his retort to 
the claim made by the Humean that the Kantian cannot do without 
a 'psychological link' between reason and action is that in 
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recognising a reason as good, a rational man makes it his own. 
(19) This, I would suggest, is an internal reason in the 
sense that the agent has 'made it his own'. I am not arguing 
against the idea that beliefs can lead agents to act against 
their current desires and therefore that rational choice 
theorists are wrong to dismiss the effect of external factors 
on the reasons agents have for their actions. Rather I am 
suggesting that we should not dismiss the 'internal' aspect of 
reason-formation in arguing that the beliefs and desires of the 
agent can be influenced by 'external' reasons. Surely, the 
very fact of recognising that a reason is good and thus making 
that reason the agent's own, the reason becomes the agent's 
reason for acting and is 'internal' in a sense somewhat 
different from that advocated by Hume. The point that I am 
making here is that, in the first place, beliefs may come from 
outside, and yet be internalised; but that this does not mean, 
as Williams implies, that these are only those that gel with an 
'existing subjective motivational set'. We must not deny the 
agent 'the strong voice of reason' which allows the agent to 
'weigh up the costs' of acting in one way rather than another 
based on the situation in which he or she finds themselves 
based on a 'reasoning processes' which is far more than 'the 
slave of the passions'. This is important and an issue that 
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we will return to in the next chapter since it provides a new 
dimension to the well-worn debate that has existed between 
internalists and externalists. 
Summary 
What I am suggesting, therefore, is that we need to understand 
the idea of 'internal reasons' in more than one way. Reasons 
may be purely internal to the agent, but this does not 
necessarily imply that they are internal only to his current 
desires. Reasons may also be internal in the sense that they 
have been appropriated from external sources and then 
internalised. This conception of internal reasons, I would 
argue, is not considered, at all, by rational choice theorists 
who seem to advocate that reasons for action can only be 
perceived in terms of category 
(i) reasons. There is no 
consideration that such reasons may have an external source in 
the sense of category (ii) reasons, nor is there any conception 
that agents may act in terms of reasons which they have not 
internalised, but which serve to modify their desired action 
especially as a result of category 
(iii) constraints. 
The account given, therefore, by rational choice theorists is 
restricted in a double sense. Not only do they fail to 
consider that the idea of 'internal' reasons involves much more 
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than just the current desires of the agent and that internal 
reasons may be appropriated from outside and then internalised. 
They also ignore a very important aspect of reason formation in 
the effect of external reasons which are not the agent's own, 
but which can influence actions in a very real sense in terms 
of opportunity costs which agents may or may not pay. However, 
as I am now going to argue, I also feel that Hollis fails to 
appreciate the distinction between reasons that are 
internalised and purely internal reasons and also the type of 
external reasons subsumed under my category (iii) reasons. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HOLLIS AND RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 
Introduction 
Let us then examine whether the model advocated by Hollis can 
provide a more adequate account of action in terms of the 
acceptance of the effects on action of 
'external' reasons. As 
suggested previously, it is to be my contention that while many 
aspects of Hollis' account have advantages over the 
explanations of action provided by 'holists' and 
'individualists', it too contains some problems which, it seems 
to me, can be overcome if we examine reasons in terms of my 
three categories. 
There are, in fact, two fundamental limitations of the 
explanation of action given by Hollis. In the first place, his 
idea of external reasons is somewhat limited and really refers 
only to category 
(ii) reasons. In the second place, and 
related to this, Hollis, in his justifiable criticism that 
individualists should not restrict their analysis of reasons to 
desires alone, also misunderstands what is involved in internal 
reasons and thus fails to consider the importance of category 
(i) reasons. In this way, we can argue, as in the other cases 
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considered, that Hollis too provides a restricted account of 
action in that he only takes into account appropriated reasons 
of the category (ii) type. 
The aim of this chapter, however, is not merely to point to the 
problems of Hollis' theory. I also want to suggest that by not 
restricting our accounts of action to only one category of 
reason, but employing all three of my categories, we can make 
some inroads into trying to resolve the internalist/externalist 
debate. That is, by accepting that reasons may be internal, 
appropriated or external 
(indeed, often a combination of two or 
all of these categories) we can avoid the situation whereby we 
have to say either external reasons or internal reasons explain 
actions. Instead, we can allow for the possibility that both 
may be involved and argue that the real issue is in discovering 
just which category or categories do explain the action of a 
particular agent or agents. 
The Sub-Kantian Model 
The simplest version of Hollis' model is: 'A' has a reason to 
'q' if 'A's interests would be furthered by 'q'ing. He argues 
that by appealing to interests rather than desires this allows 
for the monitoring of desires which the internalist cannot. It 
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claims, therefore, that 'A' has interests which are 
conceptually independent of his desires. External reasons can 
move a rational man. (1) Whilst I agree, wholeheartedly, with 
the arguments that interests must be seen as independent of 
desires and that external reasons can move an agent to action, 
I cannot see how reference to 'interests' rather than 'motives' 
(as used in Hollis' account of the individualist approach) 
takes us any further on. Surely, 'interests' could as easily 
be interpreted as internal to the agent as are 'motives'. What 
exactly does he mean by interests? For what reason should we 
regard 'interests' as external, specifically as we shall see as 
related to roles, rather than internal to the agent? 
Hollis' example of the pension fund may provide the answer. In 
this he is arguing that a person may provide for his retirement 
by taking out a pension fund at twenty-five even though he 
could use the premium money for his more pressing needs. This, 
he argues, provides a puzzle for the sub-Humean about delayed 
gratification. It arises, he argues, because a rational agent 
will provide for some desires which he foresees but does not 
yet have, but a sub-Humean agent is only moved by present 
desires. (2) Whilst, again, I agree that agents are not always 
moved to action by their 
'present' desires, I would contend 
that this example of delayed gratification does not necessarily 
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provide an external reason apart from the agent's own beliefs 
and desires. It is more likely that this is an example of a 
category (ii) appropriated internal reason whereby the agent 
has internalised the belief, as advocated in the advertisemer.: 
that it is wise to provide for your future needs by joining a 
pension scheme. But, and this is important, it is still the 
agent's choice whether to do so and this is the 'internal' 
aspect of his reason-formation. It seems to me, therefore, 
both the sub-Humean account and the sub-Kantian account of 
internal and external reasons are somewhat limited. Reasons 
are perceived as either 'internal' in the sense that they are 
the result of the present desires of the agent or 'external' in 
the sense that they are premised on the beliefs of the agent 
which act against the present desires of the agent. I would 
maintain, though, that reasons can be seen as both internal to 
the agent whilst also being formed on the basis of external 
factors in that the agent has internalised his beliefs from 
outside and then made them his or her own. We do not, in other 
words, need to make such a stark distinction between 
'subjective' factors on the one hand and 'objective' factors on 
the other - both should be considered if we are to avoid the 
situation where either the agent acts only in terms of desires 
or in terms of factors which exist outside his or her and where 
no real element of 'choice' (which is the agent's own) is 
involved. 
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Whilst, then, I am convinced that Hollis does not perceive 
'external' reasons as reasons that simply constrain individuals 
to act in one way rather than another, I would contend that 
what he is arguing for are not 'external' reasons at all. They 
are in fact 'appropriated internal reasons'. I will now 
elaborate on this. 
The Importance of Beliefs 
Hollis maintains that if an actor is to be able to act 
rationally - or indeed at all - against the balance of his 
internal reasons (presumably he means here desires), he will 
have to be able to be moved by a belief. The obstacle to this, 
for Williams, is that belief alone cannot move to action, nor 
can a belief be rational unless acquired by deliberation which 
works from a previous motivation. Williams, argues Hollis, 
means us to assent to his argument, having found it rationally 
persuasive. His message is that his case supplies good reason 
for any and every rational man to assent, whatever his previous 
motivational set. But, if the case supplies good reason for 
everyone, then either everyone already has suitable internal 
motivations or the good reason is external. Yet, he argues, 
since the desire in question would be a desire to assent to the 
conclusion of a sound argument with true premises, it is simply 
(368) 
a special case of the 'desire' to do the rational thing which 
Humeans distrust. Besides, Hollis argues that he doubts if 
everyone has the internal motivation required. There are 
plenty of bigots who have invested too much in their prejudices 
to be willingly moved by rational arguments. Since Williams 
thinks that they have no less reason to grant his case than do 
open-minded persons, he sounds like the pedlar of an external 
reason. (3) Let us pause here for a moment. If Hollis is 
correct and Williams is arguing that everyone would accept a 
rational argument despite their own beliefs or prejudices, then 
Hollis is correct to argue that there is no real 'internal' 
aspect to reason-formation in Williams view. But is Hollis not 
admitting, when he states that prejudice (or any other belief) 
can lead an agent to reject a rational argument, that beliefs 
are not only 'external' to the agent - rather, that they may be 
internalised by the agent? 
Perhaps, Hollis argues, the sub-Humean should acknowledge a 
possible desire to do the rational thing. There could be room 
for one in a motivational set which already can contain such 
things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional 
reactions, personal loyalties and various projects embodying 
commitments of the agent. But, we must ask how such things get 
into a motivational set. Williams speaks as if they were 
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either innate or caught like measles. That is all very well, 
if we are content to think of agents as the intelligent 
instruments of their own passions. But it will not do once the 
agent has been ascribed a self-direction which distances him 
from his passions. The natural model of action is, then, 
according to Hollis rational deliberation where agents arrive 
at beliefs neither by whim nor by inner impulse nor through 
socialisation but by recognising the merit of good reasons. 
Rational assent occurs because the rational person, in 
recognising a good reason, makes the reason his own. (4) 
Hollis' Restricted Account of External Reasons 
There are a number of issues here. In the first place, I would 
argue that the reasons an agent has for his actions can be 
'purely internal' to the agent (in that they are not 
appropriated from outside factors). These are my category (i) 
reasons. Whilst I would agree that in many cases reasons are 
appropriated from outside, I would not, as Hollis seems to do, 
discount these internal reasons as a source of action. In the 
second place, Hollis is restricting his model of action to 
appropriated reasons rather than allowing that reasons not only 
may be internal, but  ay be external (category (iii)) reasons 
whereby the agent may act in terms of a constraining reason not 
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because he considers these reasons as 'good' in the sense that 
he sees them as somehow 'correct' but because he or she fears 
sanctions, or is not willing to pay the price, if they act 
against these reasons. It seems to me that Hollis, when he 
states that an agent in recognising that there is a good reason 
for him to 'q' the rational man acquires a good reason to 'q', 
is not asking anything about the source of 'good reasons', he 
is assuming that if the agent acts in terms of a reason then 
that reason has been internalised. But this may not be the 
case. In short, I would maintain that Hollis is restricting 
the idea of good reasons to category 
(ii) reasons and is thus 
failing to account for what I perceive to be the possible 
effects of real 'external' reasons which are not necessarily 
internalised by the agent, but which certainly can modify his 
or her actions if the agent chooses to avoid the sanctions that 
may be incurred if these reasons are ignored, or, indeed, to 
collect the bonuses even if these go against any particular 
current desire. 
Perhaps, though, I am being rather unfair to Hollis. Indeed, 
he states that the rational reconstruction of action often 
fails to explain why actors act when they do. Hence the timing 
of action seems to depend on the state of motivation rather 
than on the recognition of good reasons. But, he argues, the 
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rational man is always busy, and his good reason to 'q' becomes 
sufficient to move him only if he has no better reason not to 
'q'. Thus the removal of a reason against can trigger a reason 
for. (5) Could we not then perceive these reasons as external 
constraining or facilitating factors rather than internalised 
appropriated reasons? Do not these reasons need to be included 
in Hollis' model of action? 
On first reading it appeared that Hollis was considering such 
external reasons when he argued that if we were confined to a 
language of internal reasons, we would have to describe people 
who succeeded in enacting their reflectively consistent 
preferences as free agents. Happy slaves, well adjusted to an 
enduring system of slavery, could not be suffering from false 
consciousness. They get what they want and they want what they 
get. Yet that ignores a major dimension of power, the 
manipulation of wants. I do not wish to imply, he argues, that 
wants thus instilled are necessarily 
'false' or that such power 
has to be malign, but I do insist that enduring contentment is 
not a sufficient test of liberty and hence that there is a 
further question about reasons for wants, requiring a language 
of external reasons. 
(6) Hollis, therefore, is giving some 
consideration here to the idea of 'power' which is external to 
the agent, but again this is restricted to 'the manipulation of 
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wants' which implies the idea of internalised ideology rather 
than external constraints - that is, that the 'wants' are 
internalised by the agent and form part of his reasons for 
acting. 
Hollis does, though, go on to talk in terms of social facts 
which he defines as features of social life which have meaning 
for the actors and are external to each of them. (7) There is, 
he argues, an idea of structures that make them systematic and 
external whilst also making it plain that structures can enable 
as well as constrain. However, he then goes on to say that he 
will discuss structures as systems of rules which are similar 
to rules of a game. Thus he proposes to use a Wittgensteinian 
notion of rules which is, he maintains, a nice way of capturing 
the sense in which social facts are external to each actor 
without being external to all. 
(8) As I am going to argue, 
though, there is nothing in the idea of social facts or 
'emergent properties' that necessitates reference only to rules 
especially rules of a game. 
The Notion of Rules 
Hollis refers to two types of rules in his analysis. 
Regulative rules, he argues, are typically those which let the 
players of a game play it better or more effectively. They are 
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practical in character, arrived at by experience. They govern 
means rather than ends. The test is whether they direct people 
to one way of arriving at an outcome for an activity rather 
than another, as opposed to determining whether the activity is 
being engaged in at all. For instance, the rules of the road 
in Britain direct motorists to drive on the left. They carry 
no implication that cars cannot be driven on the right or that 
persons who drive on the right are not motorists. Motorists 
who disobey this rule may end up in court, but they do not 
cease to be motorists. Constitutive rules are best typified by 
those rules of a game which declare what the purpose of the 
game is and what counts as playing it. For example, the rules 
of chess specify the legal moves of the pieces and the 
conditions for check-mate. Many activities, Hollis argues, can 
be identified only by way of citing the rules by those engaged 
in them because the actors take part in a capacity conferred by 
the rules and their actions have no purpose which can be 
specified outside these rules (the Winchian idea of rules 
endowed with all the problems of this idea previously 
outlined). Hollis, though, does say that we cannot explain 
social life by arguing that all action instances an institution 
and all institutions are ultimately self-contained. However, 
he argues, that one need not be committed to explaining all 
actions through their internal relations to institutions before 
(374) 
agreeing that constitutive rules are important. Nor need one 
suppose that they are always distinct from regulative rules. 
It is enough to say that people often act in an institutional 
capacity which defines their options. Forms of life are 
crucial for identifying many social actions, whatever one goes 
on to say about explaining them. (9) 
Let us look at these ideas more closely. It seems to me that 
whether we are talking in terms of regulative or constitutive 
rules, the agents appear to be directed in their actions by the 
presence of these rules without there being any 
'choice' made 
by the agent as to whether or not they abide by the rules in 
question. I have already stated my criticisms of Winchian type 
constitutive rules, but I do not think that Hollis' reference 
to regulative rules allows the agents much more freedom in 
deciding how they should act. Whilst I agree that some actions 
may be modified by the presence of rules - the motorist who 
disobeys the rules of the road may expect punishment so he 
chooses to obey these rules to avoid punishment - but this does 
not mean that all motorists are going to obey the rules just 
because they are there. It is up to the agent to weigh up the 
costs of disobeying rules and decide his or her action in terms 
of these costs. Moreover, I cannot accept that all action 
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takes place in terms of specific rules. I will repeat, 'what 
are the rules of taking a walk, reading a book, watching the 
television, and so on? '. What, more importantly since we are 
talking about institutions, were the rules for, as examples, 
founding and developing an educational system, developing 
Trades Unions, etc., which could not be rule-governed (when 
talking in terms of regulative and especially constitutive 
rules) since as emergent entities, rules applicable to them 
would only be actually involved after they had been formed. 
That is, both these examples are not rule-governed in their 
primary objectives. Obviously some rules like legal and 
financial ones are involved, but this is secondary to their 
objectives. 
Another problem with the idea of rules is that it is hard to 
account for social change. Hollis, indeed, admits to this 
problem. He argues, that if we think of context as a game (or 
set of games) in which the actors are players, we get a fresh 
idea of what options are feasible. The actors are now choosing 
from among the moves open to a player of the game in progress. 
The constitutive rules of the game enter into the description 
of the possible moves. The regulative rules govern what is 
acceptable as a way of playing and hence what each player can 
expect of others. The rules together account for the player's 
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knowledge of how to go on (note how Winchian this sounds). 
This yields an inbuilt explanation of historical continuity. 
For example, developing societies cannot make instant leaps 
forward while commercially rational actions are not proper 
moves in traditional games of honour. The rules of the 
traditional games have to change first. Rules need not, argues 
Hollis, be thought of as self-contained (although it is hard to 
see how 'rules' cannot be so -they either are rules or are not 
rules). It may partly explain continuity, he argues, to point 
out that people accept the new only when they have made sense 
of it in terms of the old. But it is also a fair point that 
continuity suits those with power. Since power depends as much 
on acceptance as on a big stick, it is often redistributed by 
changes in the game. What is crucial is that this all makes 
change a puzzle for a theory which defines context in terms of 
the prevailing rules. (10) 
Hollis tries to overcome this problem by the notion of 
unintended consequences. Changes in technology, for example, 
he argues, can have unintended effects on rules. Changes in 
rules can bring about further changes in rules. There is no 
reason why the system, once disturbed, should tend to its 
previous equilibrium, if the changes are large enough to make 
the previous game futile or, indeed, unplayable. (11) But, I 
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would ask, where are the actors in this scenario? Who brings 
about the changes and why - for what reasons - not those 
embodied in rules without this concept becoming vacuous. 
Hollis argues that the feed-back is controlled by the actors 
themselves. They give direction. But how can they if they are 
simply abiding by rules? Hollis maintains that the sense of 
game he is referring to is not that of game-theory. In this no 
serious attempt is made to capture the expressive aspects of 
social life or the internal meaning and value attaching to many 
practices. Nor is there much scope 
for the actor's critical 
monitoring of their performances especially 
from a moral point- 
of-view. For these dimensions to emerge we need a conception 
of role-playing. (12) 
Whilst I agree that game-theory thus far described does seem to 
exclude the internal reasons for acting of the agents 
themselves, I am doubtful that Hollis' version of the idea of 
the rules of a game can rectify this situation. It seems to me 
that any notion of pre-scripted rules as the foundation of 
action-explanations will result 
in the agent appearing as a 
'puppet' unable to make choices concerning his or her action. 
Why, though, does Hollis use the idea of rules in the first 
place? The answer to this seems to 
lie in his conception of 
agents as following the norms contained 
in the roles they 
(378) 
undertake as social actors. It is the case, as we shall see, 
that Hollis' conception of role-playing, especially his idea of 
'personification' tries to get away from the 'puppet' 
mindlessly reading the small print of the rules. But, although 
Hollis is able to let the actor back into the picture in his 
notion of roles, I am going to suggest that by confining all 
interests to roles (and their accompanying rule-set), there are 
no other interests which can provide any leverage to action by 
supplying reasons for it. Particularly, Hollis cannot explain 
why it is rational for agents to adopt a role and how a role 
array comes about and changes. Let us then examine what is 
entailed in the notion of role-playing and the problems 
associated with it. 
Role-Playing 
Hollis argues that it makes good sense to speak of a system of 
rules as external to each actor and yet internal to them all. 
(But is this implying that all rules are accepted and 
internalised by all actors -a point to which I shall return/) 
Y 
Rules, he argues, evolve in a way influenced by the actors' 
shared experiences and thus we get a promising idea of 
historical location (ways of life? ). The actors become flesh 
and blood followers of rules with a knowledge of how to go on. 
(379) 
Even so, it remains unclear how the actors relate to the rules. 
Since the image is no longer one of causal forces there is not, 
according to Hollis, a danger of turning agents into puppets (I 
would dispute this in the sense previously outlined although 
Hollis' conception of roles is more promising). Instead, the 
suggestion is that they are players of roles governed by 
normative expectations. 
(Note here that I have stressed the 
word 'governed'. Does not this imply a form of determinism? ) 
Hollis admits that an actor who is not the creature of hidden 
forces may yet be the creature of rules. That, he argues, 
would be too high a price to pay 
for expectations which make 
social life determinate. 
(13) How then does he want to avoid 
'paying this price'. 
It is here that Hollis introduces the Bureaucratic Politics 
model of decision making. It matters very much, he argues, 
whether the units of a Bureaucratic Politics model are 
bureaucracies (agencies) or bureaucrats (agents). The starkest 
contrast to a rational-actor model would make them 
bureaucracies with the human agents cast as mere puppets or 
mouthpieces of the agencies. This 
he rejects. As soon as we 
ask how the dynamics work, Hollis claims, we find that we need 
human agents to work through. Let us then regard bureaucratic 
agents as rule-followers subject to sets of rules which 
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differentiate between bureaucracies (ways of life again? ). In 
other words, let us resume the idea that systems are construed 
in terms of rules rather than in terms of functions. Think of 
each policy maker at the crucial moment of a collective 
decision-making as having an institutionalised position which 
accounts for his presence. Think of each position as laying 
normative expectations on whoever occupies it, thus giving him 
rules to follow, tasks to perform and demands to fulfil. Think 
of each actor as obedient to the demands of his position. In 
brief, think of the actors as role-players and of role as the 
normative expectations attaching to official positions. (14) 
Let us pause for a moment. Are we to assume from this that we 
should see all human actions as similar in type to the actions 
of bureaucrats in an institutionalised system? This, it seems 
to me, is a rather worrying conclusion to draw. Do we really 
go on in our everyday lives undertaking tasks that have been 
assigned to us and conforming to the rules that define these 
tasks? Moreover, is it really the case, even in bureaucracies, 
that people always obey the rules? I will examine this latter 
point first. 
Hollis, indeed, argues that if rules are supposed to be 
complete lists of duties, then it is simply false that they are 
performed in full and simply feeble to say that they usually 
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are. But, he maintains, the model becomes plausible as soon as 
it is granted that roles are not fully scripted in advance of 
every situation. There are some definitive do's and don'ts but 
agents are also able to use their judgement. (15) Roles, for 
Hollis, are treated as sets of normative expectations attached 
to social positions. Normative expectations, he argues, need 
not be explicit, still less created by law, and they imply 
nothing about ethics, but they sanction social rules, prove 
their existence and are a source of reasons for action. Hollis 
admits that 'normative expectations' sound forbiddingly 
external and he wishes to avoid the idea of making roles into a 
system over and against individuals. (16) To do this he allows 
the agent judgement in the performance of their roles. This 
is a very promising picture of the agent as a role-player who 
has some say in how he or she plays a role whilst also being 
constrained to some extent by the situation in which they find 
themselves. Let us then expand on what, in Hollis' view, is 
actually involved in the idea of role-playing. 
Hollis maintains that a dramaturgical analogy can shed light on 
what is involved in playing a role. By one account of the 
theatre, he argues, a stage is a place where individuals step 
out of their private lives and into character parts. They 
pretend to be the 'dramatis personae' for the performance and 
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act as the play requires. The text is already scripted; the 
players don masks for the duration of the play and when the 
curtain falls return to their off-stage lives. This, Hollis 
suggests, at first sight, is a reassuring account to apply to 
social life if one is recommending individualism. It 
distinguishes sharply between public and private being and 
postulates a self behind the mask. There exists role-distance 
and leaves it open to any actor who is morally offended by the 
action of the play to 'throw off the mask' and go home. Taken 
literally, though, the text has nothing to do with individual 
choices. While the individual is totally distinct from the 
role he is totally unimportant. The script is everything. 
Then, asks Hollis, how about making the analogy one with an 
incompletely scripted play and where the actors supply the 
endings themselves -a compromise between a character provided 
as far as the script goes and an individual fleshing out the 
rest of it for whatever private purposes of his own. But, for 
Hollis, this makes no sense at all. In so far as the private 
purposes obtrude, they spoil the play and, in so far as they 
remain concealed they do not matter. If norms and choices are 
related as public discipline to private motive, then the 
discipline is what counts. Thus when the model is applied to 
the individual in the play of his own life he is again 
abolished. (17) 
(383) 
Hollis, argues, though that the analogy need not be taken this 
way. Before considering this, though, I would suggest that 
perhaps such an analogy in itself is not really appropriate to 
an analysis of human action. Such an analogy already 
presupposes that actors adopt 
'roles' and act in accordance 
with 'rules' that are set out in scripts. But is this really 
true of agents in their everyday lives, dealing with new 
situations and making decisions in terms of the circumstances 
in which they find themselves? 
As will be argued subsequently, these circumstances  ay not be 
associated with roles but with structural and material 
conditions - for example, the situation of the 
'underprivileged'. These agents are not in a 'role' but their 
situation as such presents them with 
'interests' on the basis 
of which they make decisions. Nevertheless, Hollis' account of 
roles does try to bring back to the notion of role-playing the 
acting agent who is not playing a prescripted part in a play 
(even though his idea that all interests are role-related 
raises problems as indicated above). Hollis argues that in his 
account of the theatre, actors are thought of not as 
impersonating characters but personifying them. One actor's 
portrayal of Hamlet uses the same 
lines as another's but is 
different. Great actors become the masks which they have 
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donned. Their performances are open-ended despite the complete 
script. Role-distance, he argues, conjures up images of 
alienation, disenchantment and frustration. But in this 
account we can think of it as detached judgement within the 
play. Detachment can be not the cool use of the stage for some 
private purpose but the monitoring of one's own endeavours to 
bring the character to life. (18) This, for Hollis, puts the 
actor on the stage and gives him work to do. 
The question pointed up by drama, according to Hollis, is 
whether roles create agents or agents create roles. For 
Autonomous Man, the notion of roles offers an 'explanans'. 
Agents create their roles or at least influence them. Such a 
claim, however, should be worded cagily if we are to avoid 
ghostly individualism. Hollis claims that he makes no 
individualist assumptions about the identity of the agents who 
are to create their roles. Provided a man can make his roles 
essential to being who he is and do so without losing his 
autonomy, we may yet have the best of an old argument. At any 
rate, he argues, Autonomous Man has a clear interest in the 
notion of role which is both a source of reason for action and 
a vehicle giving him control of his own social life. 
Autonomous Man must keep space for the self. An action 'A', 
argues Hollis, can be seen to have a normative explanation in 
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so far as: (i) the agent occupied a position with a role 'R' 
requiring 'A'; (ii) the agent knew that 'R' required 'A'; (iii) 
the agent did 'A' because of (i) and (ii). But, the third 
clause is obscure and is doing too much work. We can read it 
as asserting that (i) and 
(ii) caused him to do 'A' in that he 
was so well socialised that he always acted on a normative 
syllogism with true premises. Alternatively, we can treat (i) 
and (ii) as reasons for doing 'A' which apply to this 
particular agent and (iii) as asserting that these reasons were 
his reasons. A single role array, argues Hollis, rarely 
requires a unique course of action, and, even when it does, 
there is often more than one way of discharging the duty. We 
can thus re-write the normative scheme as follows: (i) the 
agent occupied positions with roles 'R1'...... 'Rj', requiring 
'A'; (ii) the agent knew that 'R1'...... 'Rj' required 'A'; 
(iii) conditions (i) and (ii) were the agent's reasons for 
doing 'A'. (19) 
Here then we have a model of the actor which avoids the dual 
problems of oversocialisation and over-individuation. As 
Archer states such an account eschews two notions, that of an 
actor undertaking a prescripted part (too much of society; too 
little of self), or one who merely dons and doffs masks behind 
which his private business can be conducted (too much self; too 
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little of the social). In Hollis' concept, the social actor 
becomes such by choosing to identify him or herself with a 
particular role and actively to personify it in a 
particularistic way. The actor's real interests come with the 
role she or he has chosen to personify. 
(20) In other words, 
as agents we are able to choose the roles we take in our 
everyday life, but within the roles there are certain do's and 
don'ts which come along with these roles - which define these 
roles as the roles they are. However, within the constraints 
of these the actor has a certain amount of lee-way in how he or 
she personifies that role 
(as the actor has in personifying 
Hamlet). For example, a university lecturer chooses to adopt 
the role of a lecturer for his or her own reasons (perhaps they 
have had contact with other lecturers and like the sound of 
what they have been told about that particular career -a point 
I will return to). But, within this role they have to abide by 
certain norms attached to that role - if they are to avoid 
sanctions - as laid down in their contract (for example, 
turning up regularly to give lectures unless they have a 
legitimate excuse, marking essays promptly, and so on). This, 
though, does not exhaust their role as a lecturer. They have 
the freedom to interpret what they perceive the role to be 
within the aforementioned constraints. - They may decide that 
they will teach on a very formal basis or in the informal 
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setting of a seminar. They may decide to restrict their 
interest in their students to purely academic matters or they 
may take a personal interest in all their students' activities. 
Thus, to this extent the agent has a certain amount of choice 
within the role he or she has chosen to adopt. 
It must be noted, however, and it seems that Hollis does not 
really raise this point, that roles will vary as to the degree 
of 'elasticity' within them. The university lecturer has far 
more scope in how he or she interprets his or her role than, 
say, the policeman who has to abide by more restrictive rules 
in order to carry out his or her job effectively. The 
fundamental problem, though, with Hollis' account of role- 
playing is his failure to account for why agents choose a role 
in the first place. Indeed, Hollis himself argues that the 
actor 'qua atomic social individual' has no reason to adopt one 
identity rather than another. He cannot have a reason because 
he has no prior interests upon which reasons can work because 
in Hollis interests are embedded in roles. For Hollis, real 
interests are acquired within a social contract. The initial 
choice of position is non-rational in prospect. A man can have 
good reason to be glad today that he got married yesterday 
without thereby having to have had a good reason yesterday to 
be glad at his impending change of state. (21) As a 
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consequence of this position, as Archer argues, the initial 
choice of a position is 'contractarian' -a contract which it 
is non-rational to enter into but which can be rational in 
retrospect or rationally corrected. In this way, the 
explanation of why actors choose the roles they play either 
cannot be given or is reduced to depth psychology. (22) 
This is certainly a situation I would wish to avoid. What we 
must remember, in the first place, is that agents are born into 
social situations which are not of their own making and which 
serve to influence 
(but not determine) the range of roles 
available to them. For example, someone who has never had the 
opportunity to go on to higher education, for whatever reason, 
is unlikely to be able to 'choose' the role of university 
lecturer. I am not arguing that these category (iii) 
constraints or enablements determine the options open to agents 
but they are influential to the extent that they decide how 
high the opportunity costs of attaining a particular role are. 
It is this idea of differential costs which can be seen to 
provide 'good reasons' for why agents adopt certain roles and 
not others. We have then a rational actor with rational 
interests in accepting a social role. We can locate 'reasons' 
for why actors choose the roles they do in terms of the 
existence of category (iii) factors. Moreover, as I argued 
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previously, ve can identify interests in adopting a role in 
terms of category (ii) appropriated reasons whereby, for 
example, we can explain why one agent chose to be a policeman 
and another to be a fireman in terms of the fact, perhaps, that 
the first agent had been in contact with a policeman and liked 
what he heard about that career whereas the second agent had 
not, but had been in contact with a fireman and liked what he 
had heard about that career. 
The problem with Hollis' account of role-playing is that he 
locates all interests within roles. He does not allow that 
some interests pertain to social actors outside the roles they 
adopt. It is also the case that the account of role-playing 
given by Hollis means, as Archer claims, that actors are 
condemned to a 'normative conventionalism' which severely 
limits their innovations as 'artificers'. Thus she suggests 
that we need to link the pre-grouping aspect of social agency 
to its promotive re-grouping aspect since it is the latter 
which gives us purchase on how new positions or roles are 
constructed out of something other than role-clash and how the 
action involved is not restricted by rule-governed normative 
conventions. What we need to do is to to stress that as social 
agents, groups and collectivities of people confront problems 
which are interest-related but not role-related 
(we can share 
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an interest in a clean environment without this entailing the 
adoption of a role: we do not need to be a member of the Green 
Party to want to live in a town where there is no pollution); 
and also to appreciate that as social agents they engage in 
promotive activities, when tackling these problems, which are 
too innovative to be construed as 'games' since they follow no 
regulative rules and embody no constitutive rules. For example, 
Archer argues that the 'underprivileged' confront plenty of 
daily exigencies, given their poor life chances, and thus have 
the best of reasons for struggling towards collective 
organisation (unionisation, franchise and civil rights 
movements, and so on), just as the 
'privileged' find good 
reasons in protecting their vested interests to try to contain 
or repress the former. In the struggle between them (and the 
privileged and non-privileged are not playing the 'Us and Them' 
game), the extant role array undergoes considerable 
transformation. New positions get defined under the prompting 
of promotive interest groups, though they will bear the marks 
of compromise and concession in the course of interaction 
against opposition. Equally, the defence of vested interests 
may prompt role changes precisely in order to defend interests 
themselves (Kings will accept any form of constitutionalism in 
order to remain King - but it is a very different position 
embedded in a much modified role array). (23) 
(391) 
What Archer is saying, therefore, is that the re-grouping of 
social agents provides the mechanism which generates new role- 
rule sets as some of its unintended consequences, 'thus 
providing an account of their development in terms of non-rule 
governed action'. This is not open to social actors if they 
are perceived as incumbents of roles hedged by normative 
conventions. In this way, we can, on the one hand, remove the 
illusion of contractual freedom to become any social self we 
choose to personify (because of the presence of wider 
interests), but we also gain (thanks to the re-grouping of 
agents) a collective capacity to refashion social positions 
which allows us to make society as well as ourselves. (24) 
The crux of the argument I am making here is as follows. The 
idea of actors as role-players who have shared interests within 
that role, and the idea that these shared interests serve to 
influence how they act once they have taken on a role has much 
explanatory power. After all, I claimed that the actor who 
adopted the role of 'good neighbour' was influenced in his 
action not to play loud music for the reason that it was in the 
interests of all concerned not to cause a disturbance after a 
certain time of night and this was accepted by that agent. I 
also accept, indeed endorse, the notion that within roles 
agents are able, within the constraints of accepted do's and 
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don'ts, to use individual judgement in how they interpret these 
roles. Where I think Hollis is mistaken is to restrict the 
idea of 'interests' to those within roles. In doing this he 
cannot explain why - for what reasons - agents choose roles in 
the first place. If they have no interests other than those 
within the role then they cannot have reasons for adopting one 
role rather than another. Moreover, if we reject the idea of 
'wider interests' other than those within roles we are left 
with a very static picture of social life. Roles could not 
change as a result of the unintended consequences of the 
pursuit of these other interests which, it seems to me, is an 
unacceptable conclusion to draw. 
Having considered the positive and negative aspects of Hollis' 
idea of role-playing, I would also suggest that there are 
problems involved in his conception of what is involved in 
'reasons for action'. This stems from his distinction between 
'legitimating' and 'real' reasons. 
The Problem of Legitimating Reasons 
Hollis claims that in discovering the reasons why an agent acts 
as he does there is no guarantee that the reasons given are the 
agent's underlying reasons. The reasons, he argues, which make 
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the utterance appropriate in its context are legitimating 
reasons. He argues that one might fancy that legitimating 
reasons are unimportant to explanation unless they coincide 
with the actor's motives in putting them forward (surely the 
actor has to have a motive in putting them forward). As 
Skinner argues, though, the legitimating language enables and 
constrains the power of the actors to effect their motives. 
For example, if your motives in playing chess are to humiliate 
me, you will get nowhere unless you play better moves than I by 
the public legitimating test of what makes a good move. Once 
the terms of the game are set, the players may not challenge 
them nor the public values enshrined in them. Hollis argues 
that everyday actors in everyday lives commonly conduct second 
discourses distinguishable from their official ones. The 
official one continues to matter because it enables and 
constrains the others. The others matter because they account 
for how the actors pick their way through the indeterminate 
permission of the official discourse. We, thus, need to 
understand both the legitimating and the real reasons. (25) 
Hollis sets out this idea in the following table: - 
Action's Meaning Actor's Meaning 
What? conventions intentions 
Why? legitimating reasons real reasons 
(394) 
Hollis states that the epistemological problems of knowing that 
an interpretation is correct on all four counts are formidable 
since answers to the two 'What? ' questions often need 
justifying by reference to the two 'Why? ' questions. With the 
action's meaning in partial variation with the actor's meaning 
we shall have to strengthen the rationality assumption required 
for 'desire plus belief equals action'. (26) Hollis argues 
that we have here a hermeneutic circle which comes into view 
when we note that the context of action is a conjecture, which 
we erect with explanatory intent. We need conventions to 
identify the intentions and vice versa (does he mean here that 
we need to identify the external factors that can influence 
'subjective' reasons and we need to understand the agent's 
reasons in being influenced by these external factors? ). We 
need both to get at the reasons and vice versa. Actions, 
argues Hollis, have meanings taken from a stock created by 
actors who use it. However, he states, the circle is not fatal 
in practice because one can work piece-meal by alternating 
between context and actor using conjectures about one to test 
hypotheses about the other. But this is possible only by 
relying on strong rationality assumptions to the effect that 
actors are moved by good reasons for their desires, their 
beliefs and hence their actions. (27) 
(395) 
Again, then, we come to what Hollis means by 'good' reasons. 
Why, he asks, assume that all agents are rational when we know 
that they are not? There is some case for a flat denial of 
this difficulty. This might be done by playing up the 
subjective element until all agents always do what seems to 
them to be best at the time and there is nothing more to be 
said. (28) Indeed, I can see no reason for Hollis to object to 
this idea. I would maintain that the reason the agent has for 
his action, at the time, is a good reason even though it may be 
premised on false or inadequate information. This is not to 
say that the agent is incapable, at a later date and in the 
light of new information, of realising that his reason was not 
a good one, but, at the time in question, it was a good reason 
for the agent in question. However, Hollis maintains, that 
rationality involves more than subjective consistency 
(presumably because he tends to underplay the role of 
'subjectivity' in his analysis of action). Another suggestion, 
he maintains, seems to be to play up the degree to which all 
action conforms to rules (or what the agent takes the rules to 
be) and is always rational in this sense. But, Hollis argues 
that he hopes to have given ample reason for refusing to let 
the rules absorb the agent (although I would dispute whether he 
has done this, and if he has why talk in terms of rules at 
all). There is then a genuine puzzle here. Action cannot be 
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non-rational since we cannot ascribe intention to behaviour 
without reproducing at least some reason on the actor's part (I 
would agree with this). Action cannot be very irrational 
because we need warrant for believing that the reasons we 
ascribe were the agent's own or at least likelier to have been 
his own than other possible reasons. But actions need not 
always be completely rational. The more rational the action is 
the easier it is to understand and explain so it pays to give 
the actors the benefit of the doubt. (29) 
Reasons Rather Than Rules 
Whilst I would agree that we should treat the actions of agents 
as rational in the sense that they are acting for reasons which 
appear to them to be good reasons at the time of the action, I 
would maintain that this does not mean that we cannot take as 
rational the agent's own reason for the action even if it is 
premised on false or incomplete information. What we need to 
understand is the reason the agent had for his or her action 
and the situations which helped form this reason. If we begin 
our explanation in terms of the actor's reasons we can overcome 
Hollis' problem, as he states it, of where we cannot understand 
social action. Hollis maintains that there is still work to be 
done at the causal level for the parts of social life which 
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understanding cannot reach. The first case of this kind, for 
Hollis, is when an actor's own reasons derive from irrational 
beliefs and desires. This gives us a causal question about the 
source of these beliefs and desires. Irrational, here, does 
not mean 'false'. One can hold a false belief for a good 
reason and a true belief for a bad reason. 
(30) It is not 
clear here what Hollis means by an 
'irrational' belief or 
desire. Presumably he means something like the neurotic 
handwasher. If he does, then I cannot see that the actions o: 
the handwasher are beyond understanding. The beliefs he holds 
may not appear rational to us, but this does not mean that we 
cannot explain or understand his actions in terms of 'reasons' 
since the reason the agent has for washing his hands are that 
they appear dirty to him and this accounts for his action. 
Hollis also argues that more goes on in social life than the 
actors singly or plurally realise. This then is another area 
where understanding is difficult. I have already stressed, 
however, that although actors may not fully understand all of 
the factors that make up their reasons, they do have some 
awareness of the reasons for their own actions. I would agree, 
though, that explanations of social action should not end with 
the actor's reasons - further questions need to be answered. 
Thus, as Hollis argues, even when an action is done for a good 
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reason which the actor recognised and we therefore know why it 
was done, there are questions to be asked. For instance, much 
of the history of technology is a success story of rational 
solutions to engineering problems. But that does not prevent 
interesting questions about the conditions for technological 
advances. 'Verstehen' then opens the enquiry because that is 
how we set the questions, but it does not provide all the 
answers to all of them. 
(31) 
Summary 
To sum up Hollis' account. He maintains that the opening step 
of explanation is to identify the act by the agent's intentions 
in its context or conventions. Perception under an action- 
description may suffice if the enquirer already knows the 
conventions, but shades in to more nuanced interpretation if 
intention or context is opaque. The next step is to recover 
the agent's reasons and judge his judgements to see what is 
thereby accounted for and what needs further explanation. The 
enquirer, Hollis argues, must pass judgement since the merit of 
the actor's reasons affects the residue for further 
explanation. A rational role-player allocates resources 
efficiently but by a test of efficiency which relates to the 
norms governing his role. His role leaves him latitude to 
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judge what is appropriate. He could not carry it out at all 
were he unable to take settled custom for granted. Suc: - 
customs include his own proven habits and other people's stable 
practices. (32) Whilst I would agree with Hollis that we must 
take account of the agent's reasons for his or her actions, 
would argue that the discovery of these reasons should be the 
first step in the explanation. It is only after discoverin; 
these reasons that we should look at the context in which these 
reasons are formed to arrive at a fuller picture of why the 
agent had these reasons. Moreover, why should we have to pass 
judgement on these reasons? If the agent is acting for a 
reason which he or she feels is a good reason at the time of 
the action then this is the explanation of that action whether 
or not we believe that action was or was not based on rational 
criteria. 
One fundamental problem, it seems to me, with Hollis' view of 
rational action is the fact that in talking in terms of norms 
he takes the retrograde step of referring to rules. This then 
raises all the problems that we encountered with Winch and 
seems to leave the agent as a 'puppet' who acts entirely in 
terms of socially constructed and sanctioned rules. 
(400) 
The account of role-playing, however, given by Hollis has muci 
explanatory power and he is able to bring the actor back into 
the picture by arguing that agents are free to subjectively 
interpret what their roles are within the constraints of 
specific do's and don'ts that are entailed in that role. Where 
Hollis is mistaken, it seems to me, is in arguing that 
'interests' are only found within roles. This gives us no 
explanation of why agents choose to adopt the roles that they 
do in the first place and it also results in a rather static 
conception of roles whereby no account could be given of why 
they can and do change as a consequence of wider interests. 
This, it seems to me, is rather a strange conclusion for Hollis 
to draw given the statements he made in the last chapter of 
Models of Man. In this he stresses the importance of context 
which he argues enables and constrains the individual actor - 
setting him problems. Hollis, in fact, argues that for a 
single actor institutions are usually given, being stores of po 
wer and stocks of reasons for action. He can count on being 
helped or hindered depending on what he decides to do, and this 
fact is a reason which influences his decision. He goes on to 
say that institutions are more than the results, foreseen and 
unforeseen, of individual negotiations. A theory of emergence 
is needed. 
(401) 
However, having stated this, Hollis in The Cunning of Reason 
seems to fail to consider category (iii) factors at all. 
Where, I would argue, in the idea of role-related interests, is 
an acceptance of the effects of emergent properties which exist 
outside the negotiation of individuals in the creation of 
roles? Where, in other words, are the wider interests that can 
serve to modify or constrain the roles the actor can undertake? 
If, though, we dispense with many of the claims made by 
methodological individualism and accept emergence, we can 
explain how interests are distributed and allocated not on the 
basis of 'chance' but in relation to a range of external 
category (iii) reasons which have nothing to do with roles. 
This, then, enables us to overcome the problem faced by Hollis 
in his being unable to account for why - for what reasons - 
agents adopt one role rather than another. 
What I want to emphasise is that Hollis, by trading only in 
category (ii) reasons, produces a rather limited account of 
action-explanation in terms of reasons. This is particularly 
apparent in his analysis of roles and seems rather at odds with 
his contention that emergent properties exist and serve to 
influence actions. If, though, we accept that factors exist 
outside the individual and that agents take these into account 
in deciding to act in one way rather than another, accepting 
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that the agent subjectively weighs up the costs involved in 
being influenced by these factors, we are able to include in 
our account the possibility of category 
(iii) emergent or 
external reasons modifying actions without resorting to any 
kind of determinism. 
Finally, I feel that Hollis is mistaken to reject the idea of 
internal (category (i)) reasons as possible explanations of 
action. Whilst I agree that methodological 
individualists are 
wrong to argue that all action should be explained in terms of 
'current desires', this need not mean that we should not allow 
for the possibility that agents act for reasons which are not 
appropriated from the beliefs, values, ideas, and so on, which 
are current in the society of which they are members. It seems 
to me that the neo-Humean/neo-Kantian debate needs to be 
reconsidered in the light of the 
idea that reasons for actions 
may be formed on the basis of my three categories. Why make 
the debate in terms of internal versus external reasons 
(remembering, in fact, that the external reasons advocated by 
Hollis are really appropriated reasons)? Why reject one type 
of reason and only accept the other? This should not be a 
'battle' of an 'either/or' type. What we should be examining 
is the factors that may explain why agents act as they do which 
could be internal, appropriated or external 
(or a combination 
(403) 
of two or all of them). We do not, in other words, need to 
reject one 'type' of reason just 
because we accept that other 
'types' may also be included in the explanation of action. 
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SUMMARY TO PART FOUR 
The fundamental aim of examining various methodological 
approaches to the analysis of human action was to try and 
demonstrate hov explaining action in terms of more than one 
'type' of reason provides a more adequate account of vhy agents 
act as they do. Thus, I have argued that within action 
explanations we should allow for the possibility that reasons 
may be internal (category (i)), appropriated (category (ii)) or 
external (category (iii)), or a combination of any of these. 
What I have suggested is that the theories studied in this 
section restrict their analyses to only one of these categories 
and thus are unable to account, in many cases, for the 
multiplicity of factors that can be seen to influence action. 
Indeed, I would maintain that they cannot explain some actions 
at all. Let us then reiterate where, in my opinion, the 
aforementioned writers have excluded important factors which 
can serve to explain actions. This I shall do in terms of the 
three categories of reason formation. Moreover, I also want to 
stress that by appreciating that reasons are not only 'purely' 
internal or external, but can be appropriated; and by showing 
(a) that external reasons are not as deterministic as 
positivists seen to imply and (b) that internal reasons do not 
need to be perceived as the product of desires alone, we can 
overcome the either/or situation which has characterised the 
internalist/externalist debate. 
(406) 
Internal (Category (i)) Reasons 
One of the basic problems with the holist argument, as 
exemplified by Durkheim, was that he failed to take account at 
all of the possibility that individuals  ay have reasons for 
their actions which are not the product of social forces at 
all. In excluding the idea of internal reasons for action, 
therefore, Durkheim was unable to explain such concepts as 
'revelation' or to understand why, for example, some agents 
adopt religious beliefs which are not propounded in the society 
of which they are members. Why, in other words, do these 
agents come to hold these beliefs, and act in accordance with 
them, if the only explanation of religion lies in the 
influence, indeed determination, of societal forces? If, 
though, we accept the idea that agents may act in terms of 
reasons that are 'internal' to them (remembering that these 
beliefs need not be 'original' to be internal) then these 
'gaps' in explanation can be closed. 
In complete contrast to Durkheim, however, methodological 
individualists want to restrict all action explanations to 
category (i) reasons - indeed, to the 
'current desires' of the 
agents in question. Again, this is problematic since it is not 
plausible to account for all reasons for action in terms of 
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desires, since beliefs can and do modify or change our desires. 
Thus, I agree with Hollis to the extent that we must take 
account of the effect of external factors on the formation of 
reasons. 
Where I think Hollis is mistaken, is to totally reject the idea 
that internal reasons can be posited as one possible 
explanation of action. It is my contention that Hollis, in his 
perfectly correct criticism of methodological individualism, 
'falls into the trap' created by the internalist versus 
externalist argument that if you accept one category of reasons 
you have to reject the other type. There is nothing in the 
acceptance of external reasons that precludes the possibility 
that the actor may have been acting on the basis of internal 
reasons. Nor, incidentally, is there, in the idea of internal 
reasons, any necessity to restrict these to 'current desires'. 
Reasons, whether internal or external, are premised on desires 
and beliefs - the beliefs too, though, can be internal to the 
agent. 
Appropriated (Category (ii)) Reasons 
While I am not denying that Durkheim appeared to be referring 
to something like appropriated reasons for action when he 
talked of agents internalising beliefs that derived from their 
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culture or society, it his idea of obligation that removes any 
notion of a subjective aspect to this type of, reason formation. 
Durkheim seems to be implying that agents internalise beliefs 
because they are 'obliged' by the society of which they are 
members to do so. Such reasons, therefore, emerge not as 
category (ii) but as types of category 
(iii) reasons, and a 
rather 'strange' type of category 
(iii) reason at that since in 
my perception of external reasons no process of internalisation 
occurs. I would maintain, in contrast to Durkheim, that 
appropriated reasons are internalised 
because the agent 
perceives them to be somehow 
'right' and they function to meet 
some desires or wants that the agent may 
have. We cannot, it 
seems to me, ever argue that society can force someone to 
believe in anything - the agent must find (or be induced to 
find in cases of extreme ideological manipulation) something 
positive in the belief in order to 
internalise it and act in 
accordance with it. 
Methodological individualists of the rational actor model do 
not seem to allow for the 
fact that the desires of an agent can 
be modified or changed by external 
factors at all, albeit 
factors that have been internalised from outside factors. 
Desires, in this view are everything and beliefs (which may be 
appropriated) play no part in the explanation. Yet, there is 
nothing in the idea of category 
(ii) reasons which prevents the 
(409) 
agent from playing a very active role in deciding what or what 
not to believe in; in formulating their own reasons for their 
own actions. The agent has good reasons for internalising 
these beliefs which are not enforced on him or her, but which 
can be explained not only in terms of the current desires of 
the agent, but in terms of the beliefs, values and ideas that 
the agent has appropriated from an outside source. 
It is in the idea of appropriated reasons that Hollis, in  y 
view, puts forward a most convincing argument, especially in 
his idea of role-related action. Here we see the agent being 
influenced by factors that are external to him or her, but 
still having considerable lee-way in decisions concerning how 
that role is to be performed. External factors, then, are not 
determining the actions of the agent, but they are influencing 
how an agent acts in accordance with the role. Agents, in 
other words, internalise the beliefs, values, ideas, and so on 
that come with the role because they perceive them as 'right' 
and necessary if they are to carry out that role. What is 
missing, however, is any consideration, as I will argue 
subsequently, of the presence of category 
(iii) reasons which 
could explain why roles are adopted in the first place and why 
they can change. 
(410) 
External (Category (iii)) Reasons 
As I have already indicated, Durkheim appears to only consider 
external reasons in his analysis of action. While I totally 
agree that the actions of agents may be influenced by external 
constraints or enablements which exist outside them and which 
they may not perceive as somehow 'right' and they thus do not 
incorporate them into their belief-systems, this does not mean 
that such reasons determine the actions of these individuals as 
Durkheim implies. It is up to the agent, based on his or her 
weighing up of the 'opportunity costs' involved whether to be 
constrained (or enabled) by these external reasons. There is, 
in other words, no need to exclude the agent even if we are 
talking in terms of category (iii) reasons. Thus, in Durkheim, 
category (iii) external factors lose all their subjective 
content, and we could even argue that, through this 
determinism, they cease to be the reasons of the agent at all - 
they are merely structural constraints. 
The rational choice explanation of action, as we have seen, 
does not take account of external reasons at all. This, 
therefore, excludes any analysis of reasons, other than the 
agents' internal reasons, from action explanations which is not 
only restrictive but mistaken. Again, we have the problem that 
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is associated with the internalist/externalist debate that if 
you can show that some actions result from reasons that are of 
one type, you necessarily have to reject reasons of other 
types. This, I would argue, is a false conclusion to draw and 
a limitation that can be overcome by assessing actions in terms 
of my three categories. 
Hollis, while arguing for the presence of external reasons also 
fails to consider category (iii) type external reasons at all. 
In his arguments, in 'The Cunning of Reason' he only refers to 
category (ii) internalised reasons. It is for this reason that 
he is unable to account for why agents adopt roles in the first 
place. He does not seem to appreciate the importance of 
constraints and enablements, derived from external reasons, 
which can serve to limit or provide for the range of choices 
available to the actor in taking on one role rather than 
another. Whilst I appreciate that Hollis wants to avoid the 
idea that the agent does not play an active role in deciding 
how he or she will act, there is nothing in the idea of 
category (iii) reasons which negates the idea of agency. We do 
not need to have the agent 
'internalising' an external factor 
to restore the notion of decision-making to the explanation of 
action in terms of the weighing up of the costs involved. 
(412) 
Subjective and Objective Reasons for Action 
It is my contention, therefore, that we should not restrict our 
analysis of human action to any one type of reason. We should 
not assume, from the outset, that agents only act according to 
one category of reason-formation. If we do this, then we will 
only obtain a partial 
(or, indeed a mistaken) account of why 
agents act as they do. Rather than talking only in terms of 
category (iii) reasons as does Durkheim; or in terms of 
category (ii) reasons as Hollis seems to do; or even just in 
terms of category (i) reasons as in the case of rational choice 
theorists: we should approach the methodology of the social 
sciences from another perspective. We should begin with the 
agents own reasons for their actions, but investigate how these 
reasons are formed on the basis of the three categories I have 
outlined above. We must not, in other words, presume from the 
outset (that is, how reasons are formed and how they affect 
actions) what we are in fact trying to explain. 
CONCLUSION 
EXPLANATION OR UNDERSTANDING - THE SECOND DICHOTOMY 
Introduction 
Throughout this thesis I have emphasised what I perceive to be 
a false dichotomy between internal and external reasons. 
However, the debate surrounding this issue has revealed 
another dichotomy that can be questioned, namely, that between 
explanation and understanding. More precisely, that we have in 
social theory two traditions which 
depend on two very different 
methodologies; prediction and explanation, on one side, versus 
understanding, on the other. In a rather simplified form this 
can be re-phrased as the opposition between positivism and 
hermeneutics as illustrated in the diagram below: - 
Positivism Hermeneutics 
Prediction Interpretation of 
reasons 
Explanation Understanding 
While i would not disagree that there is a divide between 
positivism and the type of social theory I am advocating - that 
is, a theory based on the need to account for action in terms 
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of the agents' reasons; I am going to suggest that the divide 
is not between (i) prediction and explanation, on the one hand, 
and (ii) understanding on the other. Rather it is between (i) 
prediction and (ii) explanation and understanding. Why, I am 
going to ask, do we have to exclude the possibility of being 
able to 'explain' actions if we advocate a methodological 
approach which begins with an analysis of 'understanding' the 
reasons the agents have for their actions. Explanation and 
understanding, I am going to suggest, are not mutually 
exclusive. 
The Dichotomy 'Writ Large' 
The title of the book, by Hollis and Smith, Explaining and 
Understanding International Relations perhaps, more accurately, 
should be 'Explaining or Understanding ...... ', since in it 
they claim that the social sciences thrive on two intellectual 
traditions. One story is an 'outsider's' told in the manner of 
the natural scientist seeking to explain the workings of nature 
and treating the human realm as part of nature. The other is 
an insider's, told as to make us understand what the events 
mean, in a sense distinct from any meaning found in unearthing 
the laws of nature. What, you may ask, is wrong with this? 
After all, I too have made the 
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distinction between positivism and interpretative sociology. 
Their mistake, it seems to me, is to claim that 'explaining' is 
the key tern in one approach, 'understanding' in the other. (1) 
While neither of these two authors advocate extreme 
individualism or extreme holism, they do argue that: (i) the 
'insider' approach is concerned with establishing what the 
unfolding events mean to the principal actors concerned by 
reporting their statements, analysing their actions and re- 
creating their thoughts so as to convey the reasons which 
account for why each step was taken rather than any other; 
while (ii) the 
'outsider' approach is modelled on the methods 
of the natural sciences and is usually described as a search 
for causes. (2) 
The diagram below clearly illustrates their argument: - 
Explanation 
Holism 
Understanding 
tYl 
Individualism 
(416) 
In this the holism/individualism range is represented on the 
vertical axis and the explanation/understanding contrast on the 
horizontal axis, with the actors in their social capacities 
located on the dividing line, where we can say structure meets 
action. (3) 
The crucial contrast between 'X' and 'Y', according to Hollis 
and Smith, lies in the stuff of their social worlds. For 
'X' 
the social world is an environment, independent and to some 
extent predictable. For 
'Y' it is a construction consisting of 
rules and meanings. The contrast 
brings with it different 
theories of social action and how to study 
it. There are, in 
fact, two stories to tell - one seeks to explain, the other to 
understand. While, they argue, 
it is appealing to believe that 
bits of the two stories can be added together, they maintain 
that there are always two stories to be told and combinations 
do not solve the problem. (4) 
There are two fundamental arguments I want to put forward, in 
response to these claims. Firstly, that while there may be 
two stories to be told, one positivistic and one hermeneutic; 
Hollis and Smith are mistaken about the 
'plots' of the two 
stories. Instead of seeing 
the first as concerned with 
'explanation' it should be perceived as involving 'prediction', 
while the second story is about 
both understanding and 
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explanation. Secondly, I would dispute the idea that we are 
unable to both understand reasons for action and explain action 
within a single methodological approach. 
The Positivist Story 
One problem with many accounts of action couched in 
positivistic terms is the acceptance, as I have previously 
argued, of a Humean account of causality. That is to say that 
'A' is the cause of 'B' is to say that the temporal succession 
of 'A' and 'B' is an instance of a generalisation to the effect 
that events like 'A' are always followed by events like W. 
If, then, we maintain that the relationship between reason and 
action is causal in this sense, then we are claiming that human 
action is 'predictable' in the same way as behaviour of 
phenomena in the natural world. 
It is this idea of the possibility of prediction in the social 
sciences which, it seems to me, provides the plot of one 
'story' of social action. As we have seen, however, it is one 
that is rejected, rightly, by many social theorists. As 
writers such as Davidson and Hollis suggest, generalisations 
connecting reasons to actions cannot be made into the type of 
laws upon which accurate predictions about human action can be 
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made. People do not always act the same way given the same 
situation. This, however, does not mean that causality needs 
to be excluded from the social sciences as Winch argued. 
Rather, as Bhaskar maintained, we should see causes as 
'tendencies' both in the natural and the social sciences. In 
this it is claimed that the possession of a reason, conceived 
as a more or less long-standing disposition or orientation to 
act in a certain way, can be a cause; and that if we conceive 
of reasons in this way they are clearly distinct from actions 
because they can be possessed even when unexercised and will 
only be exercised under specific conditions. 
In this view, therefore, we cannot predict action in any 
positivistic way since reasons can only be analysed as 
'tendencies' and like all tendencies, they are defeasible in 
special circumstances or under the pressure of counterveiling 
reasons. However, we can explain actions in terms of reasons 
without needing reference to predictive laws. In other words, 
we do not need the positivist story which tells us that we need 
to be able to predict in order to explain. The 'explanation' 
of the action is provided by the 
'reasons' the agent had for 
his or her action. We can explain by providing the 'because' 
in 'he or she acted thus because they had this or that 
reason(s)'. 
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The Hermeneutic Story 
The other story, according to Hollis and Smith involves 
'understanding'. The methodological claim here is that in any 
analysis of action we need to discover the agents' reasons or 
motives for acting in one way rather than another. The problem 
with this 'story' in its extreme form (that is, the type of 
methodological individualism advocated, for example, by 
rational choice theorists) is that it takes no account of the 
influence of 'external factors' on the formation of reasons. 
It goes to the opposite extreme of Durkheim's holistic approach 
which relies exclusively on the determining nature of 'social 
facts', by rejecting altogether what I term category (iii) 
external reasons. As I have previously argued, however, there 
is nothing in the idea that we should begin our analysis of 
action by discovering the agents' reasons that implies that we 
should restrict our account to the 
'internal' reasons of the 
agent. All this has been covered in some detail. The point is, 
that 'understanding' does not only involve understanding the 
agents' internal beliefs and desires, it also entails an 
understanding of the external conditions in which the agents 
find themselves. Understanding the agents desires or beliefs 
may not always explain their actions. A person may possess a 
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reason to act based on their internal desires and beliefs but 
not act that way because of their reaction and responses to 
external factors. 
What I also want to emphasise here is the inadequacy of 
'understanding' without 'explanation'. Again, we return to the 
idea of reasons as causes. As Bhaskar points out, if we do not 
see reasons as causes then reasons are seen as not affecting 
the sequence of events that actually occur. They 'hover above' 
and unconnected to whatever it is that actually happens. There 
is, in other words, little sense in trying to understand 
reasons unless they also explain the action. The very 
distinction between 'things that we do' and 'things that just 
happen to us' becomes impossible to sustain because it is only 
if we are the 'cause' of some but not other bodily movements 
that such a contrast can be made and that we can properly be 
said to act at all. What is the point, in other words, of 
'understanding' the agents' reasons (however they are formed) 
unless we accept that these reasons provide the 
'explanation' 
for these agents' action. The second story, therefore, is not 
about 'understanding' alone. It 
is about 'understanding' the 
reasons agents have for their actions and about 
'explaining' 
these actions in terms of these reasons. 
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The Explanation/Understanding Debate 
Hollis and Smith conclude their book by entering into a debate 
concerning the relative merits of methods that proceed on the 
basis of 'understanding' or on the basis of 'explaining'. (5) 
What becomes clear in this is their determination to draw a 
sharp distinction between the two. This is very apparent in 
Smith's contention that although he believes in the existence 
of structures as providing the best explanation of social life, 
this does not mean that he is committed to seeing them as fully 
'determining' or as 'timeless'. So far so good. But he goes 
on to say that, at the end of the day, he and Hollis have two 
very different views of social action. Smith maintains that 
his fits broadly within the 'Explaining' mode, Hollis' within 
the 'Understanding' mode. These different views, he argues, 
entail fundamentally different distinct 
(and mutually 
exclusive) views of the individual and of the social world. (6) 
The question is whether this is really a conclusion we need to 
draw? 
I have already argued that the contrast between explanation and 
understanding illustrated by the vertical axis on Smith and 
Hollis' diagram is misconceived. What I also want to maintain 
is that the horizontal axis showing the holism/individualism 
(422) 
range is far too extreme. If, however, we add a third 
dimension - that of methodological collectivism, then we can 
avoid the problems associated with the type of two-dimensional 
model that Smith and Hollis seem to be advocating. 
As I have tried to argue throughout this thesis, we do not need 
to perceive the understanding and explanation of action in 
terms of either the constraining or facilitating aspect of 
social structures or the internal reasons agents have for their 
actions. The type of collectivism I am advocating allows for 
both aspects and does not see them as 'polarities' - as two 
different 'kinds' of explanation. Rather, it maintains that 
'emergent factors' exist and do influence actions in the sense 
that they may place obstacles in the way of the agent to 
perform an action which is desired by that agent or by 
providing the agent with no obstacles to their desired action. 
This, though, does not imply any form of holism whereby the 
agent is 'determined' by social factors. The agent faces these 
external factors as 'real', as having an existence which is 
outside his or her internal beliefs and desires, but the agent 
still has a 'choice' whether or not to be influenced by these 
factors. 
(423) 
Let us take the analogy used by Smith and Hollis. Hollis 
claims that enablements and constraints are initially like a 
hand of cards one is dealt. But in social life not all the 
enablements or constraints are fully specified in advance of 
play. How the game turns out depends on how well one plays the 
hand. Smith responds to this by saying that the analogy can be 
taken two ways. Hollis' conception, he argues, means that the 
way one plays the hand determines, in part, the outcome. 
However, Smith wants to maintain that his reading is simply 
that an awful lot of people get dealt very poor cards, hands so 
bad that no matter what their skill they cannot do much to 
improve their lot. Talking about 'skill', he maintains, places 
responsibility on individuals for changing their lot, whereas 
in reality they cannot do so. (7) 
These two views, for Smith, are radically different and 
illustrate two opposing views of the relationship between the 
agent and the social structure. However, I would contend that 
the basic argument behind both interpretations is the same. 
That is, that agents are born into particular social situations 
which provide the objective conditions that help 'form' their 
reasons for their actions; but, also, that agents are capable 
of mating 'subjective' decisions in the light of the situations 
in which they find themselves on the basis of the 'weighing up 
(424) 
of the costs' involved. If we accept that agents make 
decisions in terms of the 'opportunity costs' they may have to 
pay in order to act or not act in certain ways; and, taking 
Smith's point, that for some the costs may be higher than for 
others; this allows us to accept both the influence of external 
conditions 
the 'game' 
on agents' actions and the agents' participation in 
(Hollis' words, not mine) that they are playing. 
This places a new light on Smith's next comment. He concedes 
that there is a tempting compromise for both of them to accept 
that individuals have some room for manoeuvre but are also 
constrained, and that they differ 'only' about the degree of 
latitude individuals have. That is, that individuals are 
subject to external influences but can still use skill and 
judgement to make actual choices. Smith insists, however, that 
such a combination of views is not possible since one sees 
'Understanding' as the key to analysis, while the other sees no 
need to resort to 'Understanding' as a necessary constituent of 
analysis, preferring instead the analysis of 'Explaining'. The 
implication of this is that, in all discussions of social life, 
there are always and inevitably two stories to be told - one 
that concentrates on 'Understanding' the other that 
concentrates on 'Explaining'. (8) Also, presumably, one that 
is primarily individualistic and one that is more holist in 
orientation. 
(425) 
I hope, however, to have demonstrated, firstly: (i) that 
explanation and understanding are not mutually exclusive 
elements in the analysis of social action, but necessary 
components of it; and 
(ii) that while there may be two stories 
to be told the dichotomy is not between explanation or 
understanding, but between prediction or explanation and 
understanding. The diagram outlined earlier, therefore, should 
be revised as illustrated below. 
Positivism Theory of Action 
Humean notion of cause Interpretation of 
reasons and causes as 
tendencies 
-40 
1 
Prediction Explanation and 
Understanding 
In the second place, I hope to have shown that the other 
dichotomy between externalist and internalist accounts of 
action is also inadequate. That the 
'compromise' Smith refers 
to (that is, that agents are subject to external influences, 
but are still able to use their ow skill and judgement in 
making choices) is not a compromise at all. Rather, it is a 
(426) 
realistic assessment of what actually occurs in the world. We 
do not, in other words, need to place the actors in their 
social capacities on some indeterminate dividing line between 
'holism' and 'individualism' (9), rather we can accept that 
'reasons for actions' may be formed on the basis of both the 
internal desires and beliefs of the agent and the influence of 
external factors on how these reasons are formed. 
NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION 
(1) Hollis, M. and Smith, S: Explaining and Understanding 
International Relations, 1990, p. 1. 
(2) Ibid. pp. 3&4. 
(3) Ibid. pp. 4&5. 
(4) Ibid. pp. 6&7. 
(5) Ibid. chapter 9. 
(6) Ibid. p. 210. 
(7) Ibid. pp. 209 & 210. 
8) Ibid. pp. 210 & 211. 
(9) Ibid. p. 5. 
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